



Studies in Jaina Philosophy - by Nathmal Tatia with a Foreword by MM Gopinath Kaviraj. Banaras, 1951.

Centre for the Arts

BRIDGESTONE



Michael Schumacher takes a break during a training session in Jerez, Spain on Sunday.

decent chance of both. The R25 looks impressive so far while Fisichella and Alonso are both very quick. Could be the year when Fisichella in particular steps into the limelight.

WILLIAMS: Mark Webber (Australia), Nick

of being able to run a third car in Friday practice. **SAUBER:** Jacques Villeneuve (Canada), Felipe Massa (Brazil). Still with Ferrari engines but now on Michelin tyres after switching from Bridgestone. That should make the Swiss team

peckish for a podium. Director Mike Gascoyne should help them to secure a first podium; maybe not until the second half of the year.

FIA said it believed the cars would not meet new technical regulations for this season and would not pass scrutinising to allow them to race.

However Stoddart, an Australian based in England, said any attempt to prevent them racing would be protested, possibly in court in Australia's Victoria state, thereby allowing the team to take part before the case was heard.

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
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STUDIES IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY

BY
NATHMAL TATIA
M.A., D.Litt. (Cal.)



The following pages embody the results of a wide and systematic study in the field of Jaina philosophy, and deal with certain basic problems of the system. These problems which relate to *Jñāna*, *Ajñāna*, *Karman*, and *Yoga* have a universal bearing and though an attempt has been made to examine each of them and to determine its value from a particular point of view it is bound to be of special interest to every earnest student of Indian philosophy. There is ample evidence to show not merely that the author's studies have been wide and varied, but also—and this is very important—that his interpretation is faithful and illuminating. To this rare combination he has added another commendable quality, *viz.* lucidity of presentation.
—From the Foreword.


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
WITH A FOREWORD BY
MAHĀMAHOPĀDHYĀYA GOPINATH KAVIRAJ

M.A., D.Litt., Late Principal, Government
Sanskrit College, Banaras



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
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
TO MY GURUS
PANDIT SUKHLALJI SANGHAVI
AND
PROFESSOR SATKARI MOOKERJEE
THIS HUMBLE WORK
IS RESPECTFULLY
DEDICATED



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यदत्र सौष्ठवं किञ्चित्दगुवोरेव मे न हि ।
यदत्रासौष्ठवं किञ्चित्तन्ममैव तयोर्न हि ॥

Whatever merit the book may possess belongs exclusively to my gurus and not to myself. Whatever defects there may be in it belong entirely to myself and not to them at all.



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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

Sheth Bholabhai J. Dalal and Sheth Premchand K. Kotawala, the Trustees of the P. K. Kotawala Trust, Bombay, offered to the Society a monthly grant of Rs. 200/- for six years from June, 1945. The Executive Committee of the Society gladly accepted the liberal offer and decided to found the Kotawala Research Fellowship. In the beginning, as no qualified scholar was available, the amount was spent for the students of Jaina philosophy at the Banaras Hindu University. But in the last quarter of 1946, Śrī Nathmal Tatia, M.A., was appointed Kotawala Research Fellow for research in Jaina philosophy. He prepared his thesis *Some Fundamental Problems of Jaina Philosophy* (now entitled *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*) and submitted it to the University of Calcutta for the degree of Doctor of Literature. It is a matter of gratification and pride for us that he has been admitted to the D.Litt. degree by the University of Calcutta. We feel proud to observe that the Society fulfils one of its objectives by publishing the work of Dr Tatia, which sets up a landmark in the field of Jainalogical research.

The scope of the literature produced by the Jaina masters is unlimited. They left no subject worth the name untouched. From the time of the Āgamas up to the time of Yaśovijaya, it had been the universal custom with the Jaina authors that they should make their own contribution to every possible branch of knowledge. The huge literature known as 'Jaina Literature' is so called only because its authors happened to be Jainas. And the Jaina community regard it to be their own only on account of its having been composed by their ancestors. In fact, however, it is nothing but a continuation and expansion of Indian literature as such and intended to promote the well-being of entire mankind. Without this literature, the treasure of India's literary heritage is bound to remain incomplete and truncated. It has been unanimously admitted by the students of Jainalogy that numerous problems of India's history and culture would remain unsolved in the absence of the study of this so-called 'Jaina Literature.' And in their opinion the confusion prevailing over a number of historical and cultural issues can be cleared up with the help of the light afforded by this branch. It has, however, to be admitted with regret that the output of systematic research work on Jaina religion, philosophy and culture has been very meagre. The scientific exploitation of this vast literature is even now only in its initial stage. It is a work to be done by not one or two isolated scholars but a task to be performed by a continuous stream of scholars who will dedicate their whole time and energy for the purpose. The result will be the production of a larger number of works of which the present work is a sample and specimen. This work has been adjudged by the highest authorities as a meritorious contribution and I am sure that the field of research on Jainalogy is so wide that it can give scope for such first-rate researches which can become legitimately the subject of at least a score of D.Litt. theses. The present work, however, sets an

example of assiduous study and analysis of the basic problems, the treatment of which was attempted before only in a scrappy and haphazard fashion. It is hoped that the future research workers will follow the standard set up by the author and apply themselves to the intensive study of individual authors and also of individual problems and thus bring up the results of Jainological researches to the same level as has been attained in the field of Vedānta or Nyāya for instance.

It will be dereliction of duty on my part if I do not give an account of the background against which the author had to carry on his researches. There was no such systematic exposition of the metaphysical and epistemological problems of Jaina philosophy, either in English or in Hindi. Of course, the learned and luminous Introductions of Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghavi contain, among many things, the expositions of many a problem of Jaina thought. But nobody else has utilized these accounts in a systematic way and put them in their historical setting. Dr Tatia has not only made full use of these materials but has succeeded in supplying the connecting links from a study of other systems of Indian philosophy, and this makes his work fully representative of the evolution of thought that took place in the adolescent and fruitful period of Indian speculation. This has been made possible by profound penetration into the inner meaning of the philosophical solutions of problems. His work is the outcome of extraordinary industry and broad philosophical outlook, intense reflection and critical appreciation of the fine shades of difference in the approaches of the various schools to the fundamental problems of philosophy.

His treatment of *avidyā* is by itself an independent contribution. It shows his wide study and deep penetration. It can be claimed that he has not allowed himself to be influenced by sectarian or communal considerations in his appraisal of the logical values of the arguments employed by different schools. His criticism of the Vedāntic and the Buddhist conceptions of *avidyā*, for instance, is not stereotyped in character, but distinctly original. The student of Indian philosophy, who will compare the author's exposition with that found in the original texts, will be surprised to find that such abundant light has been shed upon the cryptic texts. His exposition is not philological but philosophical and it will evoke the spontaneous admiration of unbiased votaries of truth that the Jaina philosophers have succeeded in defending themselves against the overwhelming onslaughts of the idealists. It is not only an exposition of the old stand but a new vindication which will strike a student of comparative philosophy with a thrill of surprise for the originality of approach and unperturbed equanimity of philosophical temper. Fortunately the author has not succumbed to the temptation of repeating the vitriolic attacks and vituperations of the mediaeval age. His arguments in defence and criticism of the rival positions are characterized by soberness of temper and expression and detached evaluation which are the outcome of modern culture at its best.

It is an ardent desire of the Society that not one or two scholars like Dr Tatia but a number of scholars should co-operate with it and prove that this field of research is not unworthy and barren. This

can be possible only if the wealthy people also co-operate with us. We cherish the hope that the present publication will draw the attention of the rich. We have ventured to undertake the publication of such a big work, even though the funds of the Society are so scanty, with the hope that public attention would be drawn to the quality of work that is being done by the Society. We consider it a duty to acknowledge our thankfulness to Sheth Bholabhai J. Dalal and Sheth Premchand K. Kotawala, the Trustees of the Kotawala Trust for their liberal encouragement in this respect. As regards the author he regards the Society as his own and has written the work as a part of his duty. We wish that the work receives appreciation of scholars and proves an incentive to the author for the writing of similar valuable works in future.

In conclusion, I place on record, on behalf of the Society, our thankfulness to Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr Gopinath Kaviraj for the illuminating Foreword he has written for this book in spite of the multifarious calls on his valuable time.

DALSUKH MALVANIYA,
Secretary,
Jain Cultural Research Society.

BANARAS 5
25 October 1951



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FOREWORD

by *Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr Gopinath Kaviraj*

The following pages embody the results of a wide and systematic study in the field of Jaina philosophy, and deal with certain basic problems of the system. These problems which relate to *Jñāna*, *Ajñāna*, *Karman*, and *Yoga* have a universal bearing and though an attempt has been made to examine each of them and to determine its value from a particular point of view it is bound to be of special interest to every earnest student of Indian philosophy. As the writer has undertaken to interpret the Jaina viewpoint, it is but natural that he should have approached his subject from this standpoint.

The work begins with a brief enunciation of the general philosophical attitude of Brāhmaṇism, as revealed in the earlier Upaniṣads, described as chiefly monistic, and is followed by a comparison with the Buddhist approach which is rationalistic and the Jaina attitude which is non-absolutistic.

With this preliminary statement as a preamble the work proceeds to discuss at length each of the four problems mentioned above on the basis of ancient Jaina traditions recorded in works considered as possessed of undisputed authority. There is ample evidence to show not merely that the author's studies have been wide and varied, but also—and this is very important—that his interpretation is faithful and illuminating. To this rare combination he has added another commendable quality, *viz.* lucidity of presentation.

His criticisms of some of the doctrines of the rival schools may not be acceptable to the exponents of those schools. But they have a distinct value of their own. It is an established convention that the exponent of a particular line of thought considers it a part of his duty not only to interpret it in its own light and judge it on its own merits but also to bring it into comparison or contrast with other lines of similar thought. In such cases the defence of one line leads usually to the condemnation of the rest. But such condemnation is not necessarily a *condemnation* if the ultimate postulates of those lines are taken into consideration.

The Jaina theory of knowledge has been dealt with in the chapter on Jaina epistemology. It is based on the Āgamas and had, like the doctrine of *Karman*, probably its origin in the wisdom of the ancient seers. The fivefold division of knowledge is very old. Knowledge is an essential attribute of the soul, but its rightness or wrongness

depends on the attitude. What is usually known as *avidyā* implies in fact only a perversion (*mithyātva*) of the attitude on account of which the purity of knowledge is vitiated. *Upayoga* or Consciousness is called *jñāna* when it is determinate (*sākāra*) and *darśana* when it is indeterminate (*nirākāra*). These two qualities, like *vīrya* and *ānanda*, are unlimited and unobscured in the emancipated soul and are clouded by the karmic matter when the soul is in bondage. To a person in ordinary life no two acts of knowledge, in fact no two states of consciousness, are concurrent. Simultaneity, wherever it seems to appear, is erroneous, the error being due to various causes, incompetence of the apprehending faculty to cognize two successive acts together being responsible for the erroneous notion. But when the obscuring *karmans* veiling the omniscience of the soul are removed omniscience is bound to be manifest.

It is true. But the question is: Do *jñāna* and *darśana* occur in succession or simultaneously? The Āgamas are emphatic on the point that simultaneity of *jñāna* and *darśana* is not possible before the *ghāti-karmans* are destroyed. On this there is unanimity between the Digambara and the Śvetāmbara schools. But for a *kevalin* there is no succession of *jñāna* and *darśana* according to the Digambaras and also to a section of the Śvetāmbaras.

The question of the possibility of *krama* in omniscience is as old as it is universal and is also relevant in the context of epistemological problems. So far as normal knowledge is concerned *krama* is inevitable, as in each case a distinct contact between the self and the mind and between the mind and the sense-organ would be necessary according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or as every act of knowledge represents a distinct modification (*parināma*) in the mind stuff which is subject to constant flux according to Sāṅkhya-Yoga. But omniscience is a supernormal experience. Patañjali refers to *vivekaja-jñāna* which arises from a meditation on *kṣaṇa* and its sequence. It is described as saving knowledge (*tāraka-jñāna*) and is integral and all comprehending having for its object *All* in *all its aspects*. This knowledge is free from *krama* and corresponds in a sense to the *kevala-jñāna* of Jainism. It grasps in one sweep everything—past, present and future as well as near and remote. This is *prātibha-jñāna* or *pratibhā*.¹ The implication of *akrama* is that it is not an act in Time (*kāla*) but in the Moment which is beyond time.² It is said that the Buddha attained to Universal Vision in which he saw *all* things simultaneously as if reflected in a mirror.³ The *Tripurārahasya*⁴ refers to *Pratibhā*,

¹ Cf. *prātibhād vā sarvam*—YD, III. 33.

² Cf. *eka-kṣaṇopārūḍhaḥ sarvaiḥ sarvathā gṛhṇāti*—Bhāṣya, YD, III. 54.

³ *dadarśa nikhilam lokam ādarśa iva nirmale*—Buddhacarita, XIV. 8c-d.

⁴ *Jñānakhaṇḍa*, XX. 36. (Saraswati Bhavana Texts No. 15, 1933).

which being devoid of all limitations is called Supreme (*Parā*), as the Essence of the Deity. Utpalācārya, in his *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-kārikā*, states plainly that *Pratibhā* or Divinity is above all *krama* and yet holds within itself the entire *krama* of the universe associated with the action of the forces of space and time (*deśa-kāla-sakti*) projected by Divine Freedom. In other words, there is *krama* in outer appearances while there is no *krama* in the Inner Mirror of the Ineffable Light which reveals those appearances.¹ This is exactly what the Vaiyākaraṇas say in regard to the *Paśyanti Vāk* which is conceived as free from *krama* within, as One, and yet as holding within itself the forces of *krama* as well.² It is equated to *Parabrahman*, *Akṣara*, *Sabdarūpa*, *Parā Vāk* and *Ātman*.³ There is no use multiplying instances to show that the Supreme Omniscience is *akrama* and yet possesses within itself every form of *krama*.

The chapter on *avidyā*, consisting of fifteen sections, is devoted to a careful examination of the problem in all its implications and bearings. The views of other schools *viz.* Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Vedānta, Buddhism and Śaivism have been stated and refuted and the Jaina theory upholding *avidyā* as identical with triple perversity (*mithyātva*) has been finally confirmed. The Jaina view of *avidyā* implies erroneousness not in knowledge only, as usually conceived, but in attitude and conduct as well.

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Closely connected with the problem of *avidyā* is the question of *karman* which in Jaina literature, as elsewhere in Indian thought, occupies a position of great importance. A separate chapter in four sections is assigned to an elaborate discussion of this topic. The conception of *karman* as *dravya*, in addition to its character as *bhāva*, is unique in Jainism and has received a special treatment in its literature. It has parallels elsewhere indeed, but its importance in Jaina thought cannot be overrated. The conception of *āṇava-mala*⁴ in dualistic Śaivism as a covering substance, which obscures the inner divinity of the self and converts it as it were into a mundane soul subject to the exigencies of various limitations, bears a close resemblance to the Jaina view. It may be of interest to note that the other two *malas* of the Tāntric dualists would also in some way be partially covered by the Jaina concept of *karman*. It may be remembered that,

¹ yā cai 'ṣā pratibhā tattatpadārthakrama-rūṣitā
akramānanta-cidrūpah pramātā sa maheśvaraḥ.

—*Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vimarśinī*, with *Bhāskari*, p. 348. (Saraswati Bhavana Texts No. 70).

² Cf. *pratisainhṛtakramāpy antah saty apy abhede samāviṣṭakramāśaktih*
paśyanti—Sivadr̥ṣṭi, p. 39. (Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies No. LIV, 1934).

³ *Vide ibid.*, p. 39.

⁴ *Vide infra*, p. 138.

like the *kañcukas* of *Māyā* concealing the omniscience, omnipotence, ubiquity, eternity and blissfulness of the soul, the *karmans* in Jainism obscure the purity of the soul. The author has dwelt on the relation of *karman* with the soul, its classification, and its states and processes.

There is another point which deserves consideration. The Vedāntic *avidyā* has the dual power of obscuration (*āvaraṇa*) and projection (*vikṣepa*). The dawn of self-knowledge removes the former and in special cases—when some more qualifications are added—leads to *jīvanmukti*. The existence of the latter, which is described as *avidyā-leśa*, does not stand in the way of *jīvanmukti*. It is experience (*bhoga*) alone which is held to be capable of exhausting the strength of the latter. This is of course the usual course. The Jaina conception of the basic difference in *karman* as *ghātin* and *aghātin* brings out the above truth clearly. The *ghāti-karman* corresponds to the *āvaraṇa* aspect and the *aghātin* to the *vikṣepa* aspect of the Vedāntic *avidyā*. It is well known that the presence of *aghāti-karmans* is not inconsistent with the rise and function of *kevala-jñāna*, though it is true that in the final state of Beatitude or *Siddhi* even the *aghāti-karmans* which are pure in nature disappear, causing the disintegration of the physical organism itself. First the *kaṣāyas* disappear and then in due course the *yoga* (activity), which is followed by *Siddhi*.

The treatment of the problem of *karman*, like that of *avidyā*, is very elaborate, but it is not, I am afraid, thorough, if looked at from the standpoint of the subject. All the issues relevant to a proper appreciation of the subject have not been, and could not have been, touched. It is true that in a work on Jainism the writer was not in a position to discuss freely points raised in works on Buddhism, Tantras, Yoga Śāstra, and Purāṇas. But it is also true that these aspects of the problem might have been viewed and discussed in the interest of thoroughness from the standpoint of Jaina thought itself. The author, for instance, says nothing of vicarious *karman*, of transfer of *karman* and its laws, and of what has been somewhere described as equilibration of *karman* (*karma-sāmya*). The nature of *vipāka*, its time and its character as *niyata* or *aniyata* together with the laws of karmic fructification required clarification. A clearer statement of the relation between the *ghātin* and *aghātin* *karmans* would have been very useful to a proper philosophical appreciation of the theory.

We now come to the last chapter which contains some very interesting data on the basic principles of spiritual evolution. The Jaina view of *paramātman* in the role of World Teacher (*tīrthaṅkara*) is akin in some respects to the Sāṅkhya and Tāntric conceptions of *īśvara* and deserves to be studied in the same context. In each case it is the *human soul* which on complete purification from matter attains to

the level of divine perfection. The pertinent question which occurs in this connection is: Why of all the souls which are similarly gifted a particular soul, and not every one, attains to this phase of perfection. *Kaivalya* is open to all, whether one is *īśvara* and possessed of *vivekaja-jñāna* or otherwise.¹ So is *Siddhi* open to all, though the status of *īśvara* or *tīrthaṅkara* is reserved for a chosen few only. What the special qualifications of these few are and how they were originally acquired we do not know. The Jaina view seems to point to radical differences inherent in the souls in spite of their essential sameness of qualitative perfection. Apart from the basic difference due to *bhavyatā* in a soul there are other differences as well, which in fact tend to make each soul unique. The Christian and Mādhwā views, together with similar ideas in other schools including Buddhism, point to a similar outlook. In Sāṅkhya an attempt has been made to show that the path of *aiśvarya* at the beginning of a new cycle is consequent on *apara-vairāgya* minus *vivekaja-jñāna* in the earlier cycle, followed by a suspension of cosmic order in *pralaya*. This status of *īśvara* is that of *kāryeśvara*, there being no provision in Kapila's system for a Supreme Being endowed with Divinity from eternity. In the Tantras also *aiśvarya* ensues to a soul, which has purged itself from the shackles of *karman* and *māyā* but has not attained to sufficient maturity in *mala-pāka* so as to bring down Divine Grace upon it and transform it into an *īśvara*, in the ensuing cosmic cycle, which is possible only on the attainment of the requisite maturity. The author says rightly that the inward tendency exists in every soul, but it is not awakened in each or not awakened at the same time in all. It may be that in some it is not awakened at all. This explains the difference in the starting point of spiritual evolution which commences with the awakening of this tendency and terminates with the attainment of *Siddhi*. Thus while the *Siddhi* is open to all awakened souls the status of *tīrthaṅkara* or World Teacher is reserved for a select few only. There are certain souls in which the spiritual evolution never takes place—not in the present cycle, nor even in the future. The *yathāpravṛttakarana*, as explained, is a very interesting factor, which is conceived as an act of unconscious resolution (*adhyavasāya*) working within from the beginningless past or as a momentary act of self-purification manifested as *vairāgya*. The life history of a soul consists mainly of four stages: (1) the embryonic stage in the *nigoda*, (2) the awakening of the inward tendency synchronizing with *granthibheda*, (3) the beginning of spiritual evolution marked by numerous *guna-sthānas*, and (4) the perfection or *Siddhi*. Some souls do not come out into the evolutionary line at all, but those which come out are sure

¹ etasyām avasthāyām kaivalyam bhavatī "śvarasyā 'niśvarasya vā vivekajñāna-bhāgina itarasya vā—*Bhāṣya*, YD, III. 55.

sooner or later to arrive at perfection. They have, as the earlier Buddhists would say, entered into the stream (*srotas*) and are destined for final realization.

The section on *gunasthāna* is admirably written and contains a mass of valuable information from the source books on the way in which the process of spiritual regeneration sets in and continues. Interesting details are given which remind one of the mysteries involved (i) in the awakening of *kundalini* or in the act of conversion which transforms a mundane into a supra-mundane *citta* moving inwards to *Nirvāna* or (ii) in the *anugraha-śakti* which not only purges but also divinizes the soul. The process is analogous, from one point of view, to the process of the first reclaiming of a *prthagjana* into an *ārya*, and then of leading an *ārya* already in the stream, through gradual eradication of all the fetters that bind him down to the wheel of life, to a state of moral and spiritual freedom. From another point of view it is comparable to the process which generates a *bodhicitta* and leads it up from stage to stage till it realizes itself as a full grown Buddha. The process begins with right vision (*samyag-darśana*) in the soul as soon as the coating of relevant karmic matter is removed, at least for a short while, by means of the various *karaṇas*¹. Right vision follows on the removal of this veil. Once it is acquired it never leaves until perfection is completed. There may be lapses, but these are at most temporary and bound to disappear.

This shows that the elimination of *karman* or *avidyā* is followed by the rise of *jñāna*. Coats of matter must be removed if right vision is to emerge. Patañjali's conception of the relation between *kriyā-yoga* and *saṃādhiyoga* is relevant here. *Kriyāyoga* helps to attenuate the *karma*-seeds but not to destroy them. They are destroyed only by *prasāmkhyāna* which follows from *saṃādhi*, thus showing that *jñāna* alone either rising from *saṃādhi* or inspired from above effects the destruction of *avidyā* and the *granthibheda*. The belief expressed in the couplet:

*bhidyate hṛdayagrantiś chidyante sarvasaṃśayāḥ
kṣiyante cā'sya karmāṇi tasmin drṣṭe parāvare²*

is on the contrary to the effect that the vision comes first, either as a result of an act of Grace from above or of an act of intense self-effort from within and is followed by *granthibheda*, *saṃśayaccheda* and *karmakṣaya*, and not *vice versa*.

In the Tantras however we have a synthesis of the two apparently conflicting positions. The counterpart of karmic matter obscuring the soul is, as has been already observed, *āṇava-mala* or atomic coating

¹ *Vide infra*, p. 271.

² *MuUp*, II. 2. 8.

and the *Māyākañcukas* which obscure the divinity of the soul and limit omniscience, omnipotence etc. The basic coating has to be removed first before the true vision can arise. When the obscuring matter is mature Grace descends on the soul and by the application of *kriyā-sakti* in *dikṣā* the matter is removed. Thus spiritual ignorance disappears and spiritual knowledge follows. The rise of intellectual knowledge through practice of *sādhanas* and the removal of intellectual ignorance fall within these two limits.¹

The Foreword has become inordinately long and I do not wish to make further observations on other points or issues raised in the work. The author, as an exponent of Jaina philosophy, has done full justice to the subject and has given unmistakable evidence of a wide acquaintance with and of great labours in the field of early Jaina philosophical speculations. It is desired however that, in the interest of a more comprehensive treatment of the problems concerned from the general viewpoint, the author should compile another work where India's outlook on these problems may be clearly represented. We have had enough of analytical work attempting to describe the different systems in isolation, taking each as a distinct *prasthāna* and proceeding along its own line. But time, I believe, has come when scholars should come out from their narrow grooves, take up a synthetic view of things, and try to discover the underlying unity and interpret India's outlook as a whole. I invite the author, whom I consider to be competent enough, to undertake the work, to come forward as a pioneer in the field, and take upon himself the sacred task of interpreting the message of undivided ancient India to the outside world.

¹ *Vide infra*, pp. 143-4.

INTRODUCTION

Jainology is a vast subject or rather consists of a number of subjects each of which is immense in its extent and content. It is a matter of gratification that the canonical literature attracted the attention of scholars for the first time and authorized translations of some of the Āgamas in the *Sacred Books of the East Series* and outside have gone a long way in acquainting the academic world with the basic doctrines and principles of Jaina religion and ethics. The contributions of the later masters in the field of logic, epistemology and metaphysics are literally stupendous. In the field of logic and epistemology the English translation of Hemacandra's *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, a standard authoritative work on the subject, by my revered teacher Professor Dr Satkari Mookerjee, M.A., Ph.D., Asutosh Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Calcutta University, and my humble self is expected to enable a modern student of philosophy to have a dependable and fairly comprehensive knowledge of the contribution of the Jaina thinkers. As regards the philosophy of *Anekāntavāda*, it has received a thorough treatment and exposition in the work *The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism* of my revered teacher. The paper on *Anekāntavāda* by Professor K. C. Bhattacharya is an outstanding and illuminating exposition of the fundamental logical attitude of the Jaina philosophers. It was felt by me that a study of Jaina philosophical thought could not be perfect without a knowledge of its evolution from its ancient moorings in the Āgamas, a large number of which is happily still extant. In the present work I have addressed myself to this difficult task. I thought it imperative that a modern scholar should have a fair acquaintance with the spiritual and religious *milieu* in which Jainism is found to take its rise. It must be admitted that Jainism was not an exotic overgrowth on the soil. It arose in the midst of currents and cross-currents of spiritual and philosophical upheaval which characterized the times when Mahāvīra and Gautama Buddha strenuously engaged themselves in their missionary work. I did not dare to go further back beyond the Āgamas for want of documentary evidence, although it is claimed by the orthodox adherents of the Jaina faith that Mahāvīra only promulgated an ancient doctrine which had been preached by an unbroken succession of *tīrthaṅkaras* whose activities were spread over thousands and thousands of years before the last *tīrthaṅkara* made his advent.

In the first chapter I have tried to give an estimate of the distinctive trends of thought and attitude of the Vedic seers, the Buddha

and Mahāvīra. I have indicated that the later growth of Jaina philosophical thought in the fields of logic, epistemology, ethics and religion has been dominated and influenced by the peculiar philosophical outlook and attitude of Mahāvīra. Later writers, in their elaboration of the fundamental problems, have given evidence of their original thinking no doubt. But they have not made a departure from the fundamental tenets which gave Jaina thought their stamp of individuality.

I have shown how Mahāvīra's attitude towards experience, sensuous and supersensuous, which provides a sharp contrast with that of the Buddha, has been the prime source of Jaina epistemology which has been dealt with in the second chapter of this work. I have tried to be scrupulously faithful to the celebrated exponents of Jaina thought, and though my treatment is mainly historical in character I have not hesitated to give a critical evaluation on points whereupon the traditional doctors delivered conflicting and divergent views. A study of this chapter will, I hope, throw welcome light on the peculiar epistemology of perception of the Jaina school and will provide a student of the standard works of Jaina logic and epistemology with the necessary background to understand the tangled problem in a clear perspective.

In the third chapter I have dealt with the supreme problem of *avidyā* in the different schools of Indian thought and have shown how the Jaina conception of *avidyā* radically differs from that of other schools. I do not know of any systematic and comparative study of this fundamental problem by a predecessor. I have endeavoured my best to be thorough in my treatment and have shown with reference to the original data how the approach to the problem has deeply influenced the philosophical outlook and conclusions of the different schools. I may not be accused of vanity if I modestly claim originality for my treatment of *avidyā* in Yoga, Sāṅkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Śaiva schools. As regards the Buddhistic and the Vedāntic conceptions of *avidyā* I have given a dispassionate and faithful exposition of the treatment accorded to it by the original exponents without the slightest leaning to weaken their position. I have given as faithful and powerful an exposition of the views of the philosophers as could be expected from an orthodox adherent of these systems. I have shown how the Jaina philosophers have squarely and boldly faced the sledge-hammer blows of the idealistic philosophers and have given their own realistic interpretation of the data from which the idealistic conclusion was deduced. The Vedāntic conception of *avidyā* has been expounded by modern exponents more or less elaborately. But the Jaina criticism

of it with all its logical strength has not been dealt with by any previous writer so far as my knowledge goes. I have drawn upon original writings of the exponents of both the schools, particularly Sureśvara and Vidyānandi. I have not gone to the later writers such as Madhusūdana Sarasvatī as I did not think that it would serve an additional purpose. I have shown the fundamental and irreconcilable difference of the philosophical approach and outlook of the Jaina realist from that of the Vedāntic and Buddhist idealists. The difference is ultimate and each has shown himself at his best and strongest. There can be no capitulation on the fundamentals and ultimate issues. The onslaughts are as powerful and telling as the defence is effective. It can be claimed without betrayal of partisan spirit and zeal of orthodoxy that the Jaina has laid his hands upon the most vulnerable point in the Vedāntist's armoury of defence. The Jaina philosopher has laid enormous stress upon the Vedāntist's reliance upon experience in his difference from the Buddhist nihilist Nāgārjuna so far as he is expounded by Candrakīrti and his critics. The Vedāntist has criticized the absolute negativism as sponsored by a school of Buddhist sceptics on the ground of self-contradiction of experience. The Jaina has shown that the charge of self-contradiction is not based upon and cannot be substantiated by pure logic. The contradiction is empirical in character. The Jaina therefore submits that the Vedāntist should not give half-hearted allegiance to experience together with its contents. The Vedāntist's appeal to the ultimate experience in final realization as an unpolarized simple affirmation does not find favour with the Jaina realist who scents mysticism in this defence. As regards appeal to the Upaniṣadic revelation the Jaina does not repudiate the validity of the Upaniṣadic text, but he has his own interpretation of the same which is radically different from that of the Vedāntic monist. As a matter of fact, if we are to believe in the Jaina tradition as recorded in the authoritative works¹, Mahāvīra himself accepts the Upaniṣad as an authoritative declaration of ultimate truth. This tradition has paramount significance both to the orthodox adherents of the Jaina faith and to those of the Vedic school. We have not found a single text in the religious and philosophical literature of the Buddhists which accepts the validity of the Vedic revelation in any form or shape. Of course, Mahāvīra and his followers have condemned the sacrificial religion of the Vedas which accepts and approves animal slaughter as a religious act. But not only the Buddhists and the Jainas are sceptical of the purity of animal sacrifice but also the Sāṅkhya-Yoga school explicitly denounces animal sacrifice as an act of demerit. In the Upaniṣads also we find denunciation of sacrificial religion as a vehicle of salvation. Of course the orthodox exponents

¹ Cf. *ViBh*, 1596-1603.

of Vedānta do not regard animal sacrifice as enjoined in the Vedic rites as positively sinful. But they frankly and unreservedly assert that there can be no hope of salvation through performance of sacrifices alone. The renunciation of the world and of the sacrificial religion in the life of a recluse is emphasized as the sole means of cultivating the spiritual perfection which will put an end to worldly life by ushering in final realization of the ultimate truth. We need not be surprised at the denunciation of Vedic ritualism by Mahāvīra or the Buddha if we can put up with the unequivocal condemnation of Vedic ritualism in the *Bhagavadgītā*. The highest spiritual life is abhorrent of inflicting slightest injury on life and this is happily the unanimous decision of the Upaniṣads and of Mahāvīra and of the Buddha.

I have been drawn, in the fourth chapter, to a discussion of the Jaina theory of *karman* which is a highly complicated doctrine with its peculiar conception and interminable shades of difference in the working out of its details. The belief in the inevitability of the Law of *Karman* is rather common to all schools of Indian philosophy. It rests upon the fundamental ethical belief of moral responsibility of a living being. It is the prerogative of human life that it has the opportunity to get rid of the burden of the heritage of *karman* which it has acquired from beginningless past. Though the Jaina conception of *karman* as a physical substance and the theory of the influx and eflux of karmic matter is entirely different from that of the other schools, its difference with regard to the results as psychical and ethical forces is not essential from that of the other schools. It must be admitted that the Jaina theory is highly elaborate and logically consistent. Although several writers such as Dr Glasenapp and before him Mr V. R. Gandhi have written on the Jaina theory of *karman*, a philosophical presentation of this important doctrine was a desideratum. Apart from the importance and interest of the Jaina theory of *karman* by itself for a student of Jaina thought I was impelled to embark upon the subject in order to make the Jaina theory of *avidyā* intelligible and complete. It was found in the discourse on Jaina conception of *avidyā* that it was bound up with the doctrine of *karman*. Jaina *avidyā* is the outcome of karmic veil. And so I had to deal with this important ethico-philosophical doctrine as a matter of internal necessity. Once drawn into the subject I could not avoid going into the essential and salient features of the doctrine though the treatment of the details might have an extra-logical look in it. But as the doctrine is very little known to students of other branches of philosophy and the presentation of it in Mr Gandhi's work is rather popular, and scrappy in Dr Glasenapp's thesis, and in view of the possibility of this respectable theory being misunderstood as a crudity or oddity, my treatment ought to be regarded as a contribution of some philosophical value.

I had to cut through the maze of the tangled literature on *karman* and had to size it up and present it in a logical shape. A curious student who may feel impelled to pursue the study of this doctrine in Jaina literature will, I hope, now start with a clear perspective which will lighten his labour and save him from confusion of issues of which there is every risk in the unaided study of the original literature.

My last chapter is on *yoga*. *Yoga* affirms its faith in the direct realization of the ultimate secrets of existence and the possibility of its achievement for a human being. It may savour of mysticism. But it is mysticism in the noble sense of the term and not in the sense of an illogical or anti-intellectual dogmatic assertion of a fact. Philosophy must culminate in the conviction of truth. But the intellectual resources that are given to a human being, though a valuable possession and asset in the progress of higher life, are found to be inadequate at the end of the journey. Philosophy may give us at best an intellectual conviction which is not and cannot be a substitute for direct intuition. The great teachers of India have unwaveringly affirmed their faith in direct intuition. This direct intuition is transcendental because it emerges only after the senses have exhausted their functions. The Jaina believes that our senses are rather hindrances to the realization of full truth. The knowledge that is achieved by means of the senses is mediate and indirect. The senses are more or less barriers standing between the knower and the truth to be known. Our empirical knowledge including that afforded by reason is bound to be hazy, indistinct and remote, because the self does not envisage the reality as it is face to face. Besides, our senses do not give us a complete picture of the truth but rather, like a prism, they give us a distorted and blurred view. According to the Jaina philosopher consciousness is not a factitious product. It is innate in us and the fact that consciousness comes in contact with reality through a medium and in a graduated scale is rather an accident and a limitation. The power is there, and once the barrier between the conscious knower and the object is removed the full and complete knowledge of reality is bound to materialize. The Jaina has shown and other philosophers may agree that our imperfection of knowledge is the direct consequence of our ethical imperfection imposed by the accumulated burden of *karman* inherited by the self. The self only inherits what it has acquired in the past. This inheritance, call it *karman* or *avidyā* or the Original Sin, has got to be done away with. The best and surest means is ethical perfection and perfect knowledge which can be acquired by a course of spiritual discipline as prescribed by the yogic process. It will be unscientific attitude to condemn it *a priori*. It stands as a challenge and as an exhortation to make the experiment and to test

its validity or otherwise. One thing should be a warning against cheap complaisance of attitude and frivolous dismissal of this time-honoured discipline. It is this that the greatest teachers of mankind have pursued it and extolled it and it will be boldness *in excelsis* to look upon these persons as cranks and faddists. Whatever might be the opinion of a modern scholar he ought to have the charity to accept my treatment as a methodological necessity in order to complete my study of the Jaina philosophy. I do not pretend to be the original promulgator of this doctrine but rather an exponent of it. One thing I may claim to have done. It is this that I have shown how the Jaina conception of *yoga* is in perfect agreement and harmony with the system which was elaborated by Patañjali. This should be regarded as a welcome addition to our knowledge. Patañjali's philosophy is more or less widely known. The Jaina system of *yoga* is little known to the modern student and it was an agreeable surprise to me when I found in the course of my study the points of agreement which it presented to the yogic discipline as expounded by Patañjali and the Buddhists. I thought it would be an unpardonable act of dereliction on my part if I withheld the results of my study of this interesting side of Jaina philosophy from the modern student out of fear for being misunderstood.

I now present the results of my prolonged study to the scholars who are interested in philosophical speculations for what they are worth. I felt the need of interpreting the ancient philosophy of the Jainas to the modern mind in a modern language and a modern way. I however assure the reader who will honour my humble contribution with a perusal that I have been scrupulously faithful to the masters whose thoughts I present in this book. In this connection I feel called upon to make a full acknowledgment of my deep gratitude and obligation to my gurus Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Professor Dr Satkari Mookerjee, to whom this work is dedicated, for the unfailing light and guidance received from them during my studies of the original texts and in the composition of the work. I must also place on record my obligation to my friend Pandit Dalsukh Malvaniya of the Banaras Hindu University who has helped me with suggestions and discussion of texts and problems. I am also indebted to Professor Rev. Bhikkhu J. Kashyap, M.A., with whom I read the Pāli Tripitaka and the Abhidhamma system of philosophy, for the illuminating guidance I received from him at Banaras.

I take this opportunity of making an acknowledgment of my debt to the departed savant the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Phanibhūṣāṇa Tarkavāgiśa who inspired me for the study of Indian philosophy and put me on the right track by placing me at the feet of Pandit Sukhlalji

Sanghavi. It is my misfortune that I cannot make a present of my book to him in this world. It was he who advised me to take to the study of Indian philosophy and predicted my success in this field. I was further fortunate to receive unbounded favour from the great savant Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr Gopinath Kaviraj, M.A., D.Litt., the late Principal, Government Sanskrit College, Banaras, who read my work in manuscript and whose suggestions have led to the considerable improvement of my work. I refrain from the futile attempt to praise him as no praise can be adequate and on the contrary it is bound to result in belittling his unimaginable intellectual and spiritual majesty which strikes awe in a scholar who has received instruction from him. My debt of gratitude has incalculably increased on account of his favouring this humble work with his learned Foreword. To Professor Dr P. L. Vaidya, M.A., D.Litt. (Paris), Mayurbhanj Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Banaras Hindu University, I owe a tremendous obligation for the encouragement I received from him. I have always found in him the good Samaritan whose robust goodness had instilled courage into me when my spirits were drooping. He is to me the pattern of a combination of benevolence and scholarship, which is unfortunately becoming rare in these days. To Sir Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan to whom students of philosophy look forward as the beacon light and perennial source of inspiration, the author feels himself bound by an indissoluble tie of gratitude for an act of supreme justice which was conferred by him upon the author in the usual course of his duties as the judge of the merit of all philosophical works.

I shall be failing in my duty and guilty of unpardonable ingratitude if I let slip this occasion of placing on record my debt of gratitude to the late Babu Bahadursingh Singhi, the great patron of scholars, who gave me all encouragement for the prosecution of my studies of Jaina philosophy at Banaras under the fostering care and guidance of Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghavi. The author cannot find suitable language to express his gratefulness to the two large-hearted benefactors of Jaina culture Śrī Rajendrasingh Singhi, B.Com., and Śrī Narendrasingh Singhi, M.Sc., LL.B., M.L.A., the Singhi brothers, who are worthy sons of the worthy father, for the immense goodwill and patronage which the author has been receiving at their hands without ceasing. A formal expression of gratitude will be too cold an affair in the context of cordial relationship and intimacy which subsist between them and the author.

I must here express my gratefulness to Dr Syamaprasad Mookerjee who bestowed the P. C. Nahar Research Fellowship upon me when he was the President, Post-Graduate Councils in Arts and Science, Calcutta University. I should also offer my thanks to the authorities

of the Jain Cultural Research Society, Banaras, for the award of the Punamchand K. Kotawala Research Fellowship which enabled me to complete my work, and also for the provision they made for its publication. I am also much indebted to my esteemed friend Pandit Narendrachandra Vedāntatīrtha, M.A., Lecturer in Sanskrit, Calcutta University, for his kindly revising the proofs of this work.

Singhi Park
CALCUTTA 19
31 October 1951

NATHMAL TATIA

PRONUNCIATION

The vowels in Sanskrit are the same as in Italian, except that the sound of *a* approaches that of *a* in *rural*, and *ā* that of *a* in *father*. A vowel with a bar (-) above it is long; *ṛ*, *ṝ* are respectively pronounced as *ri*, *li*. The consonants are almost as in English, except that *g* is always hard and the sound of *c* approaches that of *ch* in *church*; *t*, *d* etc. (indicated by a dot below) are cerebrals and are the same as *t* in *turn*, *d* in *drum*, and so on; *t*, *d*, *n* are pure dentals; the aspirated letters *kh*, *gh*, *ch* etc. have the sound of the first letter plus an aspiration; *ṅ* is like *n* in *sing*; *ñ* is like *n* in *tinge*; *ś* is like *s* in *sure*; *h* is a pure aspirate; *m̥* is the symbol of a nasal.

For the convenience of the general reader the Sanskrit alphabet along with their transliterations are given below.

Vowels

अ a, आ ā, इ i, ई ī, उ u, ऊ ū, ए ṛ,
ए ṝ, ए e, ऐ ai, ओ o, औ au.

Consonants

क् k,	ख् kh,	ग् g,	ঘ্ gh,	ঢ্ ḡ,
চ্ c,	ছ্ ch,	জ্ j,	ঝ্ jh,	ঢ্ ñ,
ঢ্ ṛ,	ঢ্ ṛh	ঢ্ d,	ঢ্ dh,	ণ্ n,
ত্ t,	থ্ th,	দ্ d,	ঢ্ dh,	ন্ n,
প্ p,	ফ্ ph,	ব্ b,	ঘ্ bh,	ম্ m,
য্ y,	ৰ্ r,	ল্ l,	ঢ্ l,	ঢ্ llh,
ব্ v,	শ্ ś,	ষ্ s,	স্ s,	হ্ h,
+ m̥ or m, : h.				

ABBREVIATIONS

ADv *Anuyogadvāra Sūtra* (Vijayakamala Sūrīvara Jaina Series No. 1).

ĀMi *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* (of Samantabhadra with Aṣṭaśatī and Aṣṭasahasrī, NSP, 1915).

ANi *Ānguttara-Nikāya* (PTS).

ĀNir *Āvaśyaka-Niryukti* (Vijayadāna Sūrīvara Jaina Granthamāla No. 16).

ĀS *Āgamaśāstra* (of Gauḍapāda, ed. MM. V. Bhattacharya, Calcutta University, 1943).

Aṣṭasahasrī *Vide* ĀMi.

Aṣṭaśatī *Vide* ĀMi.

ĀSū *Ācārāṅga Sūtra*.

AYV *Anya-yoga-vyavacchedikā* (of Ācārya Hemacandra).

BAP *Bodhicaryāvatāra-Pañjikā* ed. Poussin, Bibliotheca Indica.

BhGī *Bhagavadgītā*.

BhSū *Bhagavatī Sūtra*.

BṛUp *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*.

BS *Brahmasūtra*.

BSŚBh *Brahmasūtra-Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya* (with Bhāmatī, Kalpataru and Parimala, NSP, 1938).

Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux By Prof. Dr Satkari Mookerjee, M.A., Ph.D. (Calcutta University, 1935).

ChUp *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*.

Dhyānaśataka By Jinabhadra with Haribhadra's commentary. (Śrī Vinaya-bhaktisundaracaraṇa Granthamāla No. 3, Jamnagar).

DNi *Dīgha-Nikāya* (PTS).

DOK *The Doctrine of Karman in Jaina Philosophy* by Dr H. Von Glasenapp. (Published by the Trustees, Bai Vijibai J. P. Charity Fund, Bombay, 1942).

Dravyasaṅgraha By Nemicandra Siddhānta-cakravartin with the Vṛtti of Brahmadeva. (The Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. 1, Arrah).

DVNir *Daśavaikālika-Niryukti*.

HIP *A History of Indian Philosophy* (Vol. I) by Dr S. N. Dasgupta. First Edition.

IP *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I (1929), Vol. II (1931), by S. Radhakrishnan.

IUp *Iśā-Upaniṣad*.

Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism By Prof. Satkari Mookerjee, M.A., Ph.D.

JBP *Jñāna-bindu-prakaraṇa* (of Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya, Singhi Jain Series No. 16).

Jñānabindu Jñānabinduprakaraṇa. *Vide* JBP above.

Jñānārṇava By Śubhacandra. (Śrī Rāyacandra Jaina Sāstramāla No. 5, 7, 9 bound together, 1927).

JTBh *Jaina-tarka-bhāṣā* (of Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya, Singhi Jain Series No. 8).

Kā *Kārikā*.

KaUp *Katha Upaniṣad*.

Kg₁ *Karmagranthas I to IV* of Devendrasūri with his own commentary on I, II and IV, the commentary on III being by somebody else. Ātmā-nanda Jaina Granthamāla No. 85.

Kg₂ *Karmagranthas V and VI*. The former is the work of Devendrasūri with his own commentary while the latter is a work of Ciratnaparamarṣi with the Vivaraṇa of Malayagiri. Ātmā-nanda Jaina Granthamāla No. 86.

Kp Karmaprakṛti with Cūrṇi and the commentaries of Malayagiri and Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya (1937). [Upa=Upaśamanākaraṇa].

KSS Kashi Sanskrit Series.

KSTS Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies.

KUp Kena Upaniṣad. On p.114 (footnote) KUp refers to Kaṭha Upaniṣad.

KV Kathā-vatthu.

LA Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (ed. Bunyiu Nanjo, Kyōto, 1923).

Labdhisāra By Nemicandra Siddhāntacakravartin. Rāyacandra Jaina Śāstra-mālā No. 8, NSP, 1916.

LT Laghīyastraya (Singhi Jain Series No. 12).

Mahāyāna-viṁśikā By Nāgārjuna ed. V. Bhattacharya.

MK Madhyamaka-kārikā (ed. Poussin).

MKV Madhyamaka-kārikā-Vṛtti of Candrakīrti ed. Poussin, Bib. Budh.

MNī Majjhima-Nikāya (PTS).

MuUp Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad.

MVS Madhyānta-vibhāga-sūtra (of Maitreyanātha, *vide* MVS BhT).

MVS Bh Madhyānta-vibhāga-sūtra-Bhāṣya (of Vasubandhu, *vide* MVS BhT).

MVS BhT Madhyānta-vibhāga-sūtra-Bhāṣya-Ṭīkā (of Sthiramati, ed. V. Bhattacharya and G. Tucci, 1932).

Nandivṛtti By Malayagiri (Śrīmatī Āgamodaya Samiti, Bombay, 1924).

NBh Nyāyasūtra-Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana.

NBhV Nyāyasūtra-Bhāṣya-Vārttika of Uddyotakara.

Niyamasāra By Kundakundācārya. (The Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. IX, Lucknow, 1931).

NKC Nyāya-kumuda-candra of Prabhācandra, Manik Chandra Digambar Jain Granthamālā No. 38-39.

NM Nyāyamañjari of Jayanta (KSS No. 106, 1936).

NS Nyāya-Sūtra. Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts

NSP Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay.

NSū Nandi-Sūtra (ed. Hastimalla Muni, Candana Jaināgama Granthamālā No. 2).

NSuVṛ Nandi-Sūtra-Vṛtti of Haribhadra (Ratlam, 1928).

Pañcāstikāyasāra By Kundakundācārya (Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. III, Arrah, 1920).

Paramātma-prakāśa and Yogasāra of Yogīndudeva (Śrī Rāyacandra Jaina Śāstramālā No. 10, 1937 ed. A. N. Upadhye).

PB Praśastapāda-Bhāṣya (with Vyomavatī and other commentaries, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1930).

PBK Praśastapāda-Bhāṣya with Kandali (of Śrīdhara Bhaṭṭa ed. Pt. Vindhyaśvari-prasāda, Kashi, V.S., 1951).

PKM Prameya-kamala-mārtanda of Prabhācandra (NSP., 1941).

PMī Pramāṇa-mīmāṁsā of Ācārya Hemacandra (Singhi Jain Series).

PNT Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālāṅkāra of Vādi-Devasūri.

Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya By Kṣemarāja (KSTS, Vol. III).

PrSū Prajñāpanā-Sūtra.

PS Pañcasāṅgraha (Upa=Upaśamanākaraṇa).

PTS Pali Text Society.

PV Pramāṇa-Vārttika of Dharmakīrti (ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana).

RāP Rāya-Paśenaiya-Sutta.

ŚāBh Śābara-Bhāṣya.

Samādhitantra By Pūjyapāda (ed. Jugalkishore Mukhtar, Sarsawa 1939).

Śāntiparva Mahābhārata, Poona, 1932.

Śataratnasaṅgraha with Śataratnollekhanī (Tantrik Texts Vol. XXII, Calcutta, 1944).

Śatkhaṇḍāgama with Dhavalā commentary, Amraoti, 1939.

SBE Sacred Books of the East Series.

ŚBh Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya.

SKā Śāṅkhyā-kārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa.

SNi Saṃyutta-Nikāya (PTS).

SP Śoḍaśaka-Prakaraṇa of Haribhadra with Yaśobhadra's tīkā, Jamnagar (V.S. 1992).

SPB Śāṅkhyā-pravacana-bhāṣya of Vijñānabhikṣu.

SS Śikṣāsamuccaya ed. C. Bendall.

SŚā Saṃkṣepa-Śārīraka (of Sarvajñātmamuni, KSS No. 18, V.S., 1981).

SSi Sarvārthaśiddhi of Pūjyapāda Devanandi, a commentary on TSū.

SthSū Sthānāṅga-Sūtra (Ahmedabad, 1937).

STP Sanmati-tarka-prakaraṇa of Siddhasena Divākara (*vide* STPT).

STPT Sanmati-tarka-prakaraṇa with (Abhayadevaśūri's vyākhyā called Tattvabodhavidhāyinī (Gujrat Purātattvamandira, Ahmedabad).

SūKṛ Sūtrakṛtāṅga.

SUp, ŚvUp Śvetāśvata-Upaniṣad.

SVR Syādvāda-ratnākara of Vādi-Devaśūri, a commentary on his own PNT.

SVS Śāstra-vārtā-samuccaya (of Haribhadra).

Tantrāloka By Abhinavagupta with commentary of Rājānaka Jayaratha, (KSTS, No. XXIII).

Tk Trimśikā of Vasubandhu (ed. Sylvain Lévi in the Vijñaptimātratāśiddhi, Paris, 1925).

TKau Tattva-kaumudī of Vācaspati on SKā.

TP Tattvaprakāśa of Śrī Bhojadeva with commentary of Śrīkumāra (TSS, Vol. LXVIII).

TRā Tattvārtha-rājavārttika (of Bhāṭṭa Akalāṅka, Kashi, 1915).

TŚIV Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika of Vidyānandisvāmin, NSP, 1918.

TSN Tri-svabhāva-nirdeśa of Vasubandhu (ed. Sujit Kumar Mukhopadhyaya, Viśvabharati, 1939).

TSS Trivandrum Sanskrit Series.

TSū Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra of Umāsvāti (*vide* TSūBh).

TSūBh Tattvārthaśūtra-Bhāṣya with Siddhasenaganin's Tīkā, 2 vols. (Seth Devchand Lalbai Jain Pustakoddhāra Fund Series No. 67 and 76).

TUp Taītīriya-Upaniṣad.

UtSū Uttarādhyayana-Sūtra.

ViBh Viśeṣāvaśyaka-Bhāṣya (with Śiṣyahitā commentary. Yaśovijaya Jaina Granthamālā No. 35).

Visuddhimagga By Buddhaghosācariya (ed. Dharmananda Kosambi, Part I, Bhāratīya Vidyā Bhavana, Bombay, 1940).

VS Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra (of Kaṇāda).

V.S. Vikrama Saīnvat.

YBi Yogabindu of Haribhadra (Jaina Grantha Prakāśaka Sabhā Series No. 25 Ahmedabad, 1940).

YD Yogadarśana of Patañjali (KSS No. 110), containing Bhāṣya, Tattvavaiśāradī, etc.

YDS Yoga-dṛṣṭi-samuccaya (ed. Prof. L. Suali, Ahmedabad, 1912).

Yuktidīpikā A commentary on the Śāṅkhyakārikā (Calcutta, 1938).

YV Yogavīśikā of Haribhadra with Yaśovijaya's vyākhyā, Agra, 1922.

CHAPTER I

THE NON-ABSOLUTISTIC ATTITUDE OF THE JAINAS

Culture presupposes history. Thought presupposes culture. Literature presupposes thought. Language helps thought and thought converts language into literature. Literature is the record of history, culture and thought. Ancient Indian literature, however, is more a record of culture and thought than a record of history. This is why we are comparatively in historical darkness about India. But as regards records of culture and thought, our heritage is second to none. Our Vedic literature can be considered as one of the richest that the ancients of the world could produce. It is a record of the Brāhmaṇical culture and thought of India. Then there are the Buddhist Piṭakas in Pāli and Jaina Āgamas in Prākrit, which are the records of quite a distinct current of culture which may be called Śrāmanic. These form the basis for the subsequent Brāhmaṇical, Buddhist and Jaina literature that developed in many forms and constitutes today our rich literary heritage. We shall limit our attention only to the study of the philosophical attitude of the ancient thinkers whose experiences have been recorded in the Vedic literature, the Buddhist Piṭakas and the Jaina Āgamas.

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THE BRAHMANA ATTITUDE

Speculation on the nature of the ultimate source of the universe is a common characteristic of human intellect. *Kuta ājātā kuta iyam visṛṣṭih?*¹—From whence did it spring forth, from whence was born this creation? This is the question that stirs the mind of the sage (ṛṣi) of the *Nāsadiya* hymn. He starts with the assertion 'There was then neither what is not, nor what is',² and then speculates whether there was deep abysmal water (*ambhaḥ kim āśid gahanam gabhiram*)? Philosophical misgivings overburden his heart and he says: 'There was no death, hence there was nothing immortal.'³ But he immediately reasserts 'That One breathed by Itself without breath, other than It there was nothing.'⁴ There was absolute darkness and a sea without light. 'That One' was born by the power of austerity (*tapas*). 'The sages (ṛṣis), searching in their heart, discovered in non-existence

¹ *Rgveda*, X. 129. 6.

² nā 'sad āśin no sad āśit tadānīm—*Ibid.*, X. 129. 1.

³ *Ibid.*, X. 129. 2.

⁴ ānīd avātām svadhyā tad ekam

tasmat dhā 'nyan na paraḥ kiñcanā "sa.—*Ibid.*

the connecting bond of existence.¹ But again his mind is overwhelmed by doubts and he exclaims 'Who then knows, who has declared it here, from whence was born this creation? The gods came later than this creation, who then knows whence it arose? He from whom this creation arose, whether he made it or did not make it, the highest seer in the highest heaven, he forsooth knows, or does even he not know?'² Doubt is the starting point of philosophy. Out of the fulness of the heart comes the assertion 'That One breathed by Itself without breath' (*ānīd avātām svadhyā tad ekam*). But the human intellect is too weak to grasp the truth. It falls into the clutches of doubt in moments of weakness. The sage rejects the existent (*sat*) or the non-existent (*asat*) as the ultimate source of the universe and his heart finds solace in asserting 'That One' which 'breathed though breathless' (*ānīd avātām*). His deep spiritual experience manifests itself in self-contradictory expressions and points to the fact that the ultimate reality is inexpressible (*anirvacanīya*). In this famous hymn we can thus discern three distinct ways of speculation about creation *viz.* (1) that which bases it on existence (*sat*), (2) that which bases it on non-existence (*asat*), and (3) that which regards the ultimate source as inexpressible (*anirvacanīya*). Of these, the first two are rejected as untenable. The universe did not come out of what we call existent (*sat*) or what we call non-existent (*asat*), but out of 'The One' which cannot be expressed in words. How can something come out of the Nought? How can we believe that 'In the earliest age of the gods, the existent sprang from the non-existent'?³ Is it not, again, unmeaning to say that the existent came out of the existent? What then is the solution of the mystery of existence? This is the question that demanded solution from the seer. The answer comes forth from the depth of his heart though his mind still remains embarrassed.

The selfsame question arises in the mind of yet another sage who asks 'Who has seen the first-born, when he that had no bones bore him that has bones? Where is the life, the blood, the self of the universe? Who went to ask of any who knew?'⁴ He finds his questions answered in the realization 'The real is One, the learned call it by various names, Agni, Yama and Mātariśvan.'⁵

In the *Upaniṣads* we find these speculations in more concrete forms. Sometimes we find that Non-being (*asat*) was the source of

¹ *sato bandhum asati niravindan*

hr̥di pratīṣyā kavayo maniṣā.—R̥gveda, X. 129. 4.

² *Ibid.*, X. 129. 6-7 as translated by Max Müller.

³ *devānām pūrvye yuge 'sataḥ sad ajāyata.—Ibid.*, X. 72. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I. 164. 4.

⁵ *ekām sad viprā bahudhā vadanti*

agnim yamam mātariśvānam āhuh.—R̥gveda, I. 164. 46.

Being. 'In the beginning this was non-existent. From it was born what exists.'¹ In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* also we find 'In the beginning there was nothing here whatsoever. By death indeed all this was concealed.'² Again, in the same *Upaniṣads*, we find that Being (*sat*) is the ultimate source of existence. How can existence come out of the Nought?

'In the beginning, my dear, there was that only *which is*, one only, without a second. Others say, in the beginning there was that only *which is not*, one only, without a second ; and from that which is not, that which is was born.'

'But how could it be thus, my dear?' the father continued. 'How could that which is be born of that which is not? No, my dear, only that which is was in the beginning, one only, without a second.'³

Without going into further details which can be found lucidly delineated elsewhere we can sum up our enquiry thus: There was controversy regarding the exact nature of the ultimate source of creation, and that some thought it to have come out of Non-being or Nothing while others conceived it to have originated out of Being. There is of course controversy regarding the interpretation of 'Non-being' (*asat*). According to Śaṅkara, it means, 'what is opposite of one defined by particular name and form',⁴ in one word, what is undefined. 'Non-being', according to him, refers to *Brahman* in its primary unrevealed state. But if this interpretation is correct, what is the necessity of the refutation of the theory 'In the beginning there was that only *which is not*',⁵ which we have quoted above? It is more on the side of fact to admit that there were originally two separate and mutually contradictory ways of thought which were reconciled or rather reinterpreted into a third which regarded reality as inexpressible (*anirvacanīya*). This third speculation is found in such passages as 'He who knows the bliss of that *Brahman*, from whence all speech, with the mind, turns away unable to reach it, he never fears.'⁶ 'The eye does not go thither, nor the organ of speech, nor mind. We do not know, we do not understand, how anyone can teach it. It is different from the known, it is also above the unknown, thus we have heard from those of old, who taught us this. That which is not expessed by speech and by which

¹ asad vā idam agra āśit. tato vai sad ajāyata.—*TUp*, II. 7 ; also see *ChUp*, III. 19. 1.

² I. 2. 1.

³ *ChUp*, VI. 2. 1-2. SBE translation.

⁴ Cf. asad iti vyākṛta-nāma-rūpa-viśeṣa-viparītarūpam avikṛtam brahma 'cyate—*SBh* on *TUp*, II. 7 ; also, asad avyākṛta-nāmarūpam—*SBh* on *ChUp*, III. 19. 1.

⁵ asad eve 'dam agra āśit.

⁶ yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha
ānandaṁ brahmaṇo vidvān na bibheti kadācana.—*TUp*, II. 4.

speech is expressed, that alone know as *Brahman*, not that which people here think.¹ We have found the seed of such speculation in the *Nāsadiya* hymn of the *Rgveda*. The thinkers of the *Upaniṣads* have given it a concrete shape. Later on this became a theory and as such had a deep influence on the development of the philosophical thought of India, Brāhmaṇical, Buddhist as well as Jaina. This will be apparent in the course of our study.

There is a gradual development in the philosophical attitude of the sages of the hymns and the thinkers of the *Upaniṣads*. The various Vedic gods coalesce into One *Sat* (Absolute).² Gradually this *Sat* replaces the conception of fire (*tejas*), water, ether (*ākāśa*) etc. as the ultimate elements of creation. It is now regarded as the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe. This *Sat* is infinite, eternal and immutable. It is conscious according to the interpretation of Śaṅkara. It is ubiquitous, immortal and unchanging. The universe which has sprung forth from *It* is finite, transitory and mutable. The finite self is mortal and changing.

The doctrine of transmigration or rebirth also can be traced in the Vedic hymns. The Vedic people had a belief in the existence of the soul (*ātman*) as distinct from the body, which after death goes to the other world to reap the fruits of its action. In the *Upaniṣads*, however, we find a clear development of the doctrine,³ although even there it is not as developed as with the Buddhists and the Jainas. There are scholars who think that the Vedic Aryans had no special doctrines about life after death⁴ and that the suggestions of the conceptions of *karman* and rebirth belonged to the aboriginal Indian thinkers who had their own distinct culture and philosophy, the remnants of which can still be traced in the non-Brāhmaṇical systems of Jainism and Buddhism. But were original promulgators and systematizers of Buddhist and Jaina doctrines non-Āryans? From tradition we have it that the original *Tīrthaṅkaras* and the Buddhas were Kṣatriya princes who were as influential a part of the Āryan community as the Brāhmins were. The complex doctrine of *karman*, which is the exponent of ethical freedom of the will and is derived from the theory of law of causation as applied in the moral field, is the outcome of vigorous philosophical thought. We do not find in the autochthonous aboriginal

¹ *KUP*, I. 3.

² Cf. *ekam sad viprā bahudhā vadanti*.—*Rgveda*, I. 164. 46.

³ *BṛU*, VI. 2. 16.

⁴ Cf. 'The references to transmigration which have been seen in the *Rgveda* are all of the most improbable character: it is to ignore the nature of poetry to press the wish that there may be long life for man among the gods into the view that it contemplates rebirth.....'—A. B. Keith: *The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upaniṣads* (Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 32), p. 570.

races of India, who are still alive, any developed philosophical doctrine about moral responsibility which is the foundation of the doctrine of *karman*. It is entirely speculative to seek to affiliate this important doctrine, which has been the universal principle of all systems of thought, to non-Āryan sources. The development of the doctrine is the work of the Āryan mind and there is no evidence to show that it was borrowed from others. In the philosophical hymns of the *Vedas* we find highly developed metaphysical conceptions, which have been gathered up into the later speculations. These have been the starting point and fountain of philosophical thought in India. Until indubitable crucial evidence be forthcoming it is safe to hold that the Āryan mind developed these philosophical theories under the stress of circumstances and the urge of the human intellect to find an explanation of the mysteries of the universe. It is safer still to suspend one's judgment about the original source. To assert even tentatively that the theory of rebirth and the law of *karman* were the invention of the non-Āryans smacks of dogmatism.

A developed theory of rebirth presupposes a developed theory of *karman* which again presupposes a developed ethical attitude. The conception of *Rta* in the *Rgveda* anticipates the Law of *Karman* and gives an idea of the ethical attitude of the Vedic people. It furnishes us with a standard of morality. Ordered conduct is called a true vow (*vrata*).¹ Punishment is invoked against a liar, an abuser, a thief, and an adulterer.² Virtues and vices are distinguished. Of course, all this is only treated as a side issue. But it is not very difficult to find that the attitude of the Vedic people was as much ethical and religious as it was secular. They believed as much in the ethical values as in the secular attainments. There were sages among them who devoted their life exclusively to the attainment of spiritual enlightenment. It is, however, only in the *Upaniṣads* that a radical change takes place on a mass scale. The conception of the fivefold duties of man towards gods, seers (*r̥ṣis*), manes (*pitṛs*), men and lower creation was developed in the *Brāhmaṇas*. It was, of course, in the *Upaniṣads* that the Āryan attitude becomes supremely ethical. It is here that the philosophical insight is wedded to ethical wisdom which gradually developed, as we

¹ *IP*, Vol. I, pp. 109-110.

² Cf. yo mā pākena manasā carantam
abhicaṣṭe anṛtebhīr vacobhīḥ

.....
ye vā bhadram dūṣayanti svadhābhīḥ

.....
yo aśvānām yo gavān yas tanūnām
ripuḥ stenaḥ steyakṛd dabhrām etu
ni ṣa hiyatām tanvā tanā ca.

—*Rgveda*, VII. 104. 8 *et seq.*

have said, under the stress of circumstances and the urge of human intellect to find an explanation of the mysteries of the universe. It is here that the search for the covetable (*preyas*) completely surrenders to the search for the good (*śreyas*).¹ Philosophy illuminates the goal while ethics shows the pathway leading to it. Philosophy leads to the identification of self with the Absolute (*Brahman*) which is Truth, Consciousness and Infinite.² The ethical sense finds expression in such passages as 'He who forms desires (*kāma*) in his mind, is born again through his desires here and there. But to him whose desires are fulfilled (*paryāptakāma*) and who is conscious of the true Self (within himself) all desires vanish, even here on earth. The Self cannot be gained by Scripture (*pravacana*), nor by understanding (*medhā*), nor by much learning (*śruta*). He whom the Self chooses, by him the Self can be gained. The Self chooses him (his body) as His own. Nor is that Self to be gained by one who is destitute of strength (*balahinena*), or without earnestness (*pramādāt*), or without proper meditation (*tapaso vā 'py alingāt*). But if a wise man strives after it by those means (by strength, earnestness, and proper meditation), then his self enters the home of *Brahman*. When they have reached Him (the Self), the sages become satisfied with knowledge (*jñānatṛptāḥ*), they have realized their Self (*kṛtātmānah*), their passions have passed away (*vitarāgāḥ*), and they are tranquil (*praśāntāḥ*). The wise, having reached Him who is omnipresent everywhere, devoted to the Self, enter into Him wholly.'³ Desire (*kāma*) has been laid down as the cause of rebirth. Scriptural knowledge, logical understanding and academic learning are rejected as the pathway to spiritual realization. Spiritual strength and vigour, constant vigilance and readiness, and renunciation and asceticism are given as the means to freedom. When freed, the self attains consummation of knowledge, realizes itself and becomes passionless and tranquil. 'When thou hast surrendered all this, then thou mayest enjoy. Do not covet the wealth of any man'⁴—such is the ethical principle of the *Upaniṣads*. 'Knowing Him, the Self (*Ātman*), the Brahmins relinquish the desire for posterity, the desire for possessions, the desire for worldly prosperity and go forth as mendicants.'⁵ Spiritual emancipation (*mokṣa*) means identification of the self with the *Brahman*. In the famous passage of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*,⁶ Yājñavalkya describes to his wife Maitreyī the nature of the released soul as one with the highest reality and being not definable in terms of anything else.⁷ Emancipation (*mokṣa*) is as indefinable and ineffable as the *Brahman*, inasmuch as the former is nothing but the realization of the latter.

¹ Cf. *KaUp*, II. 2. ² Cf. *satyam jñānam anantam brahma*—*TUp*, II. 1.

³ *MuUp*, III. 2. 2-5. SBE translation (slightly modified).

⁴ *IUp*, I. ⁵ *BṛUp*, III. 5. 1. ⁶ *IV. 5. 15.*

⁷ Sir S. Radhakrishnan: *Gautama the Buddha*, p. 57.

To sum up: The Vedic thinkers speculated in more than one way on the ultimate source of the universe—some regarded *Sat* as the ultimate source, some derived existence from Non-existence, and yet a third group regarded ultimate reality as indefinable. Gradually polytheism gives place to monotheism and monotheism is replaced by monism. Speculation and realization move hand in hand. When logic contradicts itself, spiritual realization comes to its help. Ultimate reality is conceived as Truth, Consciousness and Infinite. Conceptions of *karman* and rebirth were systematized in the *Upaniṣads*. Originally the Āryan attitude was more metaphysical than ethical. It becomes supremely ethical only in the *Upaniṣads*. Asceticism asserts itself at this stage. The conception of spiritual emancipation (*mokṣa*) finds importance in the *Upaniṣads*. The state of release is as indefinable as the ultimate reality. The world that we see is the world of change. It is finite existence. Pure Consciousness alone is real. It is eternal and infinite. It is unchanging. Our empirical self is finite and changing. The real self which is *Brahman* is infinite and unchanging. It is consciousness. It is bliss.

It is to be noticed in this connection that these speculations did not take the shape of rigid theories. They were only free and supple soarings of the philosophical minds. It is only in the hands of later thinkers that they crystallized into rigid doctrines which were in vogue at the time of the Buddha and Mahāvīra. We shall now see how these problems were tackled by these two great personalities.

THE BUDDHIST ATTITUDE

The attitude of the Buddha was out and out rationalistic. He is reported once to have said to the Kālāmas: 'This I have said to you, O Kālāmas, but you may accept it not because it is a report, not because it is a tradition, not because it is so said in the past, not because it is given from (our) basket (or scripture, *piṭaka*), not for the sake of discussion, nor for the sake of a particular method, nor for the sake of careful consideration, nor for the sake of the forbearance with wrong views, nor because it appears to be suitable, nor because your preceptor is a recluse, but if you yourselves understand that this is so meritorious and blameless, and when accepted, is for benefit and happiness, then you may accept it.'¹ He used also to say to his disciples that in ascertaining truth 'A Bodhisattva rests on reasons (*yukti-sarana*) and not

¹ *ANi*, Part I, III, 65, 14. PTS. Also Cf.

tāpāc chedāc ca nikaṣāt suvaraṇam iva paṇḍitaiḥ
parikṣya bhikṣavo grāhyam madvaco na tu gauravāt.

—*Jñānasāra-samuccaya*, 31.

on a person (*pudgalasarana*) though things might be explained by an Elder (*sthavira*), or an experienced man, or Tathāgata or the Order (*sangha*). Thus resting on reason and not on a person he does not move away from the truth, nor does he follow the faith of others.¹ We have referred to the theories that were prevalent and much discussed among thinkers before the advent of the Buddha. The Buddha considered the following problems as unexplainable (*avyākata*) and refused to answer them either in the affirmative or in the negative: whether the world is eternal or the world is not-eternal; whether the world is finite or the world is infinite; whether the soul and the body are identical or they are different; whether the Tathāgata (soul) exists after death, or he does not exist after death, or whether the Tathāgata both exists and does not exist after death, or whether the Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death.² All these questions are not answerable. There are four kinds of questions: (1) which are *ekāṁśa-vyākaraṇiya*, i.e., answerable with certainty or categorically, e.g., 'Will every one who is born die?' 'Yes' is the reply; (2) *vibhajya-vyākaraṇiya*, that which is to be explained by making a division, e.g., 'Is every one reborn after death?' The reply is: 'One free from passions (*kleśas*) is not reborn, but one who is not so is reborn'; (3) *prati-pṛcchā-vyākaraṇiya*, that which is to be explained by putting another question, e.g., 'Is man superior or inferior?' It is necessary here to ask: 'In relation to what?' 'If in relation to animals, he is superior. But if in relation to gods, he is inferior'; (4) *sthāpaniya*, that which is to be set aside, e.g., 'Are the *skandhas* (aggregates) the same as the living being (*sattva*)?' This question is not to be answered. For, according to the Buddhists there is nothing known as a living *being*. And so the question is like the question: 'Is the son of a barren woman black or white?'³ If the question is based on the presumption of what is a fiction, it cannot be answered. It is a defect of metaphysics that, in most cases, it proceeds with absurd hypotheses. Take, for instance, the question of existence. The metaphysical attitude usually tries to imagine the origin of existence in non-existence on the analogy of the commonplace experience of creation. We usually experience that a thing which was non-existent comes into existence, or is brought into existence by some agent. This commonplace experience is responsible for our intellectual unrest which we seek to end by finding out in non-existence the seed of existence. This unrest leads us to metaphysics. Our logical sense finds self-contradiction in the question.

¹ *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, I. XVII; *The Basic Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 11-12.

² See *MNi*, *Cūlamālūnkyā Sutta* 63; *The Basic Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 12-13.

³ See *The Basic Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 18-19, as well as footnote to p. 19 for reference. Cf. *YD*, *Bhāṣya* IV. 33. *Milindapaṭṭi*, IV. 2. 5.

dition in our imagining in non-existence the seed of existence, and consequently we reject the conclusion, and try to form another which is intended to be logically consistent. We now derive existence from existence. But at this stage we become conscious of the futility of our speculation, because we have reached just the point from which we started. The Buddha was conscious of the absurdity of *a priori* metaphysical speculations moving in a vacuum, and so rejected the metaphysical vagaries as unanswerable. We shall consider here some such problems and the Buddha's attitude towards them.

Let us begin with Eternalism (*Sassatavāda*). The *Brahmajāla Sutta* assigns the origin of such doctrine to the development of the power of remembering the former births due to some spiritual advancement. Some again arrive at this theory by means of logic and reasoning.¹ It is stated in the *Majjhima Nikāya*² that the self (*attā*), according to the Eternalists (*Sassatavādins*), is the speaker, feeler, and enjoyer of the fruits of good and evil actions (*kamma*), is permanent (*nicca*), fixed (*dhruva*), eternal (*sassata*), unchangeable (*aparināma-dhamma*), and is steadfast like the so-called eternal objects *viz.* the Sun, Moon, ocean, earth and mountain.³ Memory of the past is responsible for the idea of persistence or permanence.⁴ Abstract logic also sometimes leads to the same conclusion. According to the *Ucchedavāda* (nihilism), on the other hand, the soul is believed to become extinct after death. The Buddha's attitude to these problems is clearly expressed in the following dialogue:

- ‘ Is sorrow, Gotama, due to oneself (*sayamkatam*)?’
- ‘ Not so, O Kassapa.’—Thus said the Lord.
- ‘ Is sorrow then, Gotama, due to another (*parakatam*)?’
- ‘ Not so, O Kassapa.’—Thus said the Lord.
- ‘ Is then this sorrow, Gotama, due to oneself as well as due to another?’
- ‘ Not so, O Kassapa.’—Thus said the Lord.
- ‘ Is then this sorrow, Gotama, neither due to oneself, nor due to another?’
- ‘ Not so, O Kassapa.’—Thus said the Lord.

¹ See Dr. N. Dutt's *Early Monastic Buddhism*, Vol. I, p. 49.

² I, p. 8.

³ Dr. N. Dutt: *Op. cit.*, p. 50.

⁴ Cf. ‘Endow this mind with memory, and specially with the desire to dwell on the past; give it the faculty of dissociating and of distinguishing: it will no longer only note the present state of the passing reality; it will represent the passing as a change, and therefore as a constant between what has been and what is.’—Bergson: *Creative Evolution*, (1928 edition), p. 310.

Then the Buddha expounded the position in the following way:

- ‘ If he who suffers is the same as he who does, then, O Kassapa, it is admitted that the sorrow is due to one who was existent, and consequently the agent is admitted as eternal (*sassata*). ’
- ‘ If again someone does, and someone else suffers, then, O Kassapa, it is admitted that one suffers for what is done by another, and consequently the agent is admitted as extinct (*ucchedam etam*). ’
- ‘ The Tathāgata, O Kassapa, avoids both these ends and preaches the Law (*dhammam*) by adopting the middle course (*majjhena*). *Avijjā* (ignorance) causes *saṅkhāra* (tendencies), *saṅkhāra* causes *viññāna*¹ (resultant consciousness) and so on. Thus originates this *khandha* (aggregate) of absolute sorrow. By the total cessation of ignorance tendencies (*saṅkhāras*) cease. By the cessation of tendencies, *viññāna* (consciousness) ceases, and so on. Thus the *khandha* (aggregate) of absolute sorrow ceases (*nirodho hoti*).² ’

The Buddha, consistently with his doctrine of the Middle Path, could not give his reply either in the affirmative or in the negative. For, if it were in the former it would be eternalism (*śāśvatavāda*), while in the latter it would be nihilism (*ucchedavāda*). But he accepted neither of them, as his doctrine is free from both of them.³

The problem of finiteness and infiniteness of the world is also treated in the same way. It is also regarded as an unanswerable question. The problem arises in the mind due to the absurd presuppositions and imaginary constructions. The imagination gives various dimensions, finite and infinite, limited and unlimited, to the world and consequently our intellect forms various conceptions which do not deserve affirmation or negation. They are only fictions of the mind.

The Buddha’s attitude towards the problem of the relation of body (*śarīra*) and soul (*jīva*) is revealed from the following dialogue:

- ‘ What, O Lord, is *jarāmarāṇa* (decay-and-death)? Whom again does this decay-and-death belong to? ’
- ‘ It is not a proper question’—said the Lord.
- ‘ If one, O Bhikkhu, would ask ‘What is decay-and-death, and whom does this decay-and-death belong to?’, and if one, O Bhikkhu, would ask ‘Is decay-and-death different, and is one

¹ *patiśandhivasena ekūnaviśatvidhārin pavattivasena dvatiṁśavidhārin*
vipākacittān viññānān nāma—*Abhidhammatthavibhāvini-tīkā*, Sinhalese edition, 1933, p. 134.

² *SNi*, XII, 17, 7-15. Also see *Madhyamakākārikā*, XII, 1.

³ *The Basic Conception of Buddhism*, p. 15 and the footnotes.

whom this decay-and-death belongs to also different?', both would mean the same thing, differing only in modes of expression. If one, O Bhikkhu, were to maintain that the self is identical with the body, then there would be no use of endeavouring for release (*brahmacariyavāso na hoti*); and if one were to maintain that the self is different, and the body is different, then also, O Bhikkhu, there would be no use of endeavouring for release. Having avoided, O Bhikkhu, both these two extremes, the Tathāgata preaches the Law by adopting the middle course—depending upon birth (*jāti-paccaya*) there is decay-and-death.¹

The self (or soul) is neither different from nor identical with the body. If it were accepted that the self is identical with the body, then it would mean that the self perishes along with the body. The consequence is unrelieved materialism (or nihilism) which implies all stop to all progress towards release. Again, if the soul were different from the body, decay-and-death would have no effect on the soul. The soul would always remain as it is. This will lead to eternalism which too puts stop to all endeavours for final release. This is the difficulty that led the Buddha to avoid both these extremes. The so-called self or the soul is, according to him, nothing but an aggregate of *rūpa* (material form), *vedanā* (feeling), *saññā* (perception), *saṃskāra* (coefficients of consciousness), and *vijñāna* (consciousness)—all of which are impermanent (*aniccam*), full of sorrow (*dukkham*) and not-self (*anattā*). This is beautifully expressed in the following dialogue:

‘.... Now what do you think, O Susīma, is the material form (*rūpam*) permanent or impermanent?’

‘Impermanent, O Lord.’

‘But is that which is impermanent, sorrow or joy?’

‘Sorrow, O Lord.’

‘Now that which is impermanent, full of sorrow, and subject to change, is it proper to say of it, ‘This is mine, this am I, this is my self?’

‘Certainly not, O Lord.’

In the same way the Buddha dealt also with the remaining four viz. *vedanā* (feeling), *saññā* (perception), *saṃkhāra* (coefficients of consciousness) and *viññāna* (consciousness). Then he said:

‘Therefore, O Susīma, all material forms, that had been in the past, that are to be in the future as well as that are at present, whether they be internal (*ajjhattam*) or external, gross or subtle, good or bad, near or distant—are not mine, are not myself, and are not my self. All this should be properly realized as such with true wisdom.’

The Buddha then spoke the same thing of *vedanā* (feeling), *saññā* (perception), *sankhāra* (coefficients of consciousness), and *viññāna* (consciousness).¹

The so-called self here is demonstrated to be devoid of any essence. It is shown to dissolve into nothing. It is at best an aggregate of *rūpa* (material form), *vedanā* (feeling) etc. which never coalesce into one indivisible entity. The synthetic reference of our perceptions is responsible for the idea of an unchanging substance called soul. But, as has been shown above, there is nothing like soul or what belongs to soul. This leads to the finding that substance is an unreal fiction, in other words, the doctrine of *suñña* (voidity or substancelessness). This will be clear from the following dialogue:

‘O Lord,’ asked Ānanda, ‘It is said—void is the world, void is the world (*suñño loka*)—Why is it so said, O Lord, that the world is void?’

‘As, O Ānanda, (all) this is devoid (*suññam*) of self (*attena*) or what belongs to self (*attaniyena vā*), so it is said that the world is void. What, Ānanda, is devoid of self or what belongs to self?’

‘The *cakkhu* (eye), O Ānanda, is devoid of self or what belongs to self. The *rūpas* (objects of eye) are also devoid of self or what belongs to self. The *cakkhu-viññāna* (eye-consciousness) is devoid of self or what belongs to self. The *cakkhu-samphassa* (eye-contact) is devoid of self or what belongs to self. . . Whatever feeling, pleasant or painful or neutral, that arises depending upon *mano-samphassa* (mind-contact), that is also devoid of self or what belongs to self.

‘As, O Ānanda, (all) this is devoid of self or what belongs to self, so is it said that the world is void.’²

When there is no soul, how can there be what belongs to it? And therefore, the sense, the object, the sense-object contact and the resultant consciousness—all these are devoid of essence and as such are void. They are only passing states. But it is absurd to ask ‘Whose states?’—a question which it is very difficult to eradicate from the mind once for all. This tendency of the human mind lies at the back of the metaphysics of eternalism which the Buddha was determined to abolish. The word *attā* (Sanskrit *ātmā*), with the Buddha, means something absolutely permanent, immutable and eternal. It is this conception of *attā* that he rejected as absurd.

¹ *SNi*, XII, 70. 32-42.

² *SNi*, XXXV. 85 (2). *Attā* here may also be taken in the sense of *svabhāva* ‘nature’.

Now let us see what the Buddha spoke of *nirvāna* (emancipation) from the following dialogue¹:

‘ . . . Does, O Lord, Tathāgata exist after death?—asked King Pasenadi.

‘ The question whether a Tathāgata exists after death has been left *avyākata* (unexplained) by me, O Mahārāja.’

‘ Does not then, O Lord, Tathāgata exist after death?’

‘ This too *viz.* whether Tathāgata does not exist after death has been left *avyākata* (unexplained) by me, O Mahārāja.’

‘ Does then, O Lord, Tathāgata both exist as well as not exist after death?’

‘ This too . . . has been left unexplained by me, O Mahārāja.’

* * *

Then said the King: ‘ What is, O Lord, the reason, what the cause of that being left *avyākata* (unexplained)?’

‘ I put, O Mahārāja, this question to you yourself, you may answer as you think proper.

‘ What do you think, O Mahārāja, have you got any such calculator (*ganaka*), cashier (*muddika*) or statistician (*saṅkhāyaka*) as can count the grains of sand of the Ganges and say ‘These grains are so many’ . . . or ‘These grains are so many hundred thousands?’?’²

‘ Not certainly, O Lord.’

‘ Have you, again, got any such calculator, cashier or statistician as can measure the water of the great ocean, and can say ‘This is equal to so many *ālhakas*² of water’ . . . or ‘This is equal to so many hundred thousand *ālhakas* of water?’?’

‘ Not certainly, O Lord.’

‘ What is the reason here?’

‘ Great indeed, O Lord, is the ocean, deep, immeasurable, unfathomable.’

‘ Exactly so, O Mahārāja, that form (*rūpa*) of Tathāgata is totally annihilated, uprooted, made like a *tāla* (palmyra) tree whose head is cut off (*tālavatthukataṁ*), has gradually reached extinction (*anabhāvagataṁ*), made incapable of growing again in future. Being free from the knowledge of *rūpa* (form), O Mahārāja, the Tathāgata is deep, immeasurable and unfathomable like the great ocean. Thus it is not proper

¹ *SNi*, XLIV. 1. 22-34.

² One *ālhaka* is equal to two maunds (*Vide* Monier-Williams' *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*).

to say that the Tathāgata exists after death . . . nor is it proper to say that he does neither exist nor does not exist after death.'

The Buddha spoke the same thing about the annihilation etc. of *vedanā* (feeling), *saññā* (perception), *saṅkhāra* (coefficients of consciousness) and *viññāna* (consciousness) of a Tathāgata who, when freed from all these, becomes deep, immeasurable, unfathomable.

This critical and rationalistic attitude of the Buddha towards metaphysical problems is responsible for the development in later times of a number of mutually conflicting metaphysical doctrines within the fold of Buddhism. The Buddha's attitude, however, was one of strict avoidance of all metaphysics which he considered as futile, because he held that one might die before one gets elucidation of these problems.¹ Nor was there anything esoteric in his preaching. The Buddha, on his deathbed, is reported to have said to Ānanda :

' I have preached the truth without making any distinction between exoteric and esoteric doctrine (*anantaram abāhiram katvā*) for, in respect of truth, Ānanda, the Tathāgata has no such thing as the 'closed fist of a teacher' who keeps something back.'²

The Buddha avoided the extremes because the admission of any one of the extremes would involve either nihilism or eternalism—either of which doctrines implies futility of endeavour for final release. The hypothesis of eternalism is as much inconsistent with the idea of final release as the hypothesis of nihilism. Eternalism implies inherent perfection while nihilism implies its impossibility. It is in order to avoid these two undesired consequences that the Buddha adopted the middle course and left these problems *avyākata* (unexplained).³ These were time-honoured problems and as such the dogmatic minds could not get rid of them. The absolutely rationalistic mind of the Buddha, however, found absurdities in them and completely got rid of them. The truth is too deep to get expression in words. Then there was every possibility of it being misunderstood. It is due to these reasons that the Buddha did not explain it. Whenever he was asked to explain the truth, he asked the enquirer to endeavour to see it for himself instead of knowing it from him. The truth cannot be expressed in language. It is to be realized.⁴ His refusal to explain does not mean that he upheld agnosticism, because he believed in realization and asked the enquirer to realize for himself. He characterized

¹ See the Buddha's dialogue with Mālunkaputta, *MNi*, 63.

² *DNi*, II, p. 100 (PTS edition).

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *DNi*, II, p. 217 (PTS). See *The Basic Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 23-24.

nirvāna (emancipation) as deep, immeasurable and unfathomable and as such cannot be a nihilist. His attitude is one of a thorough rationalist who would refuse to enter into enquiries which were self-contradictory on the face of it. To know from others what can only be realized by oneself is absurd. And to express in words what can only be felt is still more absurd. Thought and language have their own shortcomings. If we can think only in terms of subject-object or substance-quality relation, our language also, being only an expression of thought, cannot be free from these. It is the characteristic of our thought and language that they make immobile of what is mobile, static of what is dynamic, eternal of what is evanescent and fleeting.¹ This leads to eternalism. The other extreme is materialism which believes in death as total extinction of personality. It denounces all efforts for final release as absurd and irrational. Self-interest is the only thing worth pursuit. Absence of self-interest means absence of everything else. Annihilation of individuality means annihilation of all. If I cannot remember the past, the past is non-existent. If I cannot keep my individuality of this life intact after death, there cannot be anything beyond death. This is materialism. It can also be called nihilism. Extreme interest in individuality and gross selfishness is the spring of this attitude of mind. It is born of the total disregard of everything unselfish in our attitude. The Buddha avoided both these by keeping aloof from all dialectics. His dialogues are full of philosophical wisdom and quite immune from sophistry and cheap metaphysical quibbles. The Buddha's *dharma* (Law) is well said (*svākkhāto*), the result of it can be realized in this world (*sandiṭṭhiko*), it is immediate (*akāliko*), it says 'come-and-see' (*ehi passiko*), it brings about *nivvāna* or emancipation (*opanayiko*), it is to be realized by the wise in their own hearts (*paccattam veditabbo viññūhi*).

The Buddha's attitude was more ethical than metaphysical. *Karman* and rebirth were acknowledged as facts. They were axioms with the Buddha. His interest was riveted on finding out the pathway to freedom from this cycle of existence. Metaphysics is allowed as subservient to this end. Psychological analysis is more helpful for the purpose than metaphysical speculation. Suffering and sorrow are universal facts and every individual seeks redemption from them. The Buddha starts from these facts. Perpetual change is also given to our

¹ Cf. 'Such is the first proceeding of our thought: it dissociates each change into two elements—the one stable, definable for each particular case, to wit, the Form; the other indefinable and always the same, Change in general. And such, also, is the essential operation of language. Forms are all that it is capable of expressing. It is reduced to taking as understood or is limited to suggesting a mobility which, just because it is always unexpressed, is thought to remain in all cases the same.'—*Creative Evolution* pp. 344-5.

experience. Substance is merely a creation of the staticizing tendency of the human mind which itself, on analysis, is found to be nothing but an ever renewing aggregate of consciousness, feeling, perception (*sañjñā*) and coefficients of consciousness (*samskāra*). The evil passions of *lobha* (greed), *dosa* (aversion) and *moha* (delusion), which a human being shares in common with animals, constitute bondage of existence. Rational life is actuated by *a-lobha* (absence of greed), *a-dosa* (absence of aversion) and *a-moha* (absence of delusion). Emancipation means freedom from evil passions. Life, as it is, is an evil, and to get rid of evil is to get rid of life. In this context emancipation means freedom from all life. Faith in the continuation of pure untainted consciousness after emancipation is as much a heresy as the faith in a permanent substance called soul (*ātmā*). With the cessation of the *trṣṇā* (craving) ceases the *vijñāna* (consciousness) even as the flame of a lamp is extinguished (by the exhaustion of oil, wick etc.).¹

The Buddha expounded the four noble truths (*cattāri āriya-saccāni*) of sorrow (*dukkha*), causal chain of sorrow (*dukkha-samudaya*), cessation of sorrow (*dukkha-nirodha*) and the path leading to the cessation of sorrow (*dukkha-nirodha-gāminī paṭipadā*).² Birth, decay, disease, death, bewailings etc. are all nothing but sorrow. Non-fulfilment of desires also is sorrow. In brief, the aggregate of *rūpa* (form), *vedanā* (feeling) etc., that springs from strong attachment is sorrow. This is the first noble truth of sorrow. The causal chain of *avidyā* (ignorance), *samskāra* (tendencies), *vijñāna* (consciousness) etc. explains the origin of the aggregate of sorrow. This is the second truth which finds out the original cause of this sorrowful existence. By the cessation of the cause, the effect naturally ceases. The second truth thus leads to the discovery of the third which is called *dukkhanirodha* (cessation of sorrow). When the cause is known, the effect can be eliminated by eliminating the cause. What originates must cease. If suffering is a fact and if it is determined by well-defined conditions, it goes without saying that there must be cessation of suffering. The third truth can thus be considered as only a corollary of the first two. The fourth truth lays down the path to freedom or emancipation. It is called the eightfold path (*atthaṅgiko maggo*). It consists of right view (*sammā-ditthi*), right resolution (*sammā-saṅkappa*), proper words (*sammā-vācā*), proper action (*sammā-kammanta*), proper means of livelihood (*sammā-ājīva*), proper exertion (*sammā-vāyāma*), mindfulness in the right way (*sammā-sati*) and proper meditation (*sammā-samādhi*). Of these the first two relate to

¹ Cf. *viññāṇassa nirodhena tanhakkhayavimuttino*

pajjotasseva nibbānaṁ vimokkho hoti cetaso ti.

—*ANi*, III. 89. 2 (Pt. I, p. 236, PTS).

² *Ibid.*, III. 61. 6; *et seq.*

paññā (wisdom), the next three to *sila* (good conduct) and the last three to *saṃādhi* (meditation). The Buddha gave equal importance to each of them. 'Abstinence from all evils, acquisition of the good, and purification of one's own mind—this is the teaching of the Buddha.'¹ Attachment and aversion obscure the good tendencies. It is because of this that the teaching (*sāsana*)—though effectively expounded—has little influence on the mass mind. Self-interest has a blinding effect. It keeps us tied to the past and the static. The common mass rolls downwards. It is necessary to turn the face upward and go against the common flow. It is due to this difficulty that the Buddha hesitated to preach his *dhamma* (Law). The Buddha, after he had realized enlightenment (*bodhi*), is reported to have said to himself 'Now it is useless to proclaim what I have attained by strenuous effort, for this *dhamma* (Law) is not easily understandable by those who are sunk in attachment and aversion. This goes against the current, is subtle, deep, very difficult to realize and atomic. Those coloured with attachment and covered by mass of darkness will not see it.'² But this hesitation did not last long. Immense love for the suffering humanity asserted itself and the Buddha heard the voice of Brahmā (a god) 'Rise up, O valiant warrior, thou hast won the war and art free from debt. Travel now in the world. Let the Blessed One teach the *dhamma* (Law). There will be persons who will understand it.'³ Love (*maitrī*), compassion (*karuṇā*), sympathetic joy (*muditā*) and indifference (*upeksā*) were predominant in his character.

THE JAINA ATTITUDE

Before studying the attitude of Mahāvīra to the metaphysical problems, it will be helpful to begin with his attitude towards life. A major part of Mahāvīra's teaching was concerned with the appeal not to interfere with the lives of others. Sorrow and suffering were as much the facts with Mahāvīra as with the Buddha. To get rid of the cycle of worldly existence was the common end of both of them as of the Upaniṣadic thinkers. The Buddha found everything impermanent and hence sorrowful and substanceless. But Mahāvīra's attitude was

¹ *sabbapāpassa akaraṇam kusalassa upasampadā
sacittapariyodapanam etam buddhāna sāsanam.*

—*Dhammapada*, 183 (XIV. 5).

² *kicchena me adhigatam halam dāni pakāsitusum
rāgadosaparetehi nāyam dhammo susaṃbudho
paṭisotagāmi nipiṇam gambhīram duddasam anūm
rāgarattā na dakkhanti tamokhandhena āvutā.*

—*Mahāvagga*, I. 5. 3.

³ *Uṭṭhehi vīra vijitaśāringāma satthavāha anaṇa vicara loke
desetu bhagavā dhammarām aññatāro bhavissanti.*

—*Mahāvagga*, I. 5. 7.

not so radical. If the Upaniṣadic thinkers found the immutable reality behind the world of phenomena and plurality, and the Buddha denounced everything as fleeting and sorrowful and pointed to the futility of all speculation, Mahāvira adhered to the common experience, found no contradiction between permanence and change and was free from all absolutism. Existence is not an evil by itself and so freedom does not mean total cessation of it. With the Upaniṣadic thinkers what is impermanent is sorrowful and only empirical. The reality therefore is what is permanent and blissful. With the Buddha also everything is impermanent and hence sorrowful and substanceless. Freedom, therefore, means total cessation. But Mahāvīra did not believe in absolute permanence or total cessation. If life were accepted as an illusory phenomenon, or if it were accepted as nothing but evil and suffering, absolute permanence or total cessation would be the truth or the desired goal. But with Mahāvīra change was as much real as permanence, and so his position was quite distinct from those of the absolutists. Freedom means freedom from passions only. It is a qualitative change rather than total cessation.

The preaching of *ahimsā* (non-injury) is the most important task of Mahāvīra's life. Feeling of immense respect and responsibility for life inspires his activities. Suffering is an evil, and to impose suffering is to impose evil. Unless and until we are conscious of the vicissitudes of the soul, its transmigrations, we are not on the proper path. One who is conscious of these facts is *āya-vāī* (believer in soul), *logā-vāī* (believer in the world), *kammā-vāī* (believer in *karman*), and *kiriyā-vāī* (believer in action).¹ Repeated births are due to the ignorance of the nature of *kamma* (actions).² Suffering is a fact which is too obvious to overlook. 'The world is afflicted, decrepit, difficult to instruct, and ignorant. In this agonized world, see how the afflicted ones are causing pains, here and there, by various means.'³ Injurious activities inspired by self-interest lead to evil and darkness. This is what is called bondage (*gantaha*), delusion (*moha*), death (*māra*), and hell (*naraa*).⁴ To do harm to others is to do harm to oneself. 'Thou art he whom thou intendest to kill! Thou art he whom thou intendest to tyrannize over!'⁵ We corrupt ourselves as soon as we intend to corrupt others. We kill ourselves as soon as we intend to kill others. *Pramāda* (unmindfulness) and attachment to *guna* (sensuous objects)

¹ *ĀSū*, I. 1. 1 as explained by commentators.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, I. 1. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ tumām si nāma tam ceva jaīn 'hantavvam' ti manasi

tumām si nāma tam ceva jaīn 'ajjāveyavvam' ti manasi.

—*Ibid.*, I. 5. 5.

Cf. Your own self is your own Cain that murders your own Abel. For every action and motion of self has the spirit of Anti-Christ and murders the divine life within you.—William Law.

are the spring of violence.¹ To remain attached to sensuous objects is to remain in the whirl.² Sensuous objects are the root of worldly existence (*samsāra*).³ The wise should not remain unmindful even for a single moment.⁴ The stupid (*mandā*) and the deluded (*mohena pāudā*) turn away from the right path, and do not cross on to either side. But those who cross conquer greed by contentment and are not influenced by objects of desire.⁵ Penance (*tavo*), restraint of mind (*damo*) and restraint or moral observances (*niyamo*) are not possible for one having attachment to life and property. By nature are we fond of life and have repulsion for suffering.⁶ It is not possible to cross the ocean of worldly existence (*samsāra*) unless the animal instincts are subdued and destroyed. Perpetrators of cruel acts come to grief. They cannot cross the stream of evils (*anohantarā*) and so cannot cross the *samsāra* (world), and go to the other shore (*atīramgamā*). The sense of 'mine' is an evil. 'One who relinquishes the sense of 'mine' relinquishes also the thing about which one feels that it is 'mine'. And one who does not possess anything regarded as 'mine' is a sage who has seen the (right) path.'⁷ Property is an evil inasmuch as it cannot be had without causing suffering to others.

The common man is asleep while the ascetic is always awake, *suttā amuṇī munino sayayām jāgaranti*. He who knows the nature of the sensuous objects is possessed of self (*āyā=ātman*), knowledge (*nāṇa=jñāna*), Scripture (*veda*), Law (*dhamma*) and Truth (*bambha=brahma*).⁸ The man indeed has many thoughts.⁹ Anger, pride and greed are his enemies. 'The brave should destroy anger and pride. He should look upon greed as a great hell. The hero, therefore, should desist from killing, should give up the agreeable and should move being lightened (of the burden).'¹⁰ The responsibility of fall or rise rests on the man himself. 'Man! Thou art thy own friend; why wishest thou for a friend beyond thyself? . . . Man! Restrain thyself, and thou shalt be free from sorrow.'¹¹ The freed has destroyed all anger, pride, deceit and greed. This is the doctrine of the Seer.

¹ Cf. je pamatte gunāṭṭhie se hu dāṇḍe pavuccai.—*Ibid.*, I. 1. 4.

² je guṇe se āvaṭṭe.—*Ibid.*, I. 1. 5.

³ je guṇe se mūlaṭṭhāne.—*Ibid.*, I. 2. 1.

⁴ dhīre muhuttam avi no pamāyae.—*Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, I. 2. 2.

⁶ Cf. savve pāṇā piyāūyā, suha-sāyā, dukkha-paḍikūlā.

—*Ibid.*, I. 2. 3.

⁷ je mamāiya-mairī jahāi, se jahāi mamāiyām
se hu diṭṭhapahe muṇī, jassa natthi mamāiyām.

—*Ibid.*, I. 2. 6.

⁸ *Ibid.*, I. 3. 1.

⁹ anega-citte khalu ayām purise—*Ibid.*, I. 3. 2.

¹⁰ kohāimāṇam haṇiyā ya vīre, lobhassa pāse nirayām mahantām
tamhā hi vīre virao vahāo chindejja sāyām lahubhūya-gāmī.—*Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, I. 3. 3.

One who knows one thing knows all things, and one who knows all things knows one thing. The unmindful apprehends danger from all sides. The mindful has no danger from any quarter. He does not hanker after life.¹ The wise, always mindful and cautious, exerts himself day and night.²

What acts as cause of bondage (*āsava*) in the case of one can act as the cause of release (*parissava*) for another and *vice versa*.³ It is our attitude that counts. The path of the brave is thorny (*duranucarō*). It involves mortification of the flesh.⁴ Desires prove heavy on the soul. They lead one to death. To go near death means to recede back from freedom. To the wise life is like a water-drop on the tip of a tossing leaf. It is the stupid who do cruel acts and keep tied to the cycle of births and deaths.⁵ One should not let one's strength remain concealed (*no nīhāvejja vīriyāni*). Easy life is no life for a spiritual aspirant. For him *dhamma* (Law) means equanimity. 'What thou knowest to be equanimity (*sammam*), know that to be sagedom (*monam*). What thou knowest to be sagedom, know that to be equanimity. It is inaccessible to the weak, sinning, sensual, ill-conducted and house-inhabiting men.'⁶ The mind of a sage is like a calm and quiet lake full to the brim and lying on an even plane and free from all dust. Meditation is impossible for a wavering mind.⁷ Knowledge of the self and the world is necessary for release. The knower is the self. The self is that by which we know.⁸ The world is a whirlpool. 'The current (of sin) is said to come from above, from below, and from the sides ; these have been declared to be the currents through which, look, there is sinfulness.'⁹ Liberation means freedom from the influence of these currents. It cannot be described by words. 'All sounds recoil thence. Where speculation has no room, the mind cannot penetrate there.'¹⁰ The liberated soul has no shape, no colour, no smell, no taste, no weight, no touch, no rebirth, no attachment. It is neither male, nor female, nor otherwise. There is no analogy. It is formless existence, *arūvī sattā*.¹¹

The Jainas, like other exponents of asceticism, endorse suicide in case the body fails to fulfil the demands of the spirit. Of course, 'suicide' is a misnomer for this kind of death. It is only an abandonment of the body unable to help the spirit in its progress. It is not under the pressure of passions that the death is to be courted. Freedom from passions is the prerequisite of this kind of voluntary death. Complete absence of ill will towards every living creature, and good will for all inspire the life and activities of a true ascetic. He

¹ *Ibid.*, I. 3. 4.

² *Ibid.*, I. 4. 1.

³ *Ibid.*, I. 4. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I. 4. 4.

⁵ *Ibid.*, I. 5. 1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, I. 5. 3.

⁷ *Ibid.*, I. 5. 5.

⁸ *Ibid.*, I. 5. 5.

⁹ *Ibid.*, I. 5. 6.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

does neither covet life, nor does he desire death.¹ Attachment to life is as much an evil as attachment to death. If life helps progress of the spirit, it is to be preserved. If by courting death spiritual fall can be checked, it is welcome.

We have reviewed the Jaina position on the basis of the oldest extant record. The main emphasis of Jainism is on *ahimsā*, non-injury. This attitude of Jainism is more due to its rational consciousness than emotional compassion. It is not based on social fellow-feeling, but on individual responsibility. Jainism presumes infinite capacity for spiritual progress in every individual. Infinite knowledge and joy is the innate character of every soul. What is needed is complete non-interference from outside. Given freedom of development, every individual is bound to progress. Interference means spiritual dragging. A truth is not to be forced, but is only to be preached. Individual freedom is more helpful than social pressure. Spiritualism gives more importance to individual perfection than to social progress. Life is not for enjoyment but for exertion. Deep spiritualism was the characteristic of the age of Mahāvīra. It is not for an improved life that exertion is recommended. But it is for a transformed existence that penances are prescribed. Heaven is not the ideal. Freedom from worldly pleasures and sufferings is the end. The Jaina attitude is not in the least pessimistic. It is realistic and optimistic. Suffering is as much an evil as worldly pleasures. But voluntary suffering for the sake of radical transformation is preferable to worldly pleasures. Deep faith in spiritual freedom inspires self-imposed suffering. There is no description of the nature of freed existence. The end is not envisaged. The means stands justified by itself. This is the background whereupon the philosophical superstructure of Jainism was raised.

In consistency with this background, a Jaina *sādhu* (monk) is required to be very cautious about his speech.² He is prohibited against making unwarranted categorical assertions or negations.³ 'A wise man should not joke, nor should he explain without resort to conditional expressions.'⁴ 'He should explain with the help of *vibhajjavāya*, conditional expressions.'⁵ We have already referred to the *vibhajya-vyākaranīya*⁶ problems of the Buddhists. This *vibhajyavāda* was developed into a full-fledged philosophical doctrine by Mahāvīra. The non-violent and tolerant attitude of the Jainas was

¹ jīviyam nābhikāmkhejjā maraṇam no vi patthae.—*Ibid.*, I. 8. 8.

² See *ĀSū*, II. 4. ³ *Ibid.*, II. 4. 1 with commentary thereon.

⁴ na yā 'vi panne parihāsa kujjā na yā 'siyāvāya viyāgarejjā.—*SūKr*, I. 14. 19. The commentary however gives a different explanation.

⁵ vibhajja-vyāyā ca viyāgarejjā.—*Ibid.*, I. 14. 22.

⁶ *Supra*, p. 8. *DNi*, *Saṅgītipariyāya Sutta* (No. 33), fourfold Praśnavyākaraṇa.

responsible for their uttermost carefulness regarding speech which was required to be unassaulting as well as true. Only the merits of a fact should be stressed and not the demerits. One should not hurt the feelings of others. If there are different doctrines, there must be reasons for their origin. It is the duty of a patient thinker to find out the sources of these doctrines. Non-violent search for truth should inspire the enquiries of a thinker. He should not be prejudiced by preconceptions. It is this attitude of tolerance and justice that was responsible for the origin of the doctrine of Non-absolutism (*Anekānta*). Out of universal tolerance and peace-loving nature was born cautiousness of speech. Out of cautiousness of speech was born the habit of explaining problems with the help of *siyāvāya* (= *syādvāda*) or *vibhajjavāya*.¹ This habit, again, developed into a non-absolutistic attitude towards reality.² Our thought is relative. Our expressions are relative. The whole reality in its completeness cannot be grasped by this partial thought or expression. Nor can it be comprehended by combining these thoughts or expressions. What is required is the radical change in our absolutistic attitude. The error lies with the attitude and not with the thought or expression. Attachment and repulsion are the two great enemies of philosophical thinking. A thinker should not be guided by abstractionist tendencies which are responsible for mutually contradictory systems of thought. These tendencies are born of predilections more or less inherent. It is as much difficult to get rid of these predilections as to get rid of the other evils of life. Truth reveals itself to an impartial thinker. This origin of the doctrine of *Anekānta* can be clearly seen from a study of the solutions by Lord Mahāvīra of the problems which were left unexplained by the Buddha as stated above.

Let us begin with the problem of eternalism. The Buddha avoided both eternalism (*śāśvata-vāda*) and nihilism (*uccheda-vāda*). But Mahāvīra explained both these attitudes as real with reference to different aspects of the same reality. This will be clear from the following dialogue between Mahāvīra and his disciple Gautama:

- ‘Are the souls, O Lord, eternal or non-eternal?’
- ‘The souls, O Gautama, are eternal in some respect and non-eternal in some respect.’
- ‘With what end in view, O Lord, is it so said that the souls are eternal in some respect and non-eternal in some respect?’
- ‘They are eternal, O Gautama, from the view-point of substance, and non-eternal from the view-point of modes. And with this end in view it is said, O Gautama, that the souls are eternal in some respect and non-eternal in some respect.’³

¹ Cf. Haribhadra’s *Dharmasaṅgrahāṇī*, gāthā 921 (Bombay 1918 ed.).

² Cf. *Ibid.*, 925.

³ *BhSū*, VII. 2. 273.

It is our common experience that things persist as well as cease to persist. But if we stick to one side of the experience and reject the other as an illusion, we are led to formulate absolutist doctrines of universal eternalism, and universal nihilism. The Buddha rejected both these ends and left the problem unexplained. Mahāvīra accepted both the ends and explained the puzzle as originating from different mental attitudes, fostered by interests in the different aspects of the selfsame reality.

The problem of finiteness and infiniteness of the world (*loka*)¹ is explained with reference to substance, space, time and modes.² The world is finite as regards its substance and space. Its spatial dimensions are finite. Its substance is finite in space. The world is infinite with reference to its temporal dimension and modal expressions. Thus it can be considered as both finite and infinite. The process of the world has neither beginning nor end, though it is limited in space which, in itself, however, is infinite.

The problem of the relation of body and soul is answered by Mahāvīra in the following way:

- ‘ Is the body, O Lord, (identical with) the soul or is the body different from it?’
- ‘ The body, O Gautama, is (identical with) the soul as well as it is different from it.’³

The relation of body and soul is given as one of identity-cum-difference. The soul suffers from the injuries of the body inasmuch as it is identical with the body. It does not become extinct with the extinction of the body inasmuch as it is different from it as well.

The soul is not absolutely unchanging, and so it is liable to progress or regress. Moral endeavour is not inconsistent with this conception of soul. It is inconsistent with the doctrines of absolute staticity or absolute extinction. But this non-absolutist conception is free from this inconsistency. The Buddha avoided both these absolutist extremes, as we have seen above, in order to justify moral endeavours. Eternalism is as much inconsistent with moral endeavour as nihilism. But the Jaina theory does not endorse either eternalism or nihilism. The Buddha perhaps found self-contradiction in asserting both staticity and change in the selfsame entity with reference to identical space and time. But if experience gives this as a fact, we need not be afraid of accepting this as a truth. It is this finding of Mahāvīra that inspired the whole philosophical development of the Jaina mind. If staticity means incapability of change, then certainly

¹ *Loka* means the contents of that portion of the space (*ākāsa*) where the existence and movements of spirit and matter are possible.

² *BhSū*, II. 1. 90.

³ *BhSū*, XIII, 7. 495.

it is self-contradictory to say 'The static entity changes.' But the Jaina conception of staticity is not like this. It is better to use the term 'persistent' instead of 'static'. The Jaina conception of staticity is 'persistent flow'. The substance persists through modes. It is as well as *becomes*. *Being* and *becoming* are not mutually incompatible. One implies the other. Dead staticity is incompatible with change. Absolute being is inconsistent with becoming. If becoming were conceived as a super-addition to being, there would be self-contradiction. Becoming is not related to being in the same way as a pen is related to a table. But *becoming* means the state of *being* at a certain instant. Becoming involves and presupposes persistence. *Becoming* is not a derivative of *being* but its necessary concomitant. The question 'Why should a thing become and change?' is as absurd as the question 'Why should a thing exist?' Being and becoming are ontologically inseparable though they can be distinguished by logical thought. The thinkers who presume *being* as absolutely static and conceive *becoming* as a derivative of *being* are landed in self-contradiction. They eventually reject either *being* or *becoming* or *both* as illusory.

The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* records a number of old doctrines regarding soul, creation and morality. There were some who regarded soul as an evolute of the five material elements *viz.* earth, water, fire, air and ether, and regarded it as destroyed along with the dissolution of the elements.¹ Some again held that the intelligent principle (*vinnū*) appeared in various shapes in the universe.² There were again some who regarded soul as the sixth element and contended that both the world and the soul were eternal; furthermore they believed in determinism.³ Another group believed in five momentary aggregates (*skandhas*) which were regarded neither as different, nor as identical, nor as caused, nor as uncaused.⁴ Suffering, according to some, was neither due to oneself nor due to another; it was due to mere blind chance or fate.⁵ There were again some who were suspicious about what was beyond suspicion and unsuspicious about what was actually liable to suspicion.⁶ There were sceptics (*annāniya*, literally agnostics) who did not know anything for certain.⁷ As regards creation, again, there were some who regarded the world as created by gods, some who regarded it as created by Brahman; others again regarded it as created by Īśvara; some again conceived it as derived from *pradhāna*.⁸

The *Samosarāṇajjhayaṇa* mentions the doctrines of four types of heretics. These are (I) *kiriyam* (actionism), *akiriyam* (non-actionism),

¹ *SūKṛtāṅga*, I. 1. 1. 8.

² *Ibid.*, I. 1. 1. 9.

³ *Ibid.*, I. 1. 1. 15-16.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I. 1. 1. 17.

⁵ *Ibid.*, I. 1. 2. 2-3.

⁶ *asaṅkiyāīm saṅkanti saṅkiyāīm asaṅkiṇo*.—*Ibid.*, I. 1. 2. 10.

⁷ *nicchayatthaṁ na jāṇanti*.—*Ibid.*, I. 1. 2. 16.

⁸ *Ibid.*, I. 1. 3. 5-6.

vinayam (non-discrimination), *annāñam* (agnosticism). The *annāñiyā* (agnostics or sceptics), though they are able arguers, do not get beyond confusion and doubt (*no vitigicchatinnā*).¹ The *veñaiyā* (upholders of *vinaya*) believe truth to be untruth and exemplify what is good as evil.² The *akiriyāvāi* (non-believer in action) does not admit good or evil acts as influencing the future.³ He believes in the world as futile and fixed (*vañjho niyao kasine hu loe*).⁴ The *kriyāvādins* believe in actions, believe in suffering as due to oneself and not due to another, and also admit right knowledge and conduct as leading to liberation.⁵

It is in the context of these doctrines that the attitude of Mahāvīra is to be understood. The Jainas believed in soul as separate from the body and as persisting through different births. They believed in good and bad actions, and also in right faith, right knowledge, and right conduct as leading to final liberation. We have already reviewed the Jaina position. Mahāvīra's beliefs were opposed to the heretical beliefs enumerated above. Mahāvīra was not a sceptic, nor an agnostic. Nor so was the Buddha. Nor were they materialists. Both of them believed in such transcendental things as morality and final emancipation, howsoever much might they differ about their nature. The Buddha certainly did not believe in a spiritual substance persisting through various births, and surviving in its purest form in liberation. But he believed in the world as suffering, and regarded liberation from this suffering as the only end worth pursuit.⁶ *Nāma* (consciousness) is different from *rūpa* (material form), and so ^{Centre for the Arts} dissolution of the body does not mean dissolution of the mind. The *nāma* (consciousness) originates from its own cause, and so its cessation depends upon the cessation of its ultimate cause which is *avidyā*, ignorance. Belief in final emancipation and means thereto is the peculiarity of all those systems which are opposed to materialism. The sceptic lies in between the believers of such transcendental things as morality and final emancipation and the materialists. And the same is the position of the agnostics. We have seen the nature of the agnostics as described in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*. There we found that those thinkers who doubted everything and believed in nothing were called agnostics or sceptics. We also learn from the Buddhist sources about one Sañjaya Velaṭṭhiputta who, when asked about ultimate problems, refused to give definite answer.⁷ He

¹ *Ibid.*, I. 12. 2.

² *saccāni asaccāni iti cintayantā asāhu sāhu tti udāharantā*.

^{—Ibid.}, I. 12. 3.

³ *Ibid.*, I. 12. 4.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I. 12. 7.

⁵ *Ibid.*, I. 12. 11.

⁶ Cf. dukkham eva hi na koci dukkhito kārako na kiryā ca vijjati

atthi nibbuti na nibbuto pumā maggam atthi gamako na vijjati.

^{—Visuddhimagga}, XVI. 90.

⁷ *DNi*, *Sāmaññaphalasutta* (No. 2).

was an agnostic or a sceptic. His failure to answer was due to his indecision and all-round scepticism. There are scholars who believe that the *avyākṛta* attitude of the Buddha and the non-absolutistic attitude of Mahāvīra towards the same problems were either influenced by or developed in opposition to this sceptical attitude of Sañjaya Velaṭṭhiputta.¹ But it is beyond doubt that the respective attitudes of the Buddha and Mahāvīra were characteristic of their natures. The Buddha was a thoroughgoing rationalist and as such did not enter into problems which were beyond the reach of reason. His enquiries were mainly concerned with finding out the cause of suffering and the means to final emancipation, and he rejected as absurd the unnecessary metaphysical speculations. On the other hand, Mahāvīra inherited a number of doctrines from his predecessors and had to reinterpret and revise them in the context of the speculations of his age. In consonance with his immense faith in toleration, and peace-loving nature, he developed a non-absolutistic attitude which enabled him to solve the problems and create conviction among his followers. The whole subsequent Jaina thought is inspired by this attitude, and we shall have many occasions in the course of this work to see the results of this attitude.

¹ *Vide* SBE, Vol. XLV, Introduction, p. xxvii *et seq.*

CHAPTER II

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE ĀGAMAS

INTRODUCTORY

In the preceding chapter we have shown the difference of attitude of Mahāvīra with that of the Buddha and the Upaniṣads and have stressed his credence in the testimony of experience. He did not fall in the trap of abstract logic because he did not deprecate common-sense interpretation of experience. The logical attitude of Mahāvīra was intimately bound up with his empiricism. It is essential for the understanding of Jaina thought that the epistemology of experience as built up by the Jaina thinkers in consonance with the position of the first systematizer of Jaina thought and religion should be thoroughly understood. Realizing this necessity we now address ourselves to undertake an evaluation and exposition of Jaina theory of knowledge with special reference to experience. It is by no means a simple structure and the complexity of the theory shows that the evolution of the study was spread over a long period.

The theory of knowledge of the Āgamas is very old and perhaps originated in the pre-Mahāvīra period. It is said that *Jñāna-pravāda* formed a part of the *Pūrvāśruta*¹ which was regarded as very old and had been lost long ago. *Karma-pravāda* also formed a part of the same *Pūrvāśruta*. The *jñāna*-theory is closely related to the *karma*-theory which forms the very basis of Jaina ethics. The *karma*-theory is as old as Jainism itself, and so we can regard the Jaina theory of knowledge as of great antiquity. There seems to have been no controversy between the followers of Pārśva and Mahāvīra regarding this theory of knowledge, though they differed, and later on compromised, on certain other topics.² In the *Rāyapaseṇaiya Sūtra*, Kesi-Kumāra, a follower of Pārśva, is described as giving the same five divisions of knowledge as are found elsewhere in the Āgamas.³ This theory, in its basic form, is presupposed by the Jaina doctrine of *karman* which, in its fundamentals, is beyond doubt pre-Mahāvīra. The Āgamas are unanimous as regards the fivefold division of knowledge, and there is no controversy between the Śvetāmbaras and the Digambaras regarding it.

For a long time this theory passed more as an article of faith than as a logical doctrine. *Samyag-jñāna* or the knowledge of a person of right attitude was considered as valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). If the

¹ Jinabhadra, in his *ViBh*, quotes a *Pūrvā-gāthā* on *jñāna*. (*ViBh*, 128).

² *Vide BhSū*, I. 9. 76; *UtSū*, XXIII.

³ *RāP*, 165.

attitude is right knowledge is right. If the attitude is wrong knowledge is wrong. A person of perverted attitude (*mithyādrṣṭi*) cannot possess right knowledge. His knowledge is wrong knowledge (*ajñāna*). Non-discrimination between the truth and the non-truth, perverted understanding leading to rebirths, and the absence of self-control which is the consummation of knowledge account for the wrongness of knowledge.¹ Knowledge is inherent in the soul. It does not shine because there is karmic matter to veil it. The knowledge is perfect when this veil is totally removed. It is imperfect when there is only partial removal and subsidence of karmic matter. Absence of knowledge is unnatural to soul even as darkness is foreign to the sun. It is the clouds of the karmic matter that obfuscate the innate knowledge of the soul. Knowledge can be born, or rather emerge, with or without the help of the sense-organs. Of the five classes of knowledge, the *mati* (sensuous) and the *śruta* (scriptural) are born with the help of the sense-organs. The *avadhi* (visual intuition), the *manahparyāya* (intuition of mental modes) and the *kevala* (pure and perfect knowledge) are independent of them. The sense-organs, however, are only external instruments, the different states of the soul being the internal, or rather spiritual, counterparts of them. This conception of knowledge inspired the later epistemological enquiries of the Jaina logicians. When the problem of *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) presented itself before the Jaina thinkers, the term '*jñāna*'² (knowledge) was replaced by the word '*pramāṇa*' (valid knowledge). The fundamental basis of the epistemological position of the Jaina logicians can be adequately expressed by the equation *pramāṇa*=*samyag-jñāna* (right knowledge). *Mati* (sensuous) and *śruta* (scriptural) knowledge were put under *parokṣa* (indirect or mediate cognition), and the other three—*avadhi* (visual intuition), *manahparyāya* (intuition of mental modes) and *kevala* (perfect knowledge)—were classified under *pratyakṣa* (direct or immediate intuition).³ This was but natural: The knowledge is *pratyakṣa* (direct) or *parokṣa* (indirect) according as it is born without or with the help of an external instrument different from the self. But in order to bring their theory of knowledge in line with the theories of other systems of thought, the later Jaina thinkers accorded the status of *pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge) to the knowledge produced by the sense-organs also.⁴ Jinabhadra designates as *saṁvavahāra-pratyakṣa* (empirically direct and immediate) the knowledge produced by the sense-organs and the mind.⁴ This gradual reorientation was due to

¹ Cf. *ViBh*, 115: *sadasad-avisesaṇāo bhavaheu-jadicchiovalambhāo nāṇaphalābhāvāo micchaddiṭṭhissa aṇṇāṇāmī.*

Also *TSū*, I. 33.

² Cf. *SthSū*, II. 1. 71; *TSū*, I. 9-12. ³ See *ADV*, pp. 194-5; *NSū*, 4. ⁴ *imdiyamaṇobhavaṁ jaīn tam saṁvavahāra-paccakkham—ViBh*, 95.

the non-absolutistic attitude and its two corollaries *viz.* the doctrines of 'different attitudes' (*nayas*) and 'sevenfold predication' (*saptabhaṅgi*) which formed the nucleus of the development of Jaina thought. The Āgamic thought reveals the working of these principles in full measure. We have attempted to give a short account of it in the first chapter. But the account given is by no means full. Complete account of it requires a separate treatise, and so we have refrained from it. It can be said in general that the Jaina mind was always open to receive the alien thoughts without any distortion and assimilate them with their own. This fact was due to more than one reason. Firstly, the Jaina logical thought had a comparatively late origin, and so the non-Jaina thinkers had already asserted their position even before the Jaina thinkers came to the arena. The Jainas had a lot to learn and assimilate. Secondly, they had to argue their own case before the hostile thinkers with a measure of efficiency and critical outlook before they could hope to get a patient hearing from their opponents who would naturally refuse to listen to their arguments unless they embodied correct appreciation and fair criticism. Thirdly, many of the first-rate Jaina thinkers such as Siddhasena, Samantabhadra, Akalaṅka, Haribhadra and others were converts from learned Brāhmins and had first-hand knowledge of the non-Jaina systems of thought. This helped correct estimate and comparative understanding. Lastly—and this is the most important reason—the Jaina attitude was non-absolutistic, and its scope was wide enough to assimilate such theories as were based upon reason and truth.

Along with this comparative understanding, the Jaina thinkers had a critical disposition towards their own theories. The Āgamic position regarding *mati* (sensuous) and *śruta* (scriptural) knowledge, *avadhi* (visual intuition) and *manahparyāya* (intuition of mental modes), and *kevala-jñāna* (perfect knowledge) and *kevala-darśana* (perfect intuition) was reoriented by Siddhasena Divākara. Jinabhadra took great pains to reinstate the Āgamic position. Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka and Vidyānandi also were original thinkers and made valuable contribution to the theory. The task of reconciling Siddhasena Divākara and Jinabhadra was left to Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya whose thought also was not without its marks of originality. We shall substantiate these remarks in the course of our study.

Besides this theory of knowledge, the Jaina Āgamas contain also the materials for the logical theory of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*).¹ The *Anuyogadvāra Sūtra*² divides valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) into

¹ *BhSū*, V. 3. 192; *SthSū*, 338. The former mentions four kinds of *pramāṇas* *viz.* *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *aupamya* and *āgama*. The *Sthānāṅga* mentions the same four categories under the name *hetu*.

² *ADv*, pp. 194-202.

four categories *viz.* *pratyakṣa* (perceptual), *anumāna* (inferential), *aupamya* (analogical) and *āgama* (scriptural) cognition and further gives their subdivisions in detail. It also gives illustrations of the subdivisions of the latter three. The *Daśavaikālikaniryukti*¹ of Bhadrabāhu deals also with the problem of the number of members of a syllogism.

Let us now deal with the nature of the fivefold knowledge (*jñānas*) and their subdivisions.

MATI-*JNĀNA* (SENSUOUS COGNITION)

Mati-jñāna is usually known as *ābhinibodhika-jñāna* (perceptual cognition) in the Āgamas.² It belongs to the category of *parokṣa* (indirect cognition) inasmuch as it is born with the help of the sense-organs and the mind. Of course, the *Anuyogadvāra Sūtra* and the *Nandi Sūtra*, as noted above, recognize the knowledge born of the five senses as *indriya-pratyakṣa* (sensuous direct cognition) and Jinabhadra³ designates the knowledge born of the senses and the mind as *saṃvyavahāra-pratyakṣa* (empirical perception). But that is only by way of concession to popular usage as is clear from the use of the word '*saṃvyavahāra*' (empirical) by Jinabhadra. Vācaka Umāsvāti, however, is definitely opposed to this concession.⁴ The recognition of *indriya-pratyakṣa* (sensuous direct cognition) is only a later addition, and this extraneous character of it is proved by the fact that the knowledge born of the senses and the mind is also recognized as *mati-jñāna* (sensuous cognition) which is always counted under the category of *parokṣa* (indirect knowledge). The Jaina thinkers are unanimous in ascribing the status of *parokṣa* (indirect knowledge) to the *mati* (sensuous cognition) and the *śruta-jñāna* (scriptural knowledge). When *pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge) is subdivided into the categories of *indriya-pratyakṣa* (sensuous direct cognition) and *no-indriya-pratyakṣa* (non-sensuous direct knowledge), *avadhi* (visual intuition), (*manah-paryāya* (intuition of the mental modes) and *kevala* (perfect knowledge) are put under the latter while the knowledge born of any of the five senses is counted under the former category. One interesting fact should be noticed in this connection. The old Jaina thinkers unanimously and from the very beginning counted knowledge born with the help of any of the five senses as well as *manas* (mind) as types of *mati-jñāna* (sensuous cognition). But under *indriya-pratyakṣa*

¹ *DVNir*, gāthās 49-50; 89 *et seq.*, 137.

² The term 'mati-jñāna' seems to be older than the terms 'ābhinibodhika'. The karma-theory speaks of *mati-jñānāvaraṇa* but never *ābhinibodhika-jñānāvaraṇa*. Had the term been as old as 'mati', the karma-theory which is one of the oldest tenets of Jainism must have mentioned it with reference to the *āvaraṇa* that veils it.

³ *ViBh*, 95.

⁴ *TSū*, I. 11 and the *Bhāṣya* thereon.

(sensuous direct cognition) they counted only five types of knowledge born of one or other of the five senses. The knowledge born of *manas* (mind) does not find place under *indriya-pratyakṣa* (sensuous direct cognition). This fact points to the truth that the Jaina Āgamas contain a faithful record of the ancient views as recorded in the *Vaiśeṣika*¹ and the *Nyāya*² *Sūtra* that there are only five senses. Furthermore, the Jainas themselves recognize *manas* (mind) as only a *quasi-sense* (*anindriya* or *no-indriya*).³ It is only Vātsyāyana⁴ who contended that the fact of mind being a sense-organ naturally follows from the lack of repudiation as well as enumeration of it as a sense-organ in the works of other schools (*tantrāntara*). Perhaps the Buddhist thinkers were the first to recognize mind as a sense-organ. Vātsyāyana seems to be indebted to the Buddhists for his awareness of this. Īśvarakṛṣṇa, in the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*,⁵ clearly states mind as a sense-organ. And it may be that Vātsyāyana refers to this *Kārikā* as *tantrāntara*. The *Carakasamhitā* which is undoubtedly older than the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, however, does not recognize mind as a sense-organ⁶ though it recognizes it as one of the *karanas* (instruments).⁷ In the *Mahābhārata* also we find *manas* as separately enumerated from the ten sense-organs in connection with the evolution theory of the Sāṅkhya system.⁸ It is difficult to ascertain whether mind was designated as a sense-organ by the authors of the *Yogadarśana* and its *Bhāṣya*.⁹ The *Gītā* also enumerates mind separately from the other sense-organs.¹⁰ Saṅkarācārya¹¹ says that mind also is included under sense-organs on the authority of Smṛti (text embodying tradition). The Jainas, as we have already mentioned, regarded mind as only a *quasi-sense* (*anindriya* or *no-indriya*). It seems that when the problem whether mind should be designated as a sense-organ presented itself before the non-Buddhist thinkers, they tried to clarify their position by deducing its status of a sense-organ from the implication of their own ancient texts. The Jainas, however, adhered to their old position of regarding mind as *anindriya* or *no-indriya* i.e. *quasi-sense*. Thus whereas Vātsyāyana referred to *tantrāntara* and Saṅkarācārya to some Smṛti-text, the Jaina thinkers thought it proper to admit it as an *anindriya* (*quasi-sense*). This investigation helps us to ascertain the chronological order of the development of philosophical thought. The Sāṅkhya as presented by Īśvarakṛṣṇa is found to be a development of the Sāṅkhya found in the *Carakasamhitā* and the *Mahābhārata*. Īśvarakṛṣṇa perhaps profited by Buddhist criticism of counting mind as

¹ *VS*, III. 2. 4.

² *NS*, I. 1. 12.

³ *TSū*, I. 14, 19 and *Bhāṣya*.

⁴ *NBh*, I. 1. 4.

⁵ *SKĀ*, 24, 27.

⁶ *Caraka*, *Sārīrasthāna*, I. 17, 64.

⁷ *Ibid.*, I. 56.

⁸ *Sāntiparva*, 204. 10 ; 210. 29.

⁹ *Vide YD*, II. 19 and 54 with *Bhāṣya*.

¹⁰ *BhGi*, III. 42 ; XV. 7.

¹¹ *SBh* on *BS*, II. 4. 17.

separate from the category of *indriyas* by the authors of the Vaiśeṣika and the *Nyāya Sūtra* as well as the old Sāṃkhya thinkers. As regards the Jaina thinkers, it is not possible to ascertain whether their conception of mind as a *quasi*-sense is indebted to Buddhist criticism. The antiquity of the Jaina conception depends upon the antiquity of their conception of the twenty-eight types of *ābhinibodhika-jñāna* (perceptual cognition) which include *no-indriyaja avagraha* (quasi-sensuous indeterminate perception), *no-indriyaja iḥā* (quasi-sensuous speculation) etc. Perhaps the Jaina conception of mind as a *quasi*-sense is as old as the Buddhist conception of mind as a sense-organ. The antiquity of the Jaina conception of *manahparyāya-jñāna* (intuition of the mental modes) points to the antiquity of the Jaina conception of *manas* (mind). Of course, the recognition of mind as a separate category by all the systems of Indian thought is as old as the origin of the systems themselves. But the difference lies in their various conceptions and their later developments.

Now a problem arises as to why the different schools took so much pains to win the title of a sense-organ for mind, while the Jainas did not care for it? The non-Jaina schools unanimously agreed that the knowledge born of the contact of the sense-organs with the objects is *pratyakṣa* (direct cognition). Now when the problem of regarding the cognitions of pleasure, pain etc., which are obviously independent of the sense-organs, as cases of *pratyakṣa* (direct cognition) presented itself, it was but natural that the mind should be accorded the status of a sense-organ for otherwise the cognition of pleasure, pain etc. would not fall under *pratyakṣa-jñāna* (direct cognition). Besides this the *yogaja pratyakṣa* (transcendental perception) was also to be accounted for. In order to meet this contingency, the non-Jaina thinkers had to accord the status of a sense-organ to the mind.¹ But this presented no difficulty to the Jainas who did not regard *pratyakṣa* (direct cognition) as dependent upon the sense-organ or mind. The soul alone was held responsible for the status of *pratyakṣa* (direct cognition).

Now let us come to our *ābhinibodhika* (perceptual cognition) or *mati-jñāna* (sensuous cognition). Bhadrabāhu's *Niryukti* gives the following synonyms of *ābhinibodhika* (perceptual cognition): *iḥā* (speculation), *apoha* (exclusion), *vimāṇsā* (= *vimarśa*, enquiry), *magganā* (*mārganā*, searching), *gavesanā* (*gaveṣanā*, fathoming), *sannā* (*sañjñā*, recognition), *sai* (*smṛti*, memory), *mai* (*mati*, sensuous cognition), and *pannā* (*prajñā*, wisdom).² The *Tattvārthasūtra* mentions only *mati* (sensuous cognition), *smṛti* (recollection), *cintā* (thought), and *abhinibodha* (perceptual cognition) as synonymous.³ The *Nandi Sūtra* only follows Bhadrabāhu. It is Umāsvāti who gives for the first

¹ Cf. *NBh*, I. 1. 4.

² See *ViBh*, 396.

³ *TSū*, I. 13.

time the definition of *mati-jñāna* (sensuous cognition). Of course, he does not state anything new. He only gathers up the scattered views of the Scriptures in a logical way. He defines *matijñāna* (sensuous cognition) as 'knowledge caused by the senses and the mind'.¹ It is rather a statement of the condition of *matijñāna* (sensuous cognition) than a definition proper. But it serves quite well the purpose of a definition. It further states the two varieties of *mati-jñāna* (sensuous cognition) viz. (1) knowledge born of senses and (2) knowledge born of mind, as the author himself informs us in his *Bhāṣya*.² The commentator Siddhasenagaṇin, however, attempts to distinguish three categories of *matijñāna* viz. (1) exclusively due to the sense-organs (*indriya*), (2) exclusively due to the mind (*anindriya*), and (3) due to the joint activity of the senses and the mind.³ Umāsvāti cites the cognitions of the fivefold sense-data viz. *sparśa* (touch), *rasa* (taste) etc. by the five sense-organs of *sparśana* (touch-sense), *rasana* (taste-sense) etc. as instances of *mati-jñāna* due to sense-organs (*indriya*). Knowledge independent of the activity of the sense-organs is called 'knowledge due to *anindriya* (non-sensuous).' Thus knowledge which involves the activity of the mind alone falls under this category. Similarly, instinctive incipient intuitions of the plant world as well as the undeveloped animal organisms, which are independent of both the sense-organs and the mind, also fall under it.⁴ The commentator distinguishes an additional category comprising cognitions born of the joint activity of the mind and the senses. But this is also implied in the statement of the *Bhāṣya*. Thus in all there are four categories of *matijñāna* viz. (1) cognition without the help of both mind and senses, (2) cognition due to the activity of the senses alone, (3) cognition due to the activity of the mind alone, and (4) cognition due to the joint activity of the mind and the senses. One fact is to be noticed here. All cognitions are nothing but different states of the soul and as such are only cases of emergence and not origination proper. They depend upon the activity of the soul alone, the senses and the mind being only auxiliary conditions. We shall discuss the problem at some later stage.

Pūjyapāda Devanandi, the author of *Sarvārthasiddhi*, does not supplement the synonyms of *mati* as given by Umāsvāti.⁵ Akalaṅka supplements the list by *pratibhā* (grasp), *buddhi* (intellect) and

¹ tad indriyānindriyanimittam—*TSū*, I. 14.

N.B. We have translated *anindriya* by 'mind'. But strictly speaking it means 'what is other than a sense-organ'. Knowledge independent of both senses and the mind also falls under knowledge due to *anindriya*.

² *Bhāṣya*, *ibid.*

³ See *Tīkā*, *ibid.*

³ See *Tīkā*, *ibid.*

⁴ Cf. anindriyanimittam manovṛttir ogha-jñānatā ca—*Bhāṣya* on *TSū*, I.

^{14.} See also Siddhasenagaṇin's *Tīkā*.

⁵ See *SSi* on *TSū*, I. 13.

upalabdhi (perception), and refers to others by using the term *et cetera* (*ādi*).¹ Vidyānandi in his *Tattvārthaślokavārttika*,² however, adds *buddhi* (intellect), *medhā* (retentiveness), *prajñā* (reasoning), *pratibhā* (grasp), *abhāva* (non-perception), *sambhava* (probability) and *upamiti* (analogy) to the synonyms given by Umāsvāti.

In this connection the view of Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka deserves special attention. Akalaṅka, in his *Laghīastraya*, divides *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) into *pratyakṣa* (direct) and *parokṣa* (indirect) and recognizes *pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge) as twofold viz. *mukhya* (transcendental) and *sāṃvyaavahārika* (empirical) also called *atīndriya-pratyakṣa* (super-sensuous intuition) and *indriyānindriya-pratyakṣa* (sensuous and quasi-sensuous perception) respectively.³ *Avagraha* (perception), *īhā* (speculation), *avāya* (perceptual judgment) and *dhāraṇā* (retention) are subsumed under *indriya-pratyakṣa* (sensuous perception), while *smṛti* (memory), *sañjñā* (recognition), *cintā* (discursive thought) and *abhinibodha* (perceptual cognition) are put under *anindriya-pratyakṣa* (quasi-sensuous or mental perception). *Śruta* (scriptural knowledge), *arthāpatti* (presupposition), *anumāna* (inference), *upamāna* (analogy) etc. are put under *parokṣa* (indirect knowledge).⁴ *Mati-jñāna* thus is recognized as *pratyakṣa*. Memory, recognition, discursive thought etc. are cases of *mati-jñāna* so long as they are not associated with language. They come under *śruta* (scriptural knowledge) as soon as they are associated with words,⁵ and as such they become *parokṣa*. No other Jaina thinker has tried to subsume memory, recognition, discursive thought etc. under *pratyakṣa*. Akalaṅka stands alone in this respect. He has not even a single supporter among his successors who admired him so much. On the contrary some of his successors have attempted to find a different meaning of the statements of Akalaṅka in this connection.⁶

We shall now state in brief the nature of the subdivisions of *mati-jñāna*⁷ viz. *avagraha* (perception), *īhā* (speculation), *avāya* (perceptual judgment) and *dhāraṇā* (retention) which are nothing but so many stages of the development of *mati-jñāna*.

(a) *Avagraha* (Perception)

The *Nandi Sūtra* gives these as the synonyms of *avagraha*—*avagrahanatā* (receiving), *upadhāraṇatā* (holding), *śravaṇatā* (hearing),

¹ matiḥ smṛtiḥ sañjñā cintā 'bhinibodhādaya ityarthah. ke punas te? pratibhā-buddhy-upalabdhyādayah.—*TRā* on *TSū*, I. 13.

² Sloka 3 on *TSū*, I. 13.

³ *LT*, 3 and 4 (also see *Vivṛti* on it composed by Akalaṅka himself).

⁴ *LT*, 61 (with *Vivṛti*).

⁵ See *LT*, 10-11 (with *Vivṛti*).

⁶ Cf. *NKC* on kārikā 10 and the first half of kārikā 11 (pp. 403 et seq.).

⁷ For Ācārya Kundakunda's classification see *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, 41.

avalambanatā (grasping), and *medhā* (gradual awareness).¹ Umāsvāti, however, gives the following synonyms: *avagraha* (receiving), *graha*, *grahaṇa*, *ālocana* (intuition) and *avadhāraṇa* (holding).² *Avagraha* can be of two kinds *viz.* *vyañjanāvagraha* (contact-awareness) and *arthāvagraha* (object-perception).³ The *Nandi Sūtra* does not clearly define *avagraha*, but only clarifies the implication by illustrations. It seems to quote *Āvaśyakaniryukti* of Bhadrabāhu, which defines *avagraha* as 'cognition of sense-data' (*atthāṇam uggahaṇām*).⁴ It also states that *avagraha* is instantaneous,⁵ that is, it lasts only for one instant which is an infinitesimal and further indivisible point of time, beyond ordinary human conception. But it is to be understood that this instantaneousness relates to *arthāvagraha* (object-perception) and not to *vyañjanāvagraha* (contact-awareness) which continues for an *asaṁkhyeya* (countless) number of instants, gradually proceeding towards the plane of consciousness.⁶ Suppose, for instance, that a man is asleep and is to be awakened by call. The sound, which the Jaina thinkers regard as composed of material atoms, of the call reaches his ears and he is awakened. But the sound-atoms reach his ears in succession, and countless instants elapse before the ears are sufficiently saturated with these atoms so that the person may be awakened to consciousness. As soon as the person becomes conscious, *vyañjanāvagraha* (contact-awareness) is over as then there occurs *arthāvagraha* (object-perception) which lasts, as has already been stated, only for one instant. Now the question is whether this object-perception is determinate or indeterminate. Contact-awareness, as we have seen, is only stirring of the consciousness. It is only awakening of consciousness. Of the five sense-organs, the sense-organ of sight is incompetent for contact-awareness inasmuch as there is no physical contact between this sense-organ and its object *viz.* coloured shape (*rūpa*). Contact-awareness is possible only when there is physical contact between the sense-organ and its object. On the same ground the mind (*manas*) is also incompetent for contact-awareness. Thus there can be only four types of it, there being left only four sense-organs *viz.* ear, taste, smell and touch competent to have contact-awareness.⁷ Object-perception, however, is possible by all the five sense-organs as well as the mind, and consequently can be of six types.⁸ According to Umāsvāti and Jinabhadra, both of whom are staunch supporters of Āgamic conceptions, *avagraha* is indeterminate cognition. So far as

¹ *NSū*, 30.

² *TSūBh*, I. 15.

³ *NSū*, 27 ; *TSū*, I. 17-18 ; *ViBh*, 193.

⁴ *NSū*, 36 (gāthā 83). Cf. *ViBh*, 179. We give this number instead of the serial number of the gāthā of the *Āvaśyakaniryukti* for convenience of reference.

⁵ *NSū*, 36 (gāthā 84). Cf. *ViBh*, 333.

⁶ See *ViBh*, gāthās 333-4 with the *Śiṣyahitā Bṛhadvṛtti*. Also see *NSū*, 35.

⁷ *NSū*, 28 ; *ViBh*, 204.

⁸ See *NSū*, 29.

our knowledge goes, among the later Jaina logicians there has been none to uphold this old position, except Siddhasenaganin, the commentator of Umāsvāti's *Tattvārtha-sūtra-bhāṣya*, and Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya of the seventeenth century, who has only summarized the arguments of Jinabhadra in his *Jaina-tarka-bhāṣā*. Thus our enquiry will be based on the works of Umāsvāti, Jinabhadra, Siddhasenaganin and Yaśovijaya. We shall refer to the works of Pūjyapada Devanandi, Akalaṅka, Vidyānandi, Vādi-Devasūri and Hemacandra only by way of contrast. In this chapter we are mainly concerned with the Āgamic conception and as such should leave the details of the theories of the later logicians out of account in the present context.

Umāsvāti defines *avagraha* as 'indeterminate intuitional cognition of their respective objects by the sense-organs.'¹ The *avagraha* cognizes only the general features of an object. It is indeterminate. The distinctive characteristics of the object are not cognized by it. The object presented in it is indeterminate and free from association with names.² The *Nandi Sūtra* cites the sound-consciousness of a man just awakened from sleep by hearing the sound as an example of *arthāvagraha* (object-perception) by the sense-organ of ear. The man is conscious of some sound, but he does not cognize the definite nature of the sound at this stage.³ According to Jinabhadra, the consciousness of such a person has not even taken the form of 'This is sound' inasmuch as the cognition 'This is sound' is determinate and discursive and requires more than one instant for developing such form which is possible only in the third stage called *apāya* (perceptual judgment).⁴ The *arthāvagraha* (object-perception), being instantaneous, cannot be considered to have developed such a form. The object of *arthāvagraha* is some common feature, indefinite and devoid of any individual characteristic, name etc.⁵

What then is the exact nature of *arthāvagraha* (object-perception)? Object-perception is the consummation of *vyañjanāvagraha* (contact-awareness) and as such can be properly understood only when the nature of the latter is properly understood. Now what is *vyañjana*? 'What reveals an object even as a lamp reveals a jar is *vyañjana*. It is the relation of the physical sense-organ with the substance transformed into its sense-data such as sound-(atoms).'⁶ The *vyañjanāvagraha* is not unconscious inasmuch as it is this that finally develops

¹ tatrā 'vyaktarām yathāsvam indriyair viṣayāṇām ālocaṇāvadhāraṇam avagrahah—*TSūBh*, I. 15.

² Cf. yad vijñānam . . sāmānyasyā 'nirdeśyasya svarūpa-kalpanārahitasya nāmādikalpanārahitasya ca vastunah paricchedakām so 'vagrahah—*Tīkā* on *TSūBh*, I. 15.

³ *NSū*, 35.

⁴ See *ViBh*, gāthās 252-3.

⁵ sāmarṇam aṇiddesam sarūva-nāmāi-kappaṇārahiyam—*ViBh*, 252.

⁶ *ViBh*, 194.

into *arthāvagraha* (object-perception).¹ The consciousness is there from the very instant of inception, though it is not felt due to its undeveloped existence.² It is not possible for any ordinary man to know all the contents of the mind even when he is wide awake, inasmuch as a countless number of conscious states emerge during the course of a single day.³ Let us now come to *arthāvagraha* (object-perception).

The *Nandi Sūtra* states that in the last instant of the *vyañjanāvagraha* (contact-awareness) there emerges a cognition such as 'This is sound' though the exact nature of the sound is not cognized there. This is called *avagraha*.⁴ Jinabhadra interprets this statement as recording *only the occurrence* of the cognition *and not* its *specific content*.⁵ The *arthāvagraha* (object-perception) lasts only for an instant, and it is not possible that an instantaneous flash should be of the determinate form 'This is sound'. The cognition 'This is sound' is not *arthāvagraha* (object-perception) but *apāya* (perceptual judgment) inasmuch as it is determinate cognition having 'the exclusion of everything else other than sound' as its characteristic.⁶ Jinabhadra refutes at great length the position of the opponent who regards *arthāvagraha* (object-perception) as determinate cognition. We do not know of any logical treatise, prior to the *Viśesāvaśyakabhāṣya* of Jinabhadra, which regards *avagraha* as determinate cognition, except the *Sarvārthasiddhi* of Pūjyapāda Devanandi, which defines *avagraha* as 'the first cognition after the instant of the contact of the object and the sense-organ'⁷ and further says 'On the contact of the object and the sense-organ, there occurs intuition (*darśana*) and the cognition of the object thereafter is *avagraha*, for instance, the cognition 'This is white colour' by the organ of sight is *avagraha*'.⁸ The *Sarvārthasiddhi* regards *vyañjanāvagraha* (contact-awareness) as 'indeterminate' and *arthāvagraha* (object-perception) as 'determinate'.⁹ Jinabhadra, however, as an exponent of the Āgamic conceptions, insists on the indeterminateness

¹ Cf. *ViBh*, 195. Yaśovijaya, however, concedes as an alternative that *vyañjanāvagraha* is a cognition only by transference of epithet, being the condition of *arthāvagraha* which is a cognition.—*JTBh*, p. 3.

² Cf. *ibid.*, 196.

³ jagganto vi na jānai chaumatto hiyayagoyarañ savvam
jam tajjhavasāpāñam jam asaṁkhejjām divaseṇa.—*ViBh*, 199.

⁴ Cf. se jahānāmae kei purise avvattam saddam sunijjā teñam saddo tti uggahie, no ce 'va ḡam jānai ke vesa saddāi—*NSū*, 35.

⁵ Cf. *ViBh*, 253.

⁶ Cf. *ViBh*, 254.

⁷ viṣaya-viṣayi-sannipāta-samayānantaram ādya-grahaṇam avagrahāḥ.

—*SSI*, I. 15.

⁸ viṣaya-viṣayi-sannipāte sati darśanam bhavati, tadanantaram arthasya grahaṇam avagrahāḥ, yathā cakṣuṣā śuklam rūpam iti grahaṇam avagrahāḥ.

—*Ibid.*

⁹ arthāvagraha-vyañjanāvagrahāyor vyaktāvyaktakṛto viśeṣaḥ.—*SSI*, I. 18.

of *avagraha*. He is not prepared to allow the least reference even to a relative particular in *avagraha*, because even relative particularity is enough to put it into the category of *apāya* (perceptual judgment). If relative particularity is the criterion of the status of *avagraha*, then the possibility of *apāya* (perceptual judgment) will be ruled out inasmuch as in that case any cognition of a particular characteristic will be a case of *avagraha*, there being always available a cognition of a still more particular characteristic. It is not possible to ascertain all the particulars of an entity even in the course of a very long time.¹ An entity reveals more and more specific characteristics along with the advancement of our knowledge. It is therefore more logical to concede the status of *avagraha* only to those cognitions which are totally free from even negligible reference to some particular characteristic. The cognition that contains the least particular as its content is *apāya* (perceptual judgment), and not *avagraha*. Jinabhadra quotes the view of some thinkers who held that the *avagraha* of a new-born child cognizes only the general features while that of a person sufficiently familiar with the objects cognizes the particular characteristics even in one single instant. But he refutes the view on the ground that it will entail the postulation of an indefinite number of *avagrahas* each varying according to the richness of the knowledge of the cognizer. The richer the knowledge of a person the more will be the number of particular characteristics cognized in his *avagraha*.² But this is certainly a fantastic position. Jinabhadra further quotes an opinion which regarded *avagraha* as bringing up the rear of *ālocana* (intuitive cognition) which cognizes the general feature (*sāmānya*) and as cognizing its object as excluded from everything else. He criticizes the theory on the grounds already given and says that this *ālocana* (intuitive cognition) cannot be identified with *vyāñjanāvagraha* (contact-awareness) inasmuch as the latter has none as its object while the former has 'general feature' as its object. It can, therefore, be nothing but our *arthāvagraha* (object-perception) under different nomenclature.³

Now *avagraha*—like *īhā* (speculation), *apāya* (perceptual judgment) and *dhāraṇā* (retention)—has been characterized as 'cognizing quickly', 'cognizing slowly', 'cognizing many', 'cognizing some' etc. and this is not possible unless *avagraha* is regarded as lasting for more than one instant and as cognizing the particular characteristics.⁴ Jinabhadra gets over this difficulty by stating that these are called cases of *avagraha* only by transference of epithet (*upacārena*). A genuine (*naiścayika*) *arthāvagraha* (object-perception) lasts only for a

¹ Cf. *ViBh.*, 255-6.

² Cf. *ibid.*, 268-9.

³ See *ViBh.*, 273-7 with the *Brhadvṛtti*.

⁴ See *ibid.*, 280 with the *Brhadvṛtti*; also see *TSū*, I. 16.

single instant and cognizes the general feature alone. It is only by way of metaphor that an *apāya* (perceptual judgment) is called *avagraha* with reference to the succeeding *ihā* (speculation) and *apāya* (perceptual judgment).¹ In the case of genuine *avagraha* only the general feature is cognized. Then through the process of *ihā* (speculation) and *apāya* (perceptual judgment) the cognition becomes determinate. In this determinate cognition which is an *apāya* (perceptual judgment) a particular characteristic is cognized. Thereafter if the cognizer strives for a further specific characteristic, he has to pass through new *ihā* (speculation) to new *apāya* (perceptual judgment). In this case the former determinate cognition which was the starting point of this second process is called *avagraha* by transference of epithet. It can also be called a case of relative *avagraha*. But by no means can it be called a genuine *avagraha*. Siddhasenagāṇin has also raised the same problem and given the same answer in his commentary on the *Tattvārthasūtrabhāṣya*.² Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya has summarized the position of Jinabhadra very excellently in his *Jaina-tarka-bhāṣā*.³

We have already given the view of Pūjyapāda Devanandi and have also stated that he regards *avagraha* as determinate cognition. It is interesting to note that all the eminent Jaina logicians such as Akalaṅka, Vidyānandi, Vādi-Devasūri and Hemacandra regard *avagraha* as determinate. Akalaṅka defines *avagraha* as 'determinate cognition of the distinctive nature of an object, following in the wake of intuitional cognition of pure existence, consequent upon the contact of the sense-organ with the object'.⁴ On the contact⁵ of the sense-organ with the object there arises an intuitional cognition of pure existence (*sanmātra-darśanam*). This intuitional cognition then develops into determinate cognition of the object. This is called *avagraha*.⁶ Vidyānandi defines *avagraha* as 'the cognition of the individuality of a thing, following in the wake of the cognition of thing in general born of the contact of the sense-organ and the object'.⁷ Vādi-Devasūri

¹ See *ViBh*, 282-4.

² See *Tīkā* on *TSūBh*, I. 16: *nanu cā 'vagraha ekasāmayikah śāstre nirūpito na cai 'kasmin samaye cai 'vai 'kāvagraha evaṁvidho yukto 'Ipakālatvād iti. ucyate—satyam evam etat, kintu avagraho dvidhā—naiścayiko vyāvahārikaś ca—etc.*

³ See *JTBh*, p. 4-5.

⁴ akṣārthayoge sattāloko 'rthākāravikalpadhīḥ
avagraho—*LT*, 5.

⁵ Here 'contact' does not mean physical contact, but such proximity as is competent for the rise of cognition.

⁶ See *Vivṛti* on *LT*, 5.

⁷ akṣārthayogajād vastumātra-grahaṇa-lakṣaṇāt
jātaṁ yad vastubhedaśya grahaṇaiḥ tad avagrahah. —*TSIV*, p. 219.

defines *avagraha* as the first cognition of an object as determined by a secondary common characteristic, born of the intuitional cognition following in the wake of sense-object contact and having pure existence as its object.¹ Ācārya Hemacandra defines *avagraha* as 'the cognition of an object, which follows in the wake of indeterminate intuition due to the contact of the sense-organ with the object.'² We thus find that these Jaina thinkers unanimously hold *avagraha* to be determinate cognition. The Āgamic conception of *avagraha* as indeterminate cognition was not upheld by the Jaina logicians in view of its indefiniteness and lack of pragmatic value. This is apparent from the conception of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) of the Jaina logicians. This subject, however, is not relevant and so we do not discuss it here.

(b) *īhā* (Speculation)

īhā (speculation) follows in the wake of *avagraha* (perception). In *avagraha*, as we have seen, there is only an indeterminate cognition, or an indistinct awareness of the object. In *īhā* the object is known distinctly. For instance, in *avagraha* (perception) a person simply hears a sound while in *īhā* he cognizes the nature of the sound also.³ The indistinct awareness of the *avagraha* (perception) cognizes only a part of the object while *īhā*, being a determinate cognition, cognizes the rest and strives or enquires for a particular characteristic.⁴ The process of *īhā* continues for a certain period of time, though it never exceeds one *muhūrta*.⁵ The *Nandi Sūtra* gives these five as the synonyms of *īhā*: *ābhogaṇatā* (leaning towards), *mārgaṇatā* (searching), *gaveṣaṇatā* (fathoming), *cintā* (discursive thought) and *vimarṣa* (enquiry).⁶ Umāsvāti, however, gives quite different synonyms which are: *īhā* (speculation), *ūha* (reasoning), *tarka* (reasoning), *parīkṣā* (investigation), *vicāraṇā* (thinking) and *jījñāsā* (enquiry).⁷ Pūjyapāda Devanandi defines *īhā* as 'the striving for a specific characteristic of the object cognized by *avagraha* (perception).'⁸ The *Āvaśyakaniryukti* defines *īhā* as 'speculation (*vicāraṇam*)'.⁹ Jinabhadra, commenting upon it, says '*īhā* means enquiry for the distinctive feature'.¹⁰ *Vyañjanāvagraha* (contact-awareness) is the beginning of awareness,

¹ *PNT*, II. 7.

² *PMi*, I. 1. 26.

³ se jahānāmae kei purise avvattam saddam suṇijjā teṇam saddo tti uggahie, no ceva nām jānai ke vesa saddai, tao īham pavisai, tao jānai amuge esa sadde—*NSū*, 35.

⁴ Cf. *avagṛhīte viṣayārthaikadeśāc cheṣānugamanam niścayaviṣeṣa-jījñāsā ceṣṭā īhā*—*TSūBh*, I. 15.

⁵ *NSū*, 34; *ViBh*, 333 (*Āvaśyakaniryukti-gāthā*). One *muhūrta* is equal to forty-eight minutes.

⁶ *NSū*, 31.

⁷ *TSūBh*, I. 15.

⁸ *SSi*, I. 15.

⁹ *ViBh*, 179 (*Niryuktigāthā*).

¹⁰ bheya-magganam ahe 'hā—*ViBh*, 180.

arthāvagraha (object-perception) is the dawning of awareness, and *ihā* is determinate tendency towards the ascertainment of the particular nature of the object. Though *ihā* is a kind of speculation, it is to be distinguished from *samśaya* (doubt). Jinabhadra has drawn this very fine line of distinction between *samśaya* (doubt) and *ihā*. 'The mental state which relates to many (mutually contradictory) objects, which is stupefied owing to its incapacity for exclusion (of the false), and which seems to retire into a perfectly supine condition, is non-cognition (*ajñāna*) of the nature of doubt. And the mental state which strives for the ascertainment of the truth by means of reason and logic, which is destined to be successful, and which tends towards the acceptance of the true and avoidance of the untrue is called *ihā*'.¹ Siddhasenaganin also draws the same line of distinction between *ihā* and *samśaya* (doubt).² All the Jaina logicians have unanimously given the same view of *ihā* and so we do not mention their definitions separately.

(c) *Apāya* or *Avāya* (Perceptual Judgment)

After *ihā* (speculation) there arises *apāya* which excludes the non-existent characteristics. *Ihā* (speculation) is enquiry about right and wrong. *Apāya* is ascertainment of the right and exclusion of the wrong.³ It, therefore, is a determinate cognition of the object. *Apāya* can be rendered as 'perceptual judgment'. The *Āvaśyakaniryukti* defines *apāya* as 'determinate cognition'.⁴ *Apāya* involves determination of the existent qualities and exclusion of the non-existent qualities. For instance, when on hearing a sound one determines that the sound must be of the conch and not of the horn, because it is accompanied by such qualities as sweetness, it is a case of *apāya* (perceptual judgment).⁵ The *Sarvārthasiddhi* defines it as 'cognition of the true nature on account of the cognition of the particular characteristics'.⁶ Jinabhadra quotes an opinion which regarded *apāya* as only excluding the non-existent characteristics and attributed the function of cognizing the existent characteristics to *dhāraṇā* (retention) which brings up the rear of *apāya*.⁷ He criticizes the opinion as absurd and states that

¹ jam aṇegatthālambanam apajjudāsaparikumñhiyam cittam
seya iva savvappayao tam saṁsayarūvam annānam.
tam ciya sayatthaheū-vivattivāvaratapparamamoham
bhūyābhūya-visesāyāna-ccāyābhimuham *ihā*.

—*ViBh*, 183-84.

² Tīkā on *TSūBh*, I. 15.

³ avagr̥hite viṣaye samyag asamyag iti guṇa-doṣa-vicāraṇā-'dhyavasāyā-panodo 'pāyah—*TSūBh*, I. 15.

⁴ vavasāyam ca avāyam—*ViBh*, 179 (*Niryuktigāthā*).

⁵ *ViBh*, 290.

⁶ viṣeṣa-nirjūnād yāthātmyāvagamanam avāyah—*SSi*, I. 15.

⁷ *ViBh*, 185.

whether a cognition simply excludes the non-existent characteristics, or simply determines the existent characteristics, or does both the functions, it is *apāya* and nothing else.¹ Umāsvāti gives the following synonyms of *apāya*: *apagama*, *apnodā*, *apavyādha*, *apeta*, *apagata*, *apaviddha*, *apanutta* (all these expressions having the same meaning viz. determinate judgment).² The *Nandi Sūtra* gives these as the synonyms: *āvartanatā* (limited determination), *pratyāvartanatā* (repeated determination), *avāya* (determination), *buddhi* (vivid determination), *vijñāna* (determinate cognition).³ A comparison of these two sets of synonyms leads us to the hypothesis that the above opinion, as quoted and criticized by Jinabhadra on the nature of *apāya*, was upheld by those who regarded the first set as the synonyms of *apāya*. Of course, it is difficult to say whether Umāsvāti himself was a staunch supporter of that view, although we have a glimpse of his predilection for it from the definition of *apāya* given by him in his *Tattvārtha-sūtrabhāṣya*⁴ which has been quoted above. The synonyms of *dhāraṇā* (retention) as given by Umāsvāti in the same place also deserve consideration in this connection. They support the opinion quoted by Jinabhadra. Jinabhadra, however, is undoubtedly a staunch supporter of the Āgamic conceptions, and it is apparent from the consideration of the synonyms as given by the *Nandi Sūtra* that he agrees with the view of the *Nandi Sūtra*. The problem deserves a closer attention. But as it does not fall within the scope of our present study, we leave it for discussion elsewhere.

(d) *Dhāraṇā* (Retention)

Apāya (perceptual judgment) is followed by *dhāraṇā* (retention) which means retention of the perceptual judgment for a number of instants, *samkhyeya* (countable) or *asamkhyeya* (countless).⁵ The *Nandi Sūtra* gives the following synonyms of *dhāraṇā*: *dhāraṇā* (retention), *dhāraṇa* (holding), *sthāpanā* (placing), *pratiṣṭhā* (fixing), and *koṣṭha* (firmly grasping).⁶ Umāsvāti defines *dhāraṇā* as 'final determination of the object, retention of the (resultant) cognition and recognition (of the object on future occasions)' and gives the following synonyms: *pratipatti* (continued cognition), *avadhāraṇā* (memory), *avasthāna* (retention), *niścaya* (continued cognition), *avagama* (retention) and *avabodha* (cognition).⁷ The *Āvaśyakaniryukti* also defines

¹ *ViBh*, 186.

² *TSūBh*, I. 15.

³ *NSū*, 32.

⁴ I. 15.

⁵ Cf. *tao dhāraṇam* *pavisai*, *tao ḥam dhārei* *samkhejjam* *vā* *kālām* *asamkhejjam* *vā* *kālām*—*NSū*, 35.

⁶ *NSū*, 33.

⁷ *dhāraṇā* *pratipattir* *yathāsvam* *matyavasthānam* *avadhāraṇam* *ca*. *dhāraṇā* *pratipattir* *avadhāraṇā* 'vasthānam' *niścayaḥ* *avagamaḥ* *avabodha* *ity* *anarthāntaram*.—*TSūBh*, I. 15.

dhārānā as 'retention'.¹ Jinabhadra says that *dhārānā* means absence of lapse of the perceptual judgment.² This *dhārānā* is threefold according to him. 'The absence of lapse (*avicyuti*) of the cognition of the object, the (resultant) emergence of mental trace (*vāsanā*), and the recollection (*anusmarana*) of it again in future—all these which follow in the wake of that (viz. perceptual judgment) constitute *dhārānā*'.³ Thus *avicyuti* (absence of lapse), *vāsanā* (mental trace) and *smṛti* (recollection)—these three are included in the conception of *dhārānā*. Siddhasenaganin has accepted this view.⁴

Pūjyapāda Devanandi defines *dhārānā* as 'the condition of non-oblivion in future of what has been cognized by *avāya* (perceptual judgment)'.⁵ Akalaṅka defines it as the condition of recollection, which is called *sāṃskāra* (trace).⁶ Vidyānandi also admits the same definition.⁷ This 'trace' is not unconscious. It is, like *īhā* (speculation), of the nature of knowledge, inasmuch as it is the condition of another knowledge called recollection.⁸ Vādi-Devasūri criticizes the view of Akalaṅka and Vidyānandi that *dhārānā* is the condition of recollection. He defines it as 'gradual consolidation and absence of lapse for a certain length of time of the *apāya* (perceptual judgment) on account of the mindfulness of the cognizer'.⁹ *Dhārānā* is only concentrated persistence of the *apāya* (perceptual judgment) for a certain length of time. It is not by any means the condition of recollection in future, inasmuch as it, being a case of perceptual cognition, cannot last up to the time of recollection. And again if it were to last up to that time, then it would be impossible to cognize anything else during that interval, inasmuch as even the upholders of the said view do not admit the presence of two cognitions simultaneously.¹⁰ Vādi-Devasūri does not accept the existence of any 'trace' as the condition of recollection. Recollection is attributed to the special

¹ *dhārānāṁ puṇa dhārānām*—*ViBh*, 179 (*Niryuktigāthā*).

² *tassā 'vagamo 'vāo avicci dhārānā tassa*—*ViBh*, 180.

³ *tayaṇāntaram tayatthāviccavaṇām jo ya vāsanājogo kālāntare ya jām puṇar aṇusaraṇām dhārānā sā u*—*ViBh*, 291.

⁴ See *Tīkā* on *TSūBh*, I. 15.

⁵ *avetasya kālāntare 'vismaraṇa-kāraṇām dhārānā*—*SSi*, I. 15.

⁶ *dhārānā smṛtihetuḥ*—*LT*, 6; *smṛtihetur dhārānā sāṃskāra iti yāvat*—*Svopajñā-Vivṛti*.

⁷ See *TSIV*, verse 4 on *TSū*, I. 15.

⁸ Cf. *īhādhārānayor api jñānātmatkatvam unneyam tadupayogaviśeṣat*—*Vivṛti* on *LT*, 6. Cf. *TSIV*, verse 22 on *TSū*, I. 15.

⁹ Cf. *sādarasya pramātus tathāvidhopacaya-krameṇa kiñcitkālam apracyavamāno dhārāṇe 'ty abhidhiyate*—*SVR*, II, 10.

¹⁰ Cf. *tathā cet tarhi yasya padārthasya kālāntare smṛtiḥ sā pratyakṣātmikā dhārānā tāvatkālam yāvad anuvartata iti syāt. etac cā 'nupapannam. evam tarhi yāvat paṭapadārtha-sāṃskāra-rūpām pratyakṣām puruse bhavet tāvat padārthāntarasya sāmīvedanam eva na syāt. kṣayopāśamikopayogānām yugapadbhāva-virodhasyā 'bhyām api pratipannatvāt*—*SVR*, II. 10.

capacity of the soul to remember past events. He, however, has no objection if this capacity of the soul is given the name of *sāṃskāra* (trace). Besides, if *dhāraṇā* is considered as a remote cause of recollection, even then he has no grievance, inasmuch as it is only the conception of *dhāraṇā* as the immediate cause of recollection that he does not support.¹ Hemacandra, however, has followed Vidyānandi.² Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya, following the *Bṛhadvṛtti* on Jinabhadra's *Viśeṣāvāsyakabhāṣya*, admits that *vāsanā* (trace) in itself is of the nature of non-cognition (*ajñānarūpa*), but it is recognized as a species of cognition only by transference of epithet. *Vāsanā* (trace) produces knowledge called recollection and as such the nature of its product is transferred to itself.³

We have now described the main features of *avagraha* (perception), *īhā* (speculation), *avāya* (perceptual judgment), and *dhāraṇā* (retention). Each of these four can again be of six types inasmuch as it can be due to any of the five sense-organs or the mind. Thus we get four multiplied by six or twenty-four types. Again, as already stated, there is *vyañjanāvagraha* (contact-awareness) of four types. Thus in all there can be twenty-eight types. Each of these again can have twelve different kinds of data as its objects.⁴ Thus totally there can be twenty-eight multiplied by twelve or three hundred and thirty-six types of *ābhinibodhika* or *matijñāna* (sensuous cognition).⁵

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THE FOUR BUDDHIS

Now, these *avagraha* (perception), *īhā* (speculation) etc. can be either *śrutaniśrita* (backed by scriptural learning) or *aśrutaniśrita* (not backed by scriptural learning). The *Sthānāṅga Sūtra* classifies *ābhinibodhika* (perceptual cognition) into *śrutaniśrita* and *aśrutaniśrita* and subdivides each of the latter two into *arthāvagraha* (object-perception) and *vyañjanāvagraha* (contact-awareness).⁶ It does not include *īhā* (speculation), *avāya* (perceptual judgment), and *dhāraṇā* (retention). But they can be understood as implied, inasmuch as they naturally follow in the wake of *avagraha* (perception). Besides, the *Sthānāṅga* could not have mentioned more than two subdivisions, inasmuch as the chapter which deals with the subject follows, as a rule, the principle of dichotomy.⁷ The *Nandi Sūtra*, however, does not subdivide

¹ tasmād ātmāśakti-viśeṣa eva sāṃskārā-'paraparyāyah smṛter ānantaryeṇa hetulḥ, na dhāraṇā. pāramparyeṇa tu tasyās taddhetutābhidhāne na kiñcid dūṣaṇam—SVR, II. 10.

² See *PMi*, I. 1. 29.

³ Cf. *vāsanāyāḥ svayam ajñāna-rūpatve 'pi kāraṇe kāryopacāreṇa jñānabhedābhidhānāvirodhād iti*—*JTBh*, p. 6; see also *Bṛhadvṛtti* on *ViBh*, 189.

⁴ See *TSū*, I. 16.

⁵ See *TSūBh*, I. 19.

⁶ *SthSū*, 71.

⁷ Cf. *īhādayo 'pi śrutaniśritā eva, na tūktāḥ, dvisthānakā-nurodhāt*—*Abhayadevasūri's commentary on SthSū*, 71.

aśrutaniśrita into *arthāvagraha* (object-perception) and *vyañjanāvagraha* (contact-awareness), but gives the subdivisions of *autpattikī-buddhi* (instantaneous comprehension), *vainayikī-buddhi* (intellect born of faithful service), *karmajā-buddhi* (intellect developed by practical experience) and *pāriṇāmikī-buddhi* (mature intellect).¹ Jinabhadra gives the same view² but holds that *avagraha* (perception), *ihā* (speculation) etc. are common to *śrutaniśrita* and *aśrutaniśrita*.³ Of course, we do not find anything in the *Nandi Sūtra* that goes against the statement of Jinabhadra whose view seems to be a consistent development of the view given by the *Sthānāṅga Sūtra*. The *Āvaśyakaniryukti*⁴ gives the four kinds of *buddhi* (intellect) in quite a different context. But there is nothing there which can contradict the claim of these *buddhis* (intellects) to be regarded as *aśrutaniśrita matijñāna* (sensuous cognitions not backed by scriptural learning). These *buddhis* are special gifts of nature, and are not due to education or learning⁵ and as such their claim to be *aśrutaniśrita* (not backed by scriptural learning) is but self-evident. Jinabhadra quotes an opinion which replaced the fourfold *vyañjanāvagraha* (contact-awareness) included in the twenty-eight types of *mati* (sensuous cognition) by these fourfold *buddhis* (intellects) in order to keep the traditional number twenty-eight⁶ intact and at the same time to find a suitable place for the fourfold *aśrutaniśrita* as well.⁷ The *Āvaśyakaniryukti*, however, does not include the fourfold *buddhis* (intellects) in the twenty-eight types of *mati* (sensuous cognition).⁸ Nor does it recognize them as a separate type of it. The opinion quoted by Jinabhadra seems to be an attempt to accommodate the new comer in the old scheme. Of course, we do not know exactly when this new conception of *aśrutaniśrita mati* crept in. But undoubtedly it came after the time of Bhadrabāhu, the author of the *Āvaśyakaniryukti*. Jinabhadra criticizes the opinion as unnecessary because according to him *aśrutaniśrita* is not a separate category but it is only a variety of *avagraha* (perception), *ihā* (speculation) etc. and as such is included in them and consequently does not need separate counting.⁹ Abhaya-devasūri¹⁰ says that *vyañjanāvagraha* (contact-awareness) is not possible in the case of *buddhis* (intellects), inasmuch as they are cases of mental perception.¹¹ Instances of *aśrutaniśrita vyañjanāvagraha* (contact-awareness), however, are available in the cases of cognitions due to the sense-organs other than sight and mind. For the differentiation of *śrutaniśrita* from *aśrutaniśrita* Jinabhadra says 'That (cognition) which

¹ *NSū*, 26.

² See *ViBh*, 177.

³ Cf. *ViBh*, 303-4.

⁴ *ĀNir*, 932.

⁵ Cf. *ĀNir*, 933.

⁶ *Vide supra* p. 44.

⁷ See *ViBh*, 301-302.

⁸ See *ĀNir*, 16.

⁹ See *ViBh*, 303.

¹⁰ See his commentary on *SthSū*, 71.

¹¹ We have already given the reason why mind is incompetent for *vyañjanāvagraha* on p. 35.

at present is devoid of verbal association and belongs to one whose intellect has been previously trained by the (study of the) scriptures is *śrutaniśrita*. The opposite of it is *aniśrita* and comprises the four *matis* or intellects (viz. *autpattikī* etc.).¹ The *śrutaniśrita* is so called because the perceptual cognitions that come under it are possessed by those whose minds have been educated by the instructions of others regarding verbal usage and other sources such as scriptures, although the verbal knowledge has no direct bearing and influence upon them. The sensuous intuitions are not generated by the knowledge of language as verbal judgment (*śruta*) is. The conditions of perceptual cognitions are the same in the case of the instructed as well as the uninstructed, but the knowledge of language and the culture embodied in it enriches the content of perception by implicit or explicit association with linguistic symbols and their suggestive reference² and consequently it cannot but have its effects on the capacity of cognition.³ The *asṛutaniśrita* perceptions are those which are devoid of the background of previous education of the perceiver.⁴ They fall into two categories according as they are purely mental or cases of sensuous perceptions. The former category comprises the fourfold *buddhis* (intellects) viz. *autpattikī*, *vainayikī*, *karmajā* and *pārināmikī*, each having the stages of *avagraha* (perception), *īhā* (speculation), *avāya* (perceptual judgment), and *dhāraṇā* (retention), but never *vyañjanāvagraha* (contact-awareness). The latter category comprises cases of perceptions due to the five sense-organs including *vyañjanāvagraha* (contact-awareness) also in the cases of the sense-organs other than the eye. This is the finally developed form of the conception of *asṛutaniśrita mati* (intellect) and is found in Abhayadevasūri's commentary on the *Sthānāṅga* referred to above.

Let us now state in brief the meanings, with illustrations, of these fourfold *buddhis* (intellects).

The *Āvaśyakaniryukti* defines *autpattikī* intellect as 'the intellect which comprehends instantaneously the true nature of a thing never seen, heard of, or even reported heretofore and is crowned with unhindered success'.⁵ The *Nandi Sūtra* only quotes the same definitions as those of the *Āvaśyakaniryukti* and so we shall not refer to the *Nandi Sūtra* in order to avoid repetitions. There are given many illustrations

¹ puvvaiṁ suyaparikarṇīya-matissa jaṁ sam̄payaiṁ suyāīyaiṁ taṁ suyanissiyam iyaraīm puṇa aṇissiyaiṁ maicaukkarā tam.—*ViBh.*, 169.

² Cf. tatra śrutiṁ saṁketakālabhāvī paropadeśāḥ śruti-granthaś ca. pūrvaiṁ tena parikarmitamater vyavahārakāle tadaṇapekṣam eva yad utpadyate tat śruti-niśritam—*Bṛhadvṛtti* on *ViBh.*, 177.

³ Cf. svasamānākāra-śruti-jñāna-hita-vāsanā-prabodha-samānakālinatve sati śruti-paṭyōgābhāva-kālinaiṁ śruti-niśritam avagrahādi-caturbhedam.—*JBP*, p. 6.

⁴ Cf. ukta-(svasamānākāra-śruti-jñāna-hita)-vāsanā-prabodhā-'samānakālinam ca matijñānam autpattikyādi-caturbhedam asṛuti-niśritam.—*JBP*, p. 7.

⁵ *ANir.*, 933.

of each of the intellects (*buddhis*) but we shall give only one instance in each case. Among the numerous instances of *autpatti*, given by the *Āvaśyakaniryukti*, there is one of 'kukkuṭa (cock).'¹ Once Rohaka, the son of Bharata-naṭa was asked by the king of Avanti to make a cock fight alone. Rohaka was quite a boy. But his instantaneous intellect suggested the solution. He put a mirror before the cock, and it began to fight with its image. Jinabhadra refers to this instance, and shows how the mind passes through the stages of *avagraha* (perception), *ihā* (speculation) etc. in such a case. 'How can it fight in the absence of another cock? With the image—this is *avagraha* (perception). What (sort of image is) most suitable?—this is *ihā* (speculation). Image reflected in a mirror—this is *apāya* (perceptual judgment).'² Here Jinabhadra attempts to give the psychology of solution of problems. It is by a flash of genius that the solution of a difficult problem dawns upon the mind. This is the stage of *avagraha* (perception). The intellectual application of the solution presents a number of alternatives and consequently there is speculation or inquisitive pursuit—this stage can be called *ihā* (speculation). Again, there is the final settlement of the mind—this is *apāya* (perceptual judgment). Then follows *dhāraṇā* (retention).

The *vainayikī* is defined as 'the intellection which is capable of completing a difficult task, can comprehend the spirit and letter of the trio of *dharma* (religion), *artha* (material prosperity) and *kāma* (sensual pleasure) and is fruitful in this world as well as the world hereafter.'³ This *buddhi* is born of humility and faithful service. The ancient literature of India abounds in stories of acquisition of high knowledge by mere faithful service of the preceptor (*guru*). This knowledge has been called *vinayasamuttha* or *vainayika* (born of humility and service). The *Āvaśyakaniryukti* refers to a story of two students of astrology, one of whom became more efficient by faithful service of his preceptor while the other remained stupid in spite of his learning.

The *kārmikī* or *karmasamutthā* is defined as 'the intellection which comprehends the truth due to its attentive consciousness and breadth of vision of both the practical and the theoretical sides of actions (*karman*) and which has received appreciation of competent critics.'⁴ The intellect developed due to practical experience is called *kārmikī*. People appreciate such intellect when it is extraordinarily developed. It is not learning that is responsible for the development. But it is practical experience that lies at the back of such intellect. An experienced goldsmith can easily differentiate between pure gold and an alloy, while a layman is easily deceived.

¹ See *ANir.* 935 and the *Tīkā*.

³ *ANir.* 937.

² *ViBh.* 304.

⁴ *ANir.* 940.

The *pāriṇāmikī* is defined as 'the intellection which fulfils (its purpose) by means of inference, reasoning, and analogy, which develops with the maturity of age, and which results in well-being and salvation.'¹

The common feature of all these intellects is this that none of them is inspired by learning. They are either due to spontaneous suggestion, or modesty and humility, or practical experience, or natural maturity of the power of reasoning. It is on account of this common characteristic that they are called *aśrutaniśrita*.

We have now dealt with the types of *mati-jñāna* (sensuous cognition). It is not possible to give all the possible types. Only the most apparent ones can be enumerated. The types vary according to the nature of the perceptual cognition which can be infinitefold.² Perception of the same object varies with each individual, and so its types cannot be enumerated in full.

SRUTA-JÑĀNA (SCRIPTURAL OR VERBAL KNOWLEDGE)

Śruta-jñāna originally meant knowledge embodied in the scriptures.³ Knowledge of the scriptures was also called *śruta-jñāna*. Umāsvāti says that *śruta-jñāna* is preceded by *mati* (sensuous cognition) and falls into two categories viz. *aṅgabāhya* (other than the original scripture) and *aṅgapraviṣṭa* (included in the original scripture) which again are manifold and twelvefold respectively and comprise the whole of the Jaina scripture.⁴ He further says that *mati-jñāna* (sensuous cognition) cognizes only what is present while the *śruta-jñāna* comprehends what is present, past and future.⁵ The Jainas regarded their scriptures to contain all the truths, much in the same way as the Brahmins considered their *Śruti* or the *Vedas* to possess all possible knowledge. Such was the conception of *śruta-jñāna* in the beginning.

The *Āvaśyakaniryukti* says that the types of *śruta-jñāna* are as many as the number of letters and their various combinations, and as such it is not possible to enumerate all the types.⁶ It then enumerates fourteen salient characteristics of *śruta-jñāna* viz. *akṣara* (alphabet), *samjñin* (discursive or cognitive or scriptural), *samyak* (right), *sādika* (having beginning), *saparyavasita* (having end), *gamika* (containing repetitions) and *aṅgapraviṣṭa* (included in the original scripture) with

¹ *ANir*, 942.

² *evaṁ bajha-jjhāṁtara-nimitta-vaicittao maibahuttam
kiṁcimmetta-visesena bhijjamānaṁ puṇo ḡantaṁ*.—*ViBh*, 311.

³ Cf. *SthSū*, 71 (21); *ADv*, 3 et seq.; *TSū*, I. 20 and the *Bhāṣya*.

⁴ See *TSūBh*, I. 20. For Kundakunda's classification see *Pañcāstikāyasāra*.

⁵ Cf. *utpannā-vinaṣṭā-rthagrāhakam sāmpratakālaviṣayam matijñānam
śruta-jñānam tu trikālaviṣayam utpannavinaṣṭā-nutpannā-rthagrāhakam iti*—*Ibid.*

⁶ *ANir*, 17-18.

their opposites viz. *anakṣara*, *asañjñin* etc.¹ Inhaling, exhaling, spitting etc. are given as instances of *anakṣara-śruta*² so far as they are indices of the mental dispositions of the person. Eight qualities of the intellect are recognized as necessary for the acquisition of *śruta-jñāna*. They are: desire for hearing, repeated questioning, (attentive) hearing, grasping, enquiry, conviction, retention and right action.³ The *Āvaśyakaniryukti* thus recognizes the words as well as other symbols such as physical gestures as *śruta* and also lays down the means of the acquisition of *śruta-jñāna*. It, however, does not state the meanings of all the fourteen characteristics. It is in the *Nandi Sūtra* that we find the meanings clearly stated.⁴

In the *Nandi Sūtra*, *akṣaraśruta* is given as threefold: *saṃjñākṣara*, *vyañjanākṣara* and *labdhyakṣara*. The shape of the letter, in other words, the script or alphabet is *saṃjñākṣara*; sound of the letter, in other words, the spoken letter is *vyañjanākṣara*; *labdhyakṣara* is possessed only by one who is competent to learn alphabet (*akṣara-labdhi*) and can be possible through all the five sense-organs as well as the mind.⁵ As regards *anakṣaraśruta*, the *Nandi Sūtra* gives no new information. The first two categories of *akṣaraśruta* are only material symbols written or spoken, and as such are called *dravya-śruta*. The *labdhyakṣara* is a kind of knowledge, and is *śruta-jñāna* proper (*bhāva-śruta*).⁶ It can be produced through any of the sense-organs and the mind. If it is a sound that conditions it, then it is produced through the sense-organ of ear. If it is a coloured shape that conditions it, then it is produced through the sense-organ of sight. If it is a smell that conditions it, then it is produced through the sense-organ of smell. And so on. Only those who possess the gift of language can have *labdhyakṣara*. When one hears a sound or sees a coloured shape, there arises in the wake of the perceptual cognition, a cognition couched in appropriate words composed of syllables (*akṣara*) following the conventional vocabulary. This cognition is called *labdhyakṣara*.⁷ Knowledge of the conventional vocabulary and conscious application of it are the conditions of *śruta-jñāna*. In other words, conscious exercise of the

¹ *ĀNir.*, 19.

² *Ibid.*, 20.

³ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁴ Haribhadra in his *Vṛtti* on *NSū.* 38 (37 according to Hastimalla Muni's edition) says that although the characteristics of *akṣara* and *anakṣara* include all other characteristics, yet they are enumerated separately for only the pupils of slow understanding (na ca bheda-dvayād evā 'vyutpannamatīnām śeṣabhedāvagamah).

⁵ *NSū.*, 38.

⁶ Cf. tatra *saṃjñā-vyañjanākṣare* *dravyaśrutam*, *labdhyakṣaram* punar *bhāvaśrutam*, *labdher* *jñānarūpatvāt*.—*NSūVṛ* on *sūtra* 39.

⁷ Cf. *śabdādigrahaṇa-samanantaram* *indriya-manonimittam* *śrutagranthā-nusāri* *sāṅkha* *ityādyakṣarānuṣaktam* *vijñānam* *utpadyate*, tac cā 'nekaprakāram, tad yathā *śrotrendriya-labdhyakṣaram* *ityādi*.—*NSūVṛ* on *sūtra* 39.

gift of language is the indispensable condition of *śruta-jñāna*. The cognitions which, in spite of their being couched in words, do not involve conscious attempt on the part of the cognizer at application of vocabulary, fall in the category of *mati-jñāna* (sensuous cognition) and not *śruta-jñāna*. Of course this distinction was stressed by later logicians.¹

The *samjnī-śruta* is considered in three ways, inasmuch as there are these three varieties of *samjnā* (cognitional activity)²: (1) discursive thinking that takes into account the past, the present and the future, (2) consciousness that can discriminate between what is to be avoided and what is to be accepted for the maintenance of life, but cannot think of the past or the future, and (3) consciousness due to knowledge of the right scriptures (*samyak śruta*). The first is called (*dīrgha*)-*kālikī* (lasting for a long time), the second *hetūpadeśikī* (discriminating) and the third *drṣṭivādopadeśikī* (backed by scriptural knowledge). Those who possess these *samjnās* are called *samjnins*. The *śruta-jñāna* possessed by these *samjnins* is *samjnī-śruta*. The *asamjnins* also fall in three categories. The mind is the organ of thinking. The more developed the mind is the more one is capable of thinking. Those whose mind is weak and incapable of thinking fall in the first category of *asamjnins*.³ Those who are totally devoid of mind and live on mere instincts fall in the second category of *asamjnins*.⁴ Again those who believe in false scriptures and thus possess perverted knowledge fall in the third category of *asamjnins*.⁵ *Śruta-jñāna* possessed by the *asamjnins* is *asamjnī-śruta*.

The twelvefold *gaṇipitaka* (scripture compiled by the *gaṇadharas*) containing *Ācārāṅga*, *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* etc. is *samyak-śruta* (right scripture) while the other books such as *Bhārata*, *Rāmāyana*, the *Vedas* etc. are enumerated as *mithyā-śruta* (false scriptures). It is further said that the *samyaktva* (rightness) or *mithyātvā* (wrongness) depends upon the

¹ Cf. saṅketakālapravṛttam śrutagrantha-sambandhinam vā ghaṭādi-śabdān anusṛtya vācyā-vācaka-bhāvena saṃyojya 'ghaṭo ghaṭāḥ' ityādi antarjalpākāram antaḥśabdollekhānvitam indriyādinimittam yaj jñānam uдетi tac chrutajñānam iti—*Bṛhadvṛtti* on *ViBh*, 100; see also *JBP*, p. 6. § 15.

² See *NSū*, 39 and its *Vṛtti* by Haribhadra. We are giving only the central idea.

³ Cf. yasya nāsti iḥā 'poho mārgaṇā gaveṣaṇā cintā vimarṣaḥ so 'samjnī 'ti labhyate, ayaṁ ca sammūrchima-pañcendriya-vikalendriyādir jñeyāḥ, alpa-mano-labdhitvād abhāvāc ca . . . so 'yam kālikyupadeśena—*NSūVṛ* on sūtra 40 (39 according to Hastimalla Muni's edition).

⁴ yasya nāsti abhisandhāraṇa-pūrvikā karaṇaśaktih so 'samjnī 'ti labhyate, ayaṁ cai 'kendriya-prthivyādir avaseyo, manolabdhī-rahitatvāt. . . . so 'yam hetū-padeśena—*Ibid.*

⁵ Cf. na hi mithyādrṣṭeh samjnānam asti, hitāhitapravṛtti-nivṛttiabhāvāt. . . . asamjnīśrutasya kṣayopaśamenā 'samjnī 'ti labhyate . . . so 'yam drṣṭivādopadeśena.—*Ibid.*

attitude of the knower. If his attitude is right, whatever he knows becomes right and if his attitude is wrong (*mithyā*), his knowledge also becomes wrong. Similarly if the result of the knowledge of *mithyāśruta* (false scripture) by a *mithyādṛṣṭi* (person of perverse attitude) turns out in the end to be the abandonment of the perversity (*mithyādṛṣṭi*), the *mithyāśruta* (false scripture) is to be considered as *samyak śruta* (right scripture).¹

The characteristics of *sādika* 'having beginning' and *anādika* 'having no beginning'—*saparyavasita* 'having end' and *aparyavasita* 'having no end' are considered variously. But the discussion is unimportant for our purpose and so we do not enter into it. It is, however, to be noticed in this connection that the Jaina thinkers held that a soul could never (except when it has attained perfect knowledge) be bereft of *mati* (sensuous) and *śruta* (verbal) knowledge. Even the one-sensed organisms are held to be possessed of these.² To be bereft of these is to lose the nature of soul and become non-soul.³ Now, the one-sensed organism has the feeling of touch and so can have *mati-jñāna* (sensuous cognition), but how can it possess *śruta-jñāna* (verbal knowledge)? This is a difficult problem to answer. Jinabhadra says that although the one-sensed organisms do not possess *dravya-śruta* (symbols—written or spoken) they possess *bhāva-śruta* (potential verbal knowledge) which can be likened to the verbal knowledge of a sleeping ascetic (*yati*).⁴ But even *bhāva-śruta* is possible only with those who have the capacity to speak and to hear and with none else, and it is nothing but the mental disposition that precedes a speech or follows a hearing.⁵ And as such how can it be possible for the one-sensed organisms who have neither the capacity to speak nor the capacity to hear? Jinabhadra answers this objection as follows: 'Even as subtle internal sensuous cognitions are possible in spite of the absence of the external physical sense-organ, so 'potential verbal knowledge' is possible even for (the one-sensed) such as the earth-bodied (beings) in spite of the absence of *dravya-śruta*.'⁶ It is admitted that the one-sensed

¹ *NSū*, 41.

² Cf. egindiyā niyayaṁ duyannāñī, tam jahā—mai-annāñī ya suya-annāñī ya—quoted from Āgama in *Bṛhadvṛtti*, *ViBh*, 101. Also see *BhSū* VIII. 2 (317). The *mati* and *śruta* of the one-sensed organisms are, as a rule, called *ajñāna* 'perverted knowledge' inasmuch as they are *mithyādṛṣṭi* and the *jñāna* of a *mithyādṛṣṭi* is held to be *ajñāna*. See *Prajñāpanāśūtra*, pada 29.

³ Cf. savvajīvāñam pi ya ḥāñ akharaśa aṇantabhbāgo niccugghādīo ciṭṭhai. jai puṇa so 'vi āvarijjā teṇam jīvo ajīvattam pāvijjā—*NSū*, 42.

⁴ davvasuyāñubhbāvammi vi bhāvasuyāñ sutta-jaiñō vva—*ViBh*, 101.

⁵ bhāvasuyāñ bhāsā-soya-laddhiñō jujjae na iyarassa

bhāsābhīmuḥhassa jayañ soūna ya jañ havejjāhi.—*ViBh*, 102.

⁶ jaha suhūmañ bhāviñdiyanāñāñāñ davvīñdiyāvārohe vi

taha davvasuyābhāve bhāvasuyāñ patthivāññāñ.—*ViBh*, 103.

organisms have neither the tongue to speak nor the ear to listen, nor have they any symbols of their own. But nevertheless, according to the Jaina thinkers, the one-sensed organisms are capable of potential verbal thinking. Though we are unable to know the exact nature of the process of their thinking, yet we can have some inkling of its nature by the consideration of the external activities of the one-sensed organisms. The *Bṛhadvṛtti*¹ gives a number of instances from the plant world to prove by inference that even the one-sensed plants can hear sound, see colour, smell odour, and experience taste, and says that as in these cases the sensuous functions are carried out by the internal capacity of the organisms even in the absence of the external sense-organs so also can there be possible the existence of *bhāvaśruta* in the absence of *dravyaśruta*.² *Dravyaśruta* is the exponent of thinking while *bhāvaśruta* is such thinking itself. The question whether thinking without language is possible is the upshot of our enquiry. The Jaina scriptures recognize ten instincts (*sannā*) in the one-sensed organisms³—such as the instincts of hunger, fear, sex attraction, possession etc. The *Bṛhadvṛtti* says that these instincts are impossible without *bhāvaśruta* ‘internal capacity for verbal thinking’.⁴ The famous commentator Malayagiri maintains that the instinct is a kind of desire and quotes a passage from the *Āvaśyakaṭīkā*, which says that the instinct for food means ‘desire for food’, is born of the feeling of hunger, and is a particular disposition of the soul.⁵ He further maintains that a desire is a determinate willing for the acquisition of the object of desire. It is of the form ‘such and such object is wholesome for me ; it will be good if I can secure it’.⁶ Of course, in the case of one-sensed organisms the desires are not couched in articulate language. But nevertheless they must have some sort of instrument

¹ On *ViBh*, 103.

² Cf. *tataś ca yathai 'teṣu dravyendriyāśattve 'pi etad bhāvendriyajanyam jñānaṁ sakala-jana-prasiddham asti, tathā dravyaśrutābhāve bhāvaśrutam api bhaviṣyati*—*Bṛhadvṛtti* on *ViBh*, 103.

N.B.—Bhāvendriya is the capacity of the soul to have various sensuous experiences, dravyendriya means the external physical sense-organ.

³ kati naṁ bhaṁte! egindiyānaṁ sannāo pannattāo? goyamā! dasa, tam jahā āhārasannā bhaya-sannā mehuṇasannā pariggaha-sannā koha-sannā māna-sannā māyā-sannā lobha-sannā oha-sannā loga-sannā ya tti—Quoted in *NSūVṛ* on sūtra 40. Also see *BhSū*, VII. 8 (295) ; *Prajñāpanā*, saṁjñāpada (8).

⁴ na cai 'tāḥ saṁjñā bhāvaśrutam antareṇo 'papadyante—*Bṛhadvṛtti*, *ViBh*, 103.

⁵ saṁjñā ca abhilāṣa ucyate yata uktam *Āvaśyakaṭīkāyām*—āhāra-saṁjñā āhārābhilāṣāḥ kṣudvedanīya-prabhavaḥ khālvaḥ ātmapariṇāma-viśeṣāḥ—Malaya-giri's *ṭīkā* (p. 140) on *NSū*.

⁶ *Ibid.*

for their formation. This leads us to the postulation of a peculiar capacity of the soul. This capacity is called *bhāva-śruta*.

The other characteristics *viz.* *gamika* and *agamika*—*aṅgapravīṣṭa* and *aṅgabāhya* refer to peculiar categories of scriptural texts and so, being unimportant for our purpose, are not discussed here.¹

We have now seen how *śruta* which originally meant 'scripture' gradually came to mean any symbol, written or spoken, and finally was even identified with inarticulate verbal knowledge. This development of meaning is not, strictly speaking, chronological. It is the gradual subtlety of speculation that is responsible for this development. The self-same thinker could have started from the conception of *śruta* as scripture and reached the conception of *śruta* as inarticulate verbal knowledge. The speculations recorded in Jaina scriptures on this subject are so rich, subtle and varied that it is difficult to ascertain the original contributions of the later Jaina authors. Almost every idea that we have been dealing with can be traced in the Āgamas in some form or other. Our statement about development is to be judged with this proviso.

We have hitherto based our enquiry on the *Āvaśyakaniryukti* and the *Nandi Sūtra* and have referred to the other sources only occasionally for the sake of elucidation. After the *Nandi Sūtra* we come to the *Viśeśāvaśyakabhāṣya* of Jinabhadra. It presents the theory in a developed form as will be apparent from what follows. We shall end our enquiry of the *śruta-jñāna* by drawing a clear line of demarcation between the *mati-jñāna* and the *śruta-jñāna*.

NATURE OF SAMJNĀ

We have referred to *samjñi-śruta* and *asamjñi-śruta*. Here *asamjñā* does not mean total absence of any *samjñā*, but only an indistinct presence of it.² The capacity by which one remembers the bygone past and ponders over the coming future is *dirghakālikī* (or simply *kālikī*) *samjñā*.³ Only those who have mind⁴ can possess this capacity. A being possessing this *samjñā* enjoys the capacity for the utilization of all the sense-organs including mind. The human beings as well as the sub-human beings born of wombs (*garbhaja*) possess this

¹ For information see *NSū*, 43 *et seq.* The first *Karmagrantha* (gāthā 7) records an additional mode of considering *śruta-jñāna*, which, however, has no epistemological value and so is omitted here.

² Cf. *ViBh*, 506-7.

³ *Ibid.*, 508.

⁴ The mind, according to the Jainas, is an instrument of thinking, which a soul makes for itself out of the groups of material atoms fit for the purpose and becomes capable of thinking through its agency. Of course only the developed souls have the capacity to form minds.

samjñā.¹ The five-sensed *sammūrchanaja* beings (*i.e.* gross-bodied beings born without sex relation) possess this capacity in a very small measure and as such are regarded as *asamjñins* in comparison with those possessing a developed capacity.² Those beings who can discriminate between the desirable and the undesirable and can act accordingly for the maintenance of their bodies, but cannot think on the past or future, are called *hetuvāda-samjñins*. The organisms having two or more sense-organs are included in this category. The comparatively inactive one-sensed organisms such as the earth-bodied beings are called *asamjñins* in comparison with the organisms possessing two or more sense-organs.³ Now we come to the *dr̥ṣṭivādopadeśiki samjñā*. A being having right faith and possessed of knowledge due to subsidence-cum-destruction of karmic veil is called *samjñin* from the point of view of *dr̥ṣṭi* (faith); and such being having wrong faith is called *asamjñin*.⁴ A being possessed of perfect knowledge born of complete destruction of all karmic veil is not *samjñin* inasmuch as he, being omniscient, cannot possess the functions of recollection and pondering of future, which constitute *samjñā*.⁵ A being having wrong or perverted faith is *mithyādr̥ṣṭi*, and is also called *asamjñin*, because his *samjñā*, though competent to discriminate between what is wholesome and what is unwholesome, is, from the point of view of *dr̥ṣṭi* (faith), perverted or misplaced.⁶

We have thus studied the three types of *samjñā*. There remains now one more type called *ūha* or *ogha-samjñā*. We have translated this *samjñā* as instinct and have also enumerated its varieties.⁷ Jinabhadra says that this *ūha* or *ogha-samjñā* (which belongs to such beings as the earth-bodied) is not to be called *samjñā* in comparison with the *hetuvāda-samjñā*; similarly, the *hetuvāda-samjñā* is not to be called *samjñā* in comparison with the *kālikī-samjñā*; and similarly the *kālikī-samjñā* is not to be called *samjñā* in comparison with the *dr̥ṣṭivāda-samjñā*.⁸ The *samjñins* and *asamjñins* are thus to be considered relatively. Jinabhadra gives the following classification of *samjñin* beings. The five classes of one-sensed organisms possess *ūha-samjñā*; the organisms possessing two or more sense-organs possess *hetu-samjñā*; the denizens of heaven and hell as well as the beings born of womb possess *kālikī-samjñā*; the *samjñā* of the *samyagdr̥ṣṭi chadmastha* (a

¹ See *Bṛhadvṛtti*, *ViBh*, 509.

² *Ibid.*, *ViBh*, 511.

³ See *ViBh*, 515-516 and *Bṛhadvṛtti*.

⁴ *sammadiṭṭhī saṇṇī saṁte nāṇe khauvasamiyammi asaṇṇī micchattammi diṭṭhivāovaesaṇa*.—*ViBh*, 517.

⁵ See *ViBh*, 518.

⁶ Cf. *ViBh*, 519-520.

⁷ *Supra* p. 52. *Ūha* or *ogha* is a particular kind of *samjñā* (instinct). But Jinabhadra uses the term to indicate the ten instincts.

⁸ *ViBh*, 522.

being involved in the world but having right faith) is *śruta-jñāna* (in other words, such a being possesses *drṣṭivāda-saṃjñā*); the *kevalins* (omniscient beings), however, are free from the function of *mati-jñāna* (sensuous cognition) and as such are beyond *saṃjñā*.¹

MATI AND SRUTA

As regards the relation of *mati* and *śruta*, Umāsvāti says that *śruta* is, as a rule, accompanied by *mati* while it is not necessary that a *mati* should be accompanied by *śruta*.² But the *Nandi Sūtra* says 'Where there is *ābhinibodhika-jñāna* (that is, *mati*), there is *śruta-jñāna*, and where there is *śruta-jñāna* there is *ābhinibodhika-jñāna*. Both these are mutually involved. But nevertheless the preceptors (*Ācāryas*) notice this distinction: *ābhinibodhika* is so called because it perceives directly (*abhinibudhyate*), while *śruta* is so called because it hears (*śrṇoti*). And as *śruta* is preceded by *mati*, *mati* cannot be preceded by *śruta*'.³ According to *Nandi-Sūtra* thus the relation between *mati* and *śruta* is one of mutual concomitance. The one is necessarily accompanied by the other. Puṣyapāda Devanandi and his follower Akalaṅka also endorse this view.⁴ But here the question is whether it is the *matyupayoga*⁵ and *śrutopayoga* that are upheld to accompany each other or it is their *labdhis*⁶ that are referred to. We do not get any clear statement on this in the above references. But it is very probable that it is the *labdhis* that are held to accompany each other. The fact that the Jaina thinkers unanimously maintain the impossibility of the simultaneous occurrence of two *upayogas* also lends support to our hypothesis. Moreover, *mati* and *śruta* *quā labdhis* are unanimously held to accompany each other.⁷ Furthermore, on this hypothesis, the above statement of Umāsvāti that *mati* is not necessarily followed by *śruta* also finds proper explanation, because in that case there would be no objection against admitting that *matyupayoga* is not necessarily followed by *śrutopayoga*. It is beyond doubt that Umāsvāti refers to *upayoga* and not to *labdhi* in the above statement.

It will not be out of place in this connection to add a short paragraph on the conception of *upayoga* and *labdhi*. The consciousness in

¹ *ViBh.* 523-524.

² *śrutajñānasya matijñānenā niyatāḥ sahabhāvāḥ tatpūrvakatvāt. yasya śrutajñānam tasya niyatā matijñānam yasya tu matijñānam tasya śrutajñānam syād vā na ve 'ti*—*TSūBh.* I. 31.

³ *NSū.* 24.

⁴ See *SSi.* I. 30. Of course, it does not state the view in so many words. But it follows easily from what it states; *TRā.* I. 9 (*vārttika* 20) states *yatra* matis tatra śrutām yatra śrutām tatra matir iti.

⁵ *Upayoga* means 'active consciousness'.

⁶ *Labdhi* means 'dormant consciousness'.

⁷ iha laddhimai-suyāmī samakālām na tū 'vaogo sim—*ViBh.* 108.

its state of dormancy is called *labdhi*. In other words, the dormant capacity of the soul for knowledge is *labdhi*. *Upayoga*, on the other hand, is consciousness in its state of activity. The soul is called *upayukta* or *upayogavān* when it is actually engaged in knowing something. Mere capacity for knowledge without actual knowledge is *labdhi*.

Now we come to the problem of differentiation between *mati* and *śruta*.

DIFFERENTIATION OF MATI AND ŚRUTA

Siddhasena Divākara, in his *Niścayadvātrīmśikā*, maintains that *śruta* is not anything over and above *mati*, because the admission of the separate identity of *śruta* is futile and involves undesirable consequences.¹ Among the later logicians it is only Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya who elaborates this position of Siddhasena. We shall deal with this view of Yaśovijaya in the concluding portion of this topic.

Jinabhadra says that the knowledge that is due to the activity of sense-organs and the mind, is couched in proper words (in accordance with conventional usage), and is capable of expressing its object (to others) is *bhāvaśruta* while the rest is *mati*.² *Īhā* (speculation), *avāya* (perceptual judgment) etc. are also couched in proper words, but nevertheless they fall in the category of *mati*, inasmuch as there is no deliberate application of language in these cases of knowledge. Simple verbal association is not considered sufficient to raise a cognition to the status of *śruta*. In our ordinary perceptions we associate the object with its name as soon as we perceive it. But we do not go any further. But there are cases of perceptual cognitions which do not stop at simple verbal association, but continue further into discursive thought with the help of language. This continuation leads them to the category of *śruta-jñāna*. Thus those cognitions of objects, which are totally free from all verbal association or at best are conversant with the mere names of their objects, fall in the category of *mati*, while their further continuations with the help of the language fall in the category of *śruta*. In fact, the versatile knowledge of the objects, that follows in the wake of perceptual cognition of these objects and whose versatility is in proportion to the learnedness of the cognizer is *śruta-jñāna*.³ The more learned a person is the more versatile will be his *śruta-jñāna*.

¹ vaiyarthiyātiprasaṅgābhyaśām na matyabhyadhikām śrutam.

—*Niścayadvātrīmśikā*, 12.

² īndriyamaṇo-nimittām jaṁ viṇṇāṇām suyāṇusāreṇa

niyayatthutti-samatthām tam bhāvasuyām mai sesam.—*ViBh*, 100.

³ Cf. . . . śrutam apūrvavaiśayam, ekaṁ ghatam indriyānindriyābhyaśām niścītyā 'yām ghaṭa iti tajjātiyām anyam anekadeśa-kāla-rūpādi-vilakṣaṇam apūrvam adhigacchati yat tac chrutam, nānā-prakārārtha-prarūpaṇaparamaṁ yat tad vā śrutam . . . *TRā*, I. 9 (vārttika 32).

The *śruta-jñāna*, according to the Jaina thinker, is as a rule preceded by *mati-jñāna*. This conception owes its origin perhaps to the old conception of *śruta* as the knowledge born through the sense-organ of hearing.¹ But in fact the knowledge of the object meant by the sound (word) perceived by the sense-organ of hearing is *śruta* proper. And it is also admitted to be so. The simple perception by the sense-organ of hearing is a case of *mati*. It is maintained that all cases of verbal cognitions born through whatever sense-organ are to be regarded auditory perceptions, inasmuch as verbal expressions accompanying these cognitions are by their nature competent to be cognized by the auditory organ. Articulated words are perceived through the auditory organ without doubt. But words, which clothe our thoughts, though not actually perceived by the auditory organ, are also potentially the objects of auditory cognition. The employment of words in thought, therefore, is symptomatic of auditory cognition, and the operation of the auditory organ is more or less an accident.² It is in this sense that every *śruta-jñāna* is preceded by *mati-jñāna* of the type of auditory sense-perception. Even pure mental thinking can be considered to be accompanied by such virtual auditory sense-perception, because of the association of words which fall within the province of auditory perception. Jinabhadra says 'The knowledge of the speaker or the hearer, that is informed with his previous learning, is *śruta*. And the knowledge of the self-same person, free from association with language, is *mati*'.³ Jinabhadra quotes an opinion which sought to differentiate *mati* from *śruta* on the ground that the latter is associated with words and the former is devoid of them, and refutes it by saying 'If all types of *mati* were regarded as bereft of association with words there would be lack of *ihā* (speculation) etc. (which follow in the wake of *avagraha* and are bound up with verbal association) because without verbal expressions there can be no conceptual thinking which invariably affiliates a particular with a class-character. And consequently the discrimination between the characteristics of a post and a man will be an impossibility'.⁴ If all perceptual cognitions were free from verbal association there would be total lack of determinate cognitions. The determination of the specific characteristics requires help of language, and as such our perceptions are, as a rule, associated with words when they become determinate. If all perceptions were dumb, they would serve no purpose of life. Jinabhadra concludes that with reference to

¹ Cf. soimdiovaladdhi hoi suyarī.—*ViBh*, 117.

² Cf. sābhilāpa-vijñānam śeṣendriya-dvāreṇā 'pyutpannam yogyatayā śrotrendriyopalabdhir eva mantavyam, abhilāpasya sarvasyā 'pi śrotrendriyagrahanayogyatvāt—*Bṛhadvṛtti* on *ViBh*, 117; also see *ViBh*, 125.

³ bhaṇao suṇao vā suyarī tam jam iha suyānusāri viṇṇānam doṇham pi suyāiyam jain vinnānam tayaṁ buddhi—*ViBh*, 121.

⁴ *ViBh*, 162-163.

words *quâ* concepts (knowledge) the *mati* can be 'associated with' as well as 'bereft of' words but with reference to words *quâ* articulated symbols, the *mati* is, as a rule, bereft of words; the *śruta*, on the other hand, whether it is *dravya-śruta* or *bhāva-śruta*, can be both *sākṣara* (associated with words) as well as *anakṣara* (bereft of words).¹ *Avagraha* falls in the category of *mati* bereft of words while *ihā* etc. fall in the category of *mati* associated with words *quâ* concepts (knowledge). Articulated symbols are not concepts and thus *a fortiori* they are excluded from the category of *mati-jñāna*. *Dravya-śruta* is *sākṣara* when it consists of written or spoken words, and it is *anakṣara* when it consists of physical gestures. The *bhāva-śruta* is called *sākṣara* because it contains words *quâ* concepts and it is also called *nirakṣara* because it does not contain words *quâ* external symbols written or spoken. Jinabhadra further quotes an opinion which distinguished *mati* from *śruta* on the ground that the former, like a dumb person, can reveal its content to the cognizing self alone, while the latter, like a talking man, can reveal its contents to others as well.² This reminds us of the position of Pūjyapāda Devanandi who maintains that, as distinguished from other *pramāṇas* (organs of knowledge), the *śruta* serves the twofold purpose of enlightening the cognizing self as well as others—the former function being done on account of its self-revealing nature and the latter through the instrumentality of language. The *śruta* *quâ* knowledge reveals its contents to the cognizing self alone while the *śruta* *quâ* verbal expression reveals its contents to others as well.³ But Jinabhadra says that both *mati* and *śruta* are essentially cases of knowledge, and as such cannot reveal their contents to others. Of course, *śruta* *quâ* words can convey its meaning to others. But Jinabhadra says that physical gestures, which can cause *mati*, also reveal their meaning to others. These physical gestures stand to *mati-jñāna* in the same relation as the words stand to *śruta-jñāna*, and as such can be compared to the latter. Thus the cause of *mati* can reveal its meaning to others exactly in the same way as the cause of *śruta* does. The above line of demarcation between *mati* and *śruta* thus is proved invalid.⁴ But finally Jinabhadra concedes that *dravya-śruta* is a unique instrument of conveying knowledge to others, that it is designated as *śruta* by established convention and that there is nothing known as *dravya-mati*.⁵ In view of these considerations it is advisable to accept the line of demarcation. Furthermore, he says that physical

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¹ ubhayām bhāvakkharao, añakkharām hojja vāñjañakkharao, maināñām, suttām puṇa ubhayām pi añakkharā-kkharao.—*ViBh.*, 170.

² See *ViBh.*, 171.

³ tatra svārthām pramāṇām śrutavarjyam. śrutām punāḥ svārthām bhavati parārthām ca, jñānātmakām svārthām vacanātmakām parārthām.—*SSi*, on *TSū*, 1. 6.

⁴ See *ViBh.*, 173.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 174.

gestures also are words with meanings, because they too convey the intention—and the agent also makes use of them for lack of words in order to convey his intention.¹

NON-DIFFERENCE OF MATI AND SRUTA

We have now drawn a line of demarcation between *mati* and *śruta*, which is more or less in accordance with the traditional way of thought. But let us now study the logical implications of the traditional conception. We have seen that *īhā* (speculation) etc., though they are associated with words, fall in the category of *mati* and not *śruta*. The ground given is that the scriptures recognize them to be so and, furthermore, that language does not play the determining role of a condition of *mati* as it does regarding *śruta*. In *īhā* etc. there is only the minimum possible association with words, which is rather the outcome than the generating condition. Words come in only in order to make the cognition 'determinate and firm'. The perceptual character still remains there. The background of cognizer's learning plays only a silent part. It does not actively influence the cognition like the sense-organ. But this position is not without its weakness. The difficulty can be put thus: Can our cognitions be associated with words, and at the same time remain free from the influence of our previous training in verbal usage? If not, why should not such cognitions as are associated with words be considered as *śruta*? It is perhaps in order to avoid this difficulty that Akalaṅka held the view that our cognitions are *mati* so long as they are free from verbal association, and fall in the category of *śruta* as soon as they are associated with words.² Pūjyapāda Devanandi says that all organs of valid knowledge excepting *śruta* are for one's own self and not for others, inasmuch as they cannot express themselves to others.³ This statement of Pūjyapāda does not mean to say that all cases of knowledge except *śruta* are devoid of words. It only means that they are not expressed in language to outsiders and that they fall in the category of *śruta* when they are so expressed. We can interpret the above statement of Akalaṅka in this light. It will then mean that all processes of knowledge, perceptual or otherwise, fall in the category of *mati* so long as they are not expressed in words, and that they are transformed into *śruta* as soon as they are so expressed. This meaning follows from the statement of Akalaṅka himself as well.⁴ Akalaṅka thus widens the scope of *mati* and at the same time distinguishes it from *śruta* on the ground that *mati* is confined to the knower himself while *śruta* reveals its contents to others as well. In one word, *mati* is subjective and private (*svārtha*) while *śruta* is

¹ *Ibid.*, 175.

² *LT*, 10-11.

³ Cf. *tatra svārthaiḥ pramāṇaiḥ śrutavarjyam*.—*SSi* on *TSū*, 1. 6.

⁴ Cf. *LT*, 10-11 and *Vivṛti*.

subjective as well as objective (*parārtha*), private as well as public. But this line of demarcation is too superficial. It is immaterial whether a knowledge is expressed in words or not. Mere verbal expression cannot be taken to confer a new status on knowledge. To be logical, therefore, all such knowledge should be regarded as *mati*. This is the logical consummation of Akalaṅka's position. And this was anticipated by Siddhasena Divākara when he said, as we have already stated, that there is no *śruta* over and above *mati*. Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya has elaborated this position in his *Jñānabindu-prakarana*. Siddhasena Divākara had asserted that the admission of *śruta* as separate from *mati* involves the faults of redundancy (*vaiyarthya*) and unwarranted extension (*atiprasaṅga*).¹ Yaśovijaya only amplifies and illustrates these faults. He says that the conception of *śruta* as separate from *mati* is futile inasmuch as the function of the former can be adequately fulfilled by the latter. Moreover, if the non-difference of *mati* and *śruta* be admitted, the necessity of the postulation of a separate *avagraha* for the *apāya* (perceptual judgment) bringing up the rear of a generic verbal cognition (*śābda-jñāna* or *śruta-jñāna*) on account of a further enquiry for a more specific characteristic of the same object is also avoided, because in this new conception the generic verbal cognition itself will serve as the basic *avagraha* of the whole process which is a case of *mati-jñāna*.² The unity of the process will remain undisturbed even when it becomes intricate due to the entrance of verbal knowledge (*śruta-jñāna*), because, says Yaśovijaya, when it is acknowledged that there is no disturbance in the unity of the process of *śrutopayoga* (verbal knowledge) even when it is interspersed with more than one process of *mati*, what possible harm can there be if the process of *mati* is conceived to preserve its integrity even when the *śrutopayoga* follows in the wake of it.³ Besides, if a separate status were accorded to verbal knowledge on the ground that it is non-perceptual the undesirable consequence of the admission of a respective separate category for inference, recollection, recognition etc. would follow, because these also are non-perceptual. But the Jaina thinkers cannot accept this consequence without throwing overboard their whole theory of knowledge. The Jainas accept inference, recollection etc. to belong to the category of *mati*. What then is the ground for treating *śruta* as a separate category from *mati*? Again, if *mati* is

¹ *vaiyarthyātiprasaṅgabhyām na matyabhyadhikām śrutam.*

—*Niścayadvātrīniśikā*, 12.

² Cf. *navyās tu śrutopayogo matyupayogān na pṛthak, matyupayogenai 'va tatkāryopapattau tatpārthakya-kalpanāyā vyarthatvāt, ata eva śabdajanya-sāmānya-jñānottarami viśeṣa-jijñāsāyām tanmūlaka-matyapāyāṁśa-pravṛttau na pṛthagvagraha-kalpanāgauravam śabdasāmānya-jnānasyai 'va tatra avagraha-tvāt, JBP*, p. 16.

³ *Ibid.*

conceived as twofold *viz.* (1) perceptual¹ and (2) non-perceptual, and *avagraha*, *ihā* etc. are held to fall in the former and inference, recollection etc. are held to fall in the latter group, then logic will demand that *śruta* also should be treated as a case of non-perceptual *mati* and not as a separate category.² Thus does Yaśovijaya vindicate the position of the great logician Siddhasena Divākara whom he often quotes in his treatises with great veneration, and sometimes refers to him by the term *navya* (neo-logician).³ Siddhasena was a great logical genius and Yaśovijaya, as an inspired admirer of him, gives him the status of a neo-logician of ancient times in view of his pure logical speculations that were the characteristic of the age that was to come after a millennium from his own time.

AVADHI

...

The Jainas believe in the capacity of the soul to know all things irrespective of temporal and spatial distance. The past as well as the future can be perceived as vividly as the present. The soul is inherently capable of perceiving all things with all their characteristics—past, present and future. But this capacity of the soul is obstructed by *jñānāvaraṇiya karman* which veils the soul and permits it only an imperfect comprehension of the world. The nature and extent of the knowing capacity of a soul, therefore, depend upon the nature of the veil. But never can the veil obstruct the knowing capacity completely because in that case the soul would become as good as non-soul. The knowledge of the soul is never totally obstructed by the veil even as the light of the sun or the moon is never totally obstructed even by the darkest clouds.⁴ There is always some glimpse of the external world, however imperfect or sometimes even perverted it may be. For the sake of systematic investigation, the various states of knowledge, ranging from the most imperfect and perverted knowledge of the one-sensed organisms up to the most perfect knowledge of the *kevalin* (omniscient), have been classified into five categories *viz.* *mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi*, *manahparyāya* and *kevala*. Of these, we have dealt with *mati* and *śruta* which, as we have seen, are dependent upon the help of the various external organs. But now we come to those categories which do not depend upon any sense-organ. Of course, even in the case of

¹ *sāṁvyavahārika-pratyakṣa*.

² *yadi ca avagrahādibhedāḥ sāṁvyavahārika-pratyakṣarūpasyai 'va mati-jñānasya sūtre proktāḥ, anumānādikām tu parokṣa-mati-jñānam arthataḥ siddham iti 'syate, tarhi śrutaśabda-vyapadeśyam śabda-jñānam api parokṣa-mati-jñānam evā 'ngikriyatām.*—*JBP*, p. 16.

³ The term *navyāḥ* in footnote 2 page 60 refers to Siddhasena.

⁴ *jai puṇa so 'vi ḫāvṛijā teṇām jīvo ajīvattām pāvījjā—suṭṭhu vi meha-samudaye, hoi pabbā caṁda-sūrāṇām'*.—*NSū*, 42.

mati and *śruta*, the role of the sense-organs is a subordinate one because they only serve to eliminate the veil which envelops the knowledge of the object already there. But nevertheless they have some function of their own, in the absence of which knowledge would be impossible. The other three categories of knowledge, however, are completely free from the dependence upon the sense-organs, and as such, as we have already stated, are called *pratyakṣa* proper.¹ The conception of these categories will certainly appear dogmatic, but nevertheless it should be borne in mind that the vital source of the Jaina theory of knowledge lies in this conception. If the soul has the capacity to know, it must know independently of any other external condition. Knowledge is not spatial or temporal relation, but is a capacity. Distance, spatial or temporal, is not a hindrance for the soul. It can obstruct physical movement. But on the capacity to know it cannot have any such influence. If the soul cannot penetrate into the past or future, or see through distance, it is due to the delimitation of its knowing capacity by the obstructive veil, and not due to any inherent privation. Knowledge is as independent as existence. As existence does not depend upon some other existence for its existence, so knowledge does not depend upon something else for its knowledge. Knowledge is there in its own right as its objects are there in their own right. No physical contact, direct or indirect, with objects is necessary for the emergence of knowledge. The question of physical contact or limited distance or size comes in only when the inherent capacity is delimited. And this delimitation even is not ultimately due to some extraneous condition. It is due to the soul itself which has acquired the karmic veil by its own activity. Let us now revert to our subject proper.

The possession of *avadhi-jñāna* is a birthright of the denizens of heaven and hell. The *avadhi-jñāna* in their case is *bhava-pratyaya* (due to birth).² The *avadhi* of the human beings as well as of the five-sensed sub-human beings is due to the destruction-cum-subsidence of the relevant karmic veil (*kṣayopāśama-nimitta*).³ It is acquired by merit and is also called *guna-pratyaya* (due to merit).⁴ The distinction, however, is only apparent. The denizens of heaven and hell are endowed with *avadhi* by their very birth and hence their *avadhi* is called *bhava-pratyaya*. Other beings get it only occasionally and as a

¹ It is interesting to note that Bhūtabali in his *Mahābandha* (p. 24, Kashi, 1947 edition) admits the instrumentality of *manas* in *manahparyāya*. But Akālaṇka interprets (in his *TRā*, p. 58) *manas* as *ātman*. So far as my knowledge goes Bhūtabali had no following.

² *SthSū*, 71; *NSū*, 7; *TSū*, I. 22.

³ *SthSū*, 71; *NSū*, 8; *TSū*, I. 23 and its *Bhāṣya*.

⁴ See *NSū*, gāthā 63; also see *TRā*, I. 20: dvividho 'vadhir bhava-guṇa-pratyaya-bhedāt. See also *ViBh*, 572.

result of special merit and hence in their case it is called *kṣayopāśama-nimitta* or *gunanimitta*. In fact, however, *avadhi* is, as a rule, *kṣayopāśama-nimitta* in all cases. It is necessary in the case of the denizens of heaven and hell because they have secured the destruction and subsidence of the veiling *karman* by the acquisition of requisite merits and only occasional in the case of other beings for the reason already given, and as such is classified into two separate categories.¹

By *avadhi-jñāna* one can intuit only those things which have shape or form (*rūpin*).² The intuitions differ in scope and durability with different persons on account of the difference of their merits. One endowed with the highest type of *avadhi* can intuit³ all the things having form. In point of space his intuition extends over a space that could be occupied by a countless number of space-units of the size of *loka* (the inhabited universe) and as regards time it penetrates countless number of cycles, both past and future. But as regards the modes, it cannot know all. It knows only an infinitesimal part of them though, of course, even this tiny part consists of an infinite number of modes.⁴ The Jainas conceive infinity as having infinite gradation and as such there is no absurdity in this conception. The lowest type of *avadhi* can extend to a very small fraction of an *āngula*⁵ and know the infinite⁶ number of things having form (*rūpi dāvvaīm*) that lie therein. In point of time it can penetrate only a small part of an *āvalikā* (a small measure of time less than a second) and as regards modes it can know an infinite number of them.⁷

In this connection it is essential to have some idea of the Jaina conception of the relative subtlety of time, space, matter and modes. The ultimate constituent of time is an infinitesimal indivisible unit called *samaya* 'time-point' or 'instant'. This time-point is beyond human comprehension and can be intuited only by the omniscient. In the same way space is also conceived as having *pradeśas* (space-points) as its ultimate indivisible units. But these space-points are subtler than the time-points. It is conceived that the *number* of space-points of a small space of one *āngula* is equal to the *number* of time-

¹ Cf. *ViBh*, 574; *TRā*, I. 22. 3.

² Cf. *ĀNir*, 45; *NSū*, 16; *TSū*, I. 28.

³ The *NSū* uses both the terms *jāṇai* and *pāsai* in order to distinguish between *avadhi-jñāna* and *avadhi-darśana*. We shall, however, use both 'know' and 'intuit' without discrimination. In fact, the distinction between *avadhi-jñāna* and *avadhi-darśana* is not very essential too in this context.

⁴ See *ĀNir*, 45 (*ViBh*, 685); *NSū*, 16.

⁵ *āngulassa asaṅkhijjai bhāgām jāṇai pāsai*. An *āngula* is a very small measure.

⁶ An infinite number of atoms can exist in one point of space according to the Jainas. We shall make the point clear in the next paragraph.

⁷ See *NSū*, 16.

points of a countless number of cycles of time. But an atom of matter is still subtler. An infinite number of atoms can be accommodated in one space-point. Again, every atom has an infinite number of modes and as such the modes are conceived as subtler than the atoms. Thus of a time-point, space-point, a material atom and a mode, the succeeding one is subtler than the preceding one.¹ It, therefore, naturally follows that with the increase of the capacity for penetration into time, there is necessarily an increase in the capacity for extending over space, and comprehending more of matter and modes ; but extension in space does not necessarily involve more penetration into time, nor does comprehension of more matter and modes involve necessary spatial extension and temporal penetration.² The rationale of the argument can be brought out as follows: A time-point is more extensive as compared with a space-point and so it is held that it is easier to extend over one space-point than to penetrate one time-point. So it is conceived that temporal penetration is necessarily accompanied with spatial extension. But the reverse is not true. Now as each space-point can contain an infinite number of atoms, and each atom has an infinite number of modes, it is conceived that with the increase of scope in space, there is necessarily an increase in the number of things and their modes that are comprehended, but the comprehension of a greater number of things and modes does not necessarily involve more penetration into time and extension in space. Comprehension of a greater number of things and modes may be due to the clarity of the intuition as well and this is another reason why it does not necessarily involve spatial or temporal extension. Similarly, although the highest type of *avadhi* can comprehend all the atoms of a space-point, it cannot comprehend all their modes because the comprehension of all the modes is possible only on the attainment of the maximum of clarity which materializes only on the dawn of omniscience.

We have stated that by *avadhi* one can know only those things which have form or shape. The formless things such as the souls, *dharma* (substance that helps motion) and *adharma* (substance that helps rest), space and time, are not intuited by *avadhi*. It is only the *rūpin* contents of space and time that are known by it. Its scope and durability is determined by the capacity of the person possessed of it. The *Āvaśyakaniryukti* gives a detailed description of *avadhi* from fourteen points of view viz. its varieties, its spatial extension, shape of space it extends over etc.³ The *Nandi Sūtra*, however, gives only six varieties of *avadhi* that are possible in the case of a meritorious homeless mendicant with a few sub-varieties.⁴ We do not enter into details

¹ See *ĀNir*, 37 ; also see *ViBh*, 621-3.

³ See *ĀNir*, 26-28.

² See *ĀNir*, 36.
⁴ See *NSū*, 9-15 ; see also *TSūBh* on I. 23.

in view of the fact that they have little bearing on epistemological enquiry. Besides, they easily follow from what we have already stated, and as such do not afford important information.

MANAHPARYĀYA-JÑĀNA¹

In order to understand the nature of the *manahpariyāya-jñāna* it is necessary that the nature of the stuff of which the mind is made up should be properly understood. The Jainas conceive an infinite number of groups, called *varganās*, of atoms. The first *varganā* is conceived to contain only such atoms as remain alone and solitary and have not formed composite bodies with others. The second group contains composites of two atoms. The third group contains composites of three atoms. And so on. By this process, we arrive at a group which contains composites of an infinite² number of atoms, which is fit for the making up of the *audārika* (gross) body such as of men and animals. This group is followed by an infinite number of groups which are all competent for making the stuff of *audārika* body. Then follows a number of groups which are incompetent for any kind of body. Again, by the same process we reach an infinite number of groups which are competent to form the stuff of the *vaikriya* (subtle) body such as of celestial beings. And by following the same process, as above, another infinite number of groups are reached which are capable of forming the stuff of *āhāraka* body such as of an ascetic having special powers. Similarly by repeating the same process we obtain groups which are competent for *taijasa* (luminous) body, *bhāṣā* (speech), *ānāpāna* (respiration), *manas* (mind) and *karman*. It is to be noticed in this connection that a composite body of the group that follows consists of greater number of atoms but occupies less space in comparison with a composite body of the group that precedes. Thus a composite body of the *karma-varganā* consists of more atoms but occupies less space in comparison with a composite body of *manovarganā*, which, again, consists of more atoms but occupies less space in comparison with a composite body of the *ānāpāna-varganā*. And so on.³ From this description we can have an idea of the constituent stuff of the *manas* (mind).

The *Āvaśyakaniryukti* says that the *manapajjavanāṇa* (= *manahpariyāya-jñāna*) is the revealer of the objects thought by the minds of the people, is limited to the *mānusakhitta* (abode of human beings), is due to merit and is possessed by one having character (that is, a

¹ We also get the terms *manahpariyaya* and *manahpariyava*. Cf. *ViBh*, 83.

² The Jainas, as we have already stated, conceive an infinite gradation of 'infinity'.

³ See *ĀNir*, 39. Also see *ViBh*, 631-37 and the *Bṛhadvṛtti*.

homeless ascetic).¹ The *Sthānāṅga* recognizes two varieties of it *viz.* *rjumati* and *vipulamati*.² Umāsvāti distinguishes the former from the latter on the ground that the latter is purer and everlasting (that is, lasts up to the dawn of omniscience), while the former is less pure and sometimes falters too.³ Distinguishing between *avadhi* and *manahparyāya*, Umāsvāti says 'One possessed of *manahparyāya* knows only an infinitesimal part of the objects of *avadhi*. He knows a greater number of states of the material objects that form the contents of the invisible thinking process of the mind and are situated in the region inhabited by human beings.'⁴ According to him also, thus, it is the material objects and their states, thought of by the mind of others, that are intuited by *manahparyāya*.⁵ The mind undergoes a process of change while thinking, and the objective contents of this process are intuited by the *manahparyāya*. Jinabhadra, however, says that one possessed of such knowledge intuits the states of the mind-substance directly, but knows the external objects thought of by the mind only by way of inference.⁶ The *Bṛhadvṛtti* argues: 'A thinker may think of a material as well as a non-material object (e.g. a cognition). But it is not possible for one who is not omniscient to intuit directly a non-material object. And, therefore, it follows that one possessed of *manahparyāya* knows the object thought of (by others) only by way of inference.'⁷ Pūjyapāda Devanandi, however, holds a different view. Defining *manahparyāya* he says: ^{Indira Gandhi National} 'Due to its association with the *manas* (mind), the object of the *manas* (mind) of others is called *manas* and the *paryayaṇam* 'knowledge' of that (object) is *manahparyāya*. It is not a *mati-jñāna* because the mind is only an inactive background and does not make any contribution (in such knowledge). It is exclusively due to the potency of destruction-cum-subsidence, although it is designated by means of the *manas* of oneself or of another (on account of its association with it). The case is on a par with the usage in the proposition 'Behold the moon in the sky' in which the moon is

¹ maṇapajjava-nāṇaiḥ puṇa jaṇa-maṇa-pari-cintiyattha-pāyaṇaṇam
māṇusa-khitta nibaddhaṇi guṇa-paccaiyaiḥ carittavao.—ĀNir, 76.

² *SthSū*, 71.

³ See *TSūBh* on I. 25 and the *Tīkā*.

⁴ *avadhi-jñāna-viṣayasyā* 'nantabhāgaiḥ *manahparyāya-jñānī* jānīte, rūpi-dravyāṇi manorahasya-vicāragatāni ca mānuṣa-kṣetra-paryāpannāni viśuddha-tarāṇi ceti.—*TSūBh* on I. 29.

⁵ The commentator Siddhasenagaṇin, however, interprets Umāsvāti in the light of Jinabhadra's conception of *manahparyāya* as intuiting the mental modes and knowing the objects thought of by the mind by means of inference. See *Tīkā* on *TSūBh*, I. 24.

⁶ teṇāvabhāsie uṇa jāṇai bajjhe 'ṇumāṇeṇām—*ViBh*, 814.

⁷ cintako hi mūrtam amūrtam ca vastu cintayet. na ca chadimastho 'mūrtam sāksāt paśyati, tato jñāyate anumānād eva cintāṇyaiḥ vastv avagacchati. *Bṛhadvṛtti* on *ViBh*, 814.

pointed out by means of the sky.¹ He thus maintains, like Umāsvāti, that the external object itself is intuited by *manahparyāya*. Akalaṅka supports this view and seems to refute the position of Jinabhadra. He says that all the characteristics of a *pratyakṣa* are present in the *manahparyāya* inasmuch as it is independent of the sense-organs and the mind, and as such it should not be regarded as an inference (*anumāna*) which depends upon the instruction of others (for the knowledge of the relation between the probans and the probandum) as well as upon the sense-organs such as the eye.² It is, however, to be noticed in this connection that this contention refers only to the object of *manahparyāya* and not to the nature of it as *pratyakṣa*. Both Jinabhadra and Akalaṅka regard it as *pratyakṣa* but the contention is whether the external objects are intuited by it. Jinabhadra holds that the external objects are known by inference while Akalaṅka maintains that they are directly intuited by *manahparyāya* as they are associated with the mind being thought of by it. Jinabhadra holds that the function of *manahparyāya* is limited to the intuition of the states of the mind engaged in thinking, while it is the function of inference to know the external things thought of by the mind. Akalaṅka, following Pūjyapāda Devanandi, extends the function of *manahparyāya* to the intuition of the external things as well, and it is but natural that he has to meet the objection of those who hold that it is confined to the mental states which serve as the ^{in ground of the} ^{for the} inference of external objects. Akalaṅka explains away the difficulty by asserting that the states of the mind are only the medium through which the external objects are intuited, and as such they need not be given the position of a middle term of an inference. Jinabhadra denied the possibility of the intuition of external objects by admitting that the knowledge of the external objects is a case of inference, but at the same time asserting in clear terms that *manahparyāya* has a different function, and that function is the intuition of the states of the mind that is engaged in thinking of the external objects. It is but natural that the *manahparyāya* should be conceived as intuiting the *paryāyas* (states) of the *manas* (mind) alone, and not the external objects also. Jinabhadra adhered to this, perhaps original, conception, and when faced with the problem of the knowledge of the external objects thought of by the mind asserted that

¹ parakīya-mano-gato 'rtho mana ity ucyate sāhacaryāt tasya paryayaṇām parigamanām manahparyayaḥ. mati-jñāna-prasaṅga iti cen na, apekṣā-mātratvāt. kṣayopaśamaśakti-mātra-vijṛmbhitāt tat kevalān svapara-manobhir vyapadiṣyate. yathā abhre candramasām paśye 'ti—SSi on *TSū*, I. 9.

² *TRā*, I. 23, 6-7. Here although Akalaṅka does not mention the name of Jinabhadra, it is almost certain that he refers to the view of Jinabhadra, because, to our knowledge, there is none among the predecessors of Akalaṅka, who states so clearly as Jinabhadra does that one possessed of *manahparyāya* knows the external object only by means of inference.

it is only by inference that one knows the external objects. Akalaṅka, however, takes the position of Pūjyapāda Devanandi and rejects the solution of Jinabhadra as unnecessary and uncalled for. It is, however, not possible for want of sufficient relevant pre-Pūjyapāda literature to trace the origin of Pūjyapāda's position. Maybe he took the suggestion from the *Tattvārthabhaṣya* of Umāsvāti. It is also plausible that Pūjyapāda followed the view embodied in the *Āvaśyakaniryukti* (gāthā 76).¹ We can assert with some measure of certainty that he was familiar with this work, inasmuch as we find him quoting from the work,² and as such our conjecture is not totally unfounded.

According to Pūjyapāda, the objects intuited by *manahparyāya* include objects of the activities of the sense-organ of speech, body and mind.³ Distinguishing between *rjumati* and *vipulamati* he says that the latter knows less number of objects than the former, but knows them more vividly and thoroughly. The *vipulamati* is more lucid and penetrating than the *rjumati*. The former is infallible while the latter falters. The former is possessed by one who gradually ascends the spiritual ladder while the latter is owned by one who is destined to fall in the grip of passions and go down.⁴ Akalaṅka only elucidates the view of Pūjyapāda.⁵ Vidyānandi repeats Akalaṅka. It seems that the development of the conception of *manahparyāya* stopped with Pūjyapāda on the one side and Jinabhadra on the other. The later Jaina thinkers only took side with the one or the other, but did not make any further development.

Only human beings are competent to possess *manahparyāya*. The *Nandi Sūtra* says that only those uterine human beings who are born in the *karmabhūmis* (i.e. lands where *tīrthaṅkaras* are born), possess longevity and have fully developed organs, who are of right faith, self-controlled and free from passions (*apramatta*) and who are possessed of *rddhis* (extraordinary powers) are entitled to possess this *manahparyāya*.⁶ Even gods are not competent to possess *manahparyāya*. It is the special privilege of the gifted among the human species. Like *avadhi*, it has also gradation of spatial extension and temporal penetration.⁷

AVADHI AND MANAHPARYĀYA

Now let us see whether there is any essential distinction between *avadhi* and *manahparyāya*. *Avadhi*, as we have seen, intuits the

¹ *Vide supra* footnote 1, p. 66.

² He quotes *ĀNir*, gāthā 5 in *SSi* on *TSū*, I. 19. Of course, here Pūjyapāda does not mention the specific name of the work but introduces the reference as āgamatas tāvat.

³ See *SSi* on *TSū*, I. 23.

⁴ See *SSi* on *TSū*, I. 24.

⁵ See *TRā*, I. 23.

⁶ See *NSū*, 17.

⁷ See *NSū*, 18.

material substance and modes. *Manahparyāya*, as stated above, intuits the modes only of the material substance that constitutes the mind. It is further admitted that the material substance, intuited by *avadhi*, includes the *manodravya* (matter constituting mind) also.¹ Thus we find that both *avadhi* and *manahparyāya* can intuit the states of the material substance that constitutes the mind. The distinction between them, therefore, is only one of scope. *Avadhi* intuits other *varganās* viz. the *audārika*, *vaikriya* etc. as well, while *manahparyāya* cannot do so. Besides, only a qualified human being can possess the *manahparyāya* while the *avadhi* belongs to the denizens of heaven and hell and sometimes even to the subhuman creatures. But in our opinion these are only superficial points of distinction. They cannot be held as constituting a qualitative distinction. They can at best prove a quantitative difference. The great logician Siddhasena Divākara who, as we have seen, does not recognize the distinction between *mati* and *śruta* has refused to recognize any distinction between *avadhi* and *manahparyāya* as well. The orthodox view is that the *manahparyāya* is limited to the intuition of the minds or the objective contents of the minds of the human beings alone.² But Siddhasena objects that the subhuman organisms possessed of two or more sense-organs also are found to strive by means of attraction and repulsion, and thus are possessed of minds and as such it will be proper to extend the scope of *manahparyāya* to the minds or the objects of the minds of them as well, or otherwise it will be improper to postulate *manahparyāya* as a separate category of knowledge.³ Moreover, the *avadhi* can well serve the purpose of *manahparyāya* and so it is not necessary to admit the latter as constituting a separate category of knowledge. It can at best be considered as a specific type of *avadhi*.

KEVALA-JÑĀNA

Of the three classes of *pratyakṣa*, we have described the first two, viz. *avadhi* and *manahparyāya*. Now we come to *kevala* (omniscience), the consummation of all knowledge.

The total destruction of the *mohaniya* (deluding) *karman* is followed by a short interval lasting for less than a *muhūrta* (forty-eight minutes) after which the *karmans* veiling *jñāna* and *darśana* as also the *antarāya* (obstructive) *karman* are destroyed. And then the soul shines in its full splendour and attains omniscience⁴ which intuits

¹ See *ĀNir*, 42; see also *ViBh*, 669 and the *Bṛhadvṛtti*.

² See *ĀNir*, 76 which states that the *manahparyāya* reveals the object thought of by the *janamaṇa* 'human mind'.

³ *prārthanā-pratīghātābhyaśām* *ceṣṭante* *dvīndriyādayaḥ*
manahparyāya-vijñānam *yuktam* *teṣu* *na cā* 'nyathā'.

—*Niścayadvātrīnśikā*, 17 as quoted in *JBP*; also see *JBP*, p. 18.

⁴ See *TSū*, X. 1 with *Bhāṣya* and *Tīkā*; see also *SthSū*, 226.

all substances with all their modes.¹ Nothing remains unknown in omniscience.² Umāsvāti quotes an opinion that maintained that on the emergence of *kevala* the other four kinds of knowledge viz. *mati*, *śruta* etc. are overpowered much in the same way as the other luminaries of the sky are overpowered on the appearance of the sun in the firmament, but himself supports the view that they are absolutely impossible in the omniscient on the ground that the *kevala* is due to the total destruction while the other four are due only to the destruction-cum-subsidence of the *jñānāvaraṇa-karman*. Total destruction bars the possibility of destruction-cum-subsidence.³

The Jainas hold that each and every entity is related to all entities other than itself in the universe in some relation or other. These relations are called *paryāyas* (modes) of the entity. In order to know an entity completely, these relations or *paryāyas* are to be completely known. And hence it follows that the complete knowledge of one entity involves the complete knowledge of other entities as well. If the relations are real and if it is also possible to know these relations, it logically follows that omniscience is possible. Omniscience is perfectly consistent with the Jaina conception of emergence of knowledge as the removal of veil. As realists the Jainas believe in relations as objective links that relate each and every entity with all that is other than the entity. Symbolically, the relations are links between A and the contents of not-A. This means that the complete knowledge of A implies the complete knowledge of not-A and this is obviously the knowledge of the whole universe. In other words, the perfect knowledge of one entity means the perfect knowledge of all entities. This has been very characteristically expressed by the *Ācārāṅga* in the following terms: One who knows *one* knows *all*, and one who knows *all* knows *one*.⁴

There is no controversy regarding the nature of *kevala* among the different Jaina thinkers, and so we do not state their views separately.

JÑĀNA AND DARSANA

Upayoga (consciousness) is the defining characteristic of a soul.⁵ This *upayoga* can be *sākāra* 'determinate' as well as *anākāra* 'indeterminate'.⁶ The former is called *jñāna* and the latter *darśana*.⁷

¹ See *TSū*, I. 30 with *Bhāṣya*; see also *ANir*, 77.

² na ca kevala-jñāna-viṣayāt param kiñcij jñeyam asti—*TSūBh*, I. 30.

³ kṣayopaśamajāni catvāri jñānāni pūrvāṇi, kṣayād eva tu kevalam. tasmān na kevalināḥ śeṣāṇi jñānāni bhavanti 'ti.—*TSūBh*, I. 31.

⁴ je egam jānai se savvam jānai, je savvam jānai se egam jānai—*ĀSū*, I. 3. 4; also see *ViBh*, 320 and the *Bṛhadvṛtti*.

⁵ See *BhSū*, II. 10; *TSū*, II. 8.

⁶ See *BhSū*, XVI. 7; *TSū*, II. 9 and *Bhāṣya*.

⁷ See *TSūBh* on II. 9.

We propose to render *jñāna* as 'determinate knowledge' and *darśana* as 'indeterminate intuition' although we are fully conscious of the inadequacy of the translation. For the sake of convenience we shall sometimes use simply 'knowledge' for *jñāna* and 'intuition' for *darśana*.

The hoary antiquity of the Jaina conception of *jñānāvaraṇa* and *darśanāvaraṇa* points to the antiquity of the distinction between *jñāna* and *darśana*. The Jaina Āgamas use the terms *jñai* and *pāsai* in order to express the two faculties of the soul. The *Prajñāpanā Sūtra* recognizes a peculiar faculty called *pāsanayā* and in this connection we should notice the contents of its two chapters dealing severally with *upayoga* and *pāsanayā* (rendered *paśyattā* in Sanskrit).¹ It is recognized that both *upayoga* and *paśyattā* can be *sākāra* as well as *anākāra*.² This means that both *jñāna* and *darśana* can belong to both the categories of *upayoga* and *paśyattā*. Distinguishing between *upayoga* and *paśyattā*, the commentator Malayagiri says: 'Sākāra *upayoga* consists of five classes of knowledge (viz. *mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi*, *manahparyāya* and *kevala*) and three classes of non-knowledge (viz. *mati-ajñāna*, *śruta-ajñāna* and *avadhi-ajñāna* or *vibhaṅga*). Sākāra *paśyattā*, on the other hand, consists only of six classes (out of the eight just mentioned) inasmuch as *mati-jñāna* and *mati-ajñāna* are not included therein. *Paśyattā* is derived from *dr̥ś* and means *prekṣaṇa* and, by convention, connotes 'prolonged vision' with reference to determinate knowledge and 'clear vision' with reference to indeterminate intuition. *Mati-jñāna* and *mati-ajñāna* cognize only what is present and cannot be prolonged to what is past or future, and as such cannot possess *paśyattā*. Similarly, *anākāra upayoga* consists of four classes of *darśana* (intuition) viz. *cakṣurdarśana* (eye-intuition), *acakṣurdarśana* (intuition by the mind as well as the sense-organs other than the eye), *avadhi-darśana* and *kevala-darśana*. *Anākāra paśyattā*, on the other hand, consists only of three classes (out of these four), inasmuch as *acakṣurdarśana* being devoid of 'clear vision' cannot possess *paśyattā*, and as such is excluded from the category of *anākāra paśyattā*'.³

1 *PrSū*, padas 29 and 30.

2 *sāgāro-*'vaoge ya *anāgāro-*'vaoge ya—*PrSū*, pada 29.

sāgārapāsanayā anāgāra-pāsanayā—*PrSū*, pada 30.

3 *pañca jñānāni trīṇy ajñānāni 'ty aṣṭavidhāḥ sākāra upayogaḥ sākāra-paśyattā tu ṣaḍvidhā, matijñāna-matyajñānayoḥ paśyattayoh anabhyupagamāt, kasmād iti cet, ucyate, iha paśyattā nāma paśyato bhāva ucyate, paśyato bhāvaś ca 'dr̥śir prekṣaṇe' iti vacanāt prekṣaṇam iha rūḍhivaśāt sākāra-paśyattāyām cintyamānāyām pradīrgha-kālam anākārapaśyattāyām cintyamānāyām prakṛṣṭām parisphuṭarūpam īkṣaṇam avaseyam. matijñāna-matyajñāne tu utpannāvinaṣṭārtha-grāhake sāmpratakāla-viṣayē tathā cakṣurdarśanam acakṣurdarśanam avadhi-darśanam kevala-darśanam iti caturvidhō 'nākāropayogaḥ, anākāra-paśyattā tu trividhā, acakṣur-darśanasyā 'nākāra-paśyattā-śabda-vācyatvābhāvāt, kasmād iti cet—acakṣur-darśane parisphuṭarūpam īkṣaṇam na vidyate—Malayagiri's *Tīkā* on *PrSū*, pada 30.*

Paśyattā thus means 'prolonged vision' or 'clear vision'. It can also be called 'direct vision'. The *Prajñāpanā Sūtra* gives the divisions and subdivisions but does not clarify the meaning of *paśyattā* and its difference from *upayoga*. It is only the commentator Malayagiri who attempts to demarcate the line of distinction between *upayoga* and *paśyattā*. As regards the distinction between *jñāna* and *darśana*, however, the Āgamas are very clear and definite, and unanimous too. The great Ācārya Kundakunda, however, records a quite original conception. His leaning is towards the absolutist standpoint. He asks, with reference to the omniscient, whether his knowledge reveals the non-self, his intuition reveals self, and his soul reveals both the self and the non-self.¹ He considers the problem from the empirical as well as the transcendental standpoint² and concludes that the *ātman*, its knowledge, and its intuition (*darśana*)—all these are identical and hence each can reveal the self as well as the non-self.³ He does not refer to the *sākāra-anākāra* (determinate-indeterminate) relation, and so it is not possible to ascertain whether he distinguished between *jñāna* and *darśana* on that basis. Ācārya Virasena in his commentary called *Dhavalā* on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* of Puṣpadanta says 'What comprehends an external object of the nature of the universal-cum-particular is *jñāna*. And the comprehension of the self of the same nature is *darśana*'.⁴ Reality consists of universal-cum-particular and as such the valid cognition of it must consist in the comprehension of both these characteristics. *Jñāna* and *darśana* are both cases of valid cognition, and so each must be regarded as comprehending both the aspects of reality. Those who hold that *jñāna* comprehends only the particular features while *darśana* comprehends only the universal ones are criticized as upholding wrong conception of the nature of *jñāna* and *darśana*. A particular without the universal is a figment, and so the knowledge which comprehends a particular bereft of the universal is invalid, nay unreal. Similarly the intuition of a universal without the particular is also unreal.⁵ Virasena thus maintains that each of the two, *jñāna* and *darśana*, comprehends reality as it is, that is, a complex of universal-cum-particular, the difference between them consisting in the fact that a *jñāna* knows the external reality while a *darśana* intuits the internal

¹ *Niyamasāra*, 160.

² *Ibid.*, 161-169.

³ This is the implication of *Niyamasāra*, 170 which runs:
appāṇāṁ viṇu ṣāṇāṁ ṣāṇāṁ viṇu appago e saṁdeho
tamhā saparapayāsam ṣāṇāṁ tahā darśanām hodi.

⁴ sāmānya-viśeṣātmaka-bāhyārtha-grahaṇānī jñānam, tadātmaka-svarūpa-grahaṇānī darśanam iti siddham.—*Dhavalā* on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, I. 1. 4.

⁵ Cf. na jñānām pramāṇām sāmānya-vyatirikta-viśeṣasyā 'rthakriyā-kartṛ-tvām praty asamarthatvato 'vastuno grahaṇāt. na tasya grahaṇām api sāmānya-vyatirikte viśeṣe hy avastuni kartṛkarma-rūpābhāvāt. tata eva na darśanam api pramāṇam. *Ibid.*

self. *Darśana* is *antarmukha* (turned inside, introvert) while *jñāna* is *bahirmukha* (turned outside, extrovert). If the *jñāna* knows the external world *darśana* intuits the internal self. The internal reality is as much a complex of universal-cum-particular as an external entity. Thus the object of both a *jñāna* and a *darśana* is a complex of universal-cum-particular. Brahmadeva in his *Vṛtti* on the *Dravyasaṅgraha* of Nemicandra upholds a similar position. In his commentary on *Dravyasaṅgraha*, *gāthā* 43, he recognizes the *darśana* as intuition of a universal characteristic. But in his commentary on *gāthā* 44, he distinguishes two views—(1) according to logic (*tarkābhiprāyena*), and (2) according to scripture (*siddhāntābhiprāyena*). The usual view of *darśana* as intuition of the universal, for instance *sattā* (existence), is referred to as according to logic.¹ The conception of *darśana* according to the scripture is given as follows: Awareness or vision of one's self, consisting in the striving for the genesis of knowledge in its wake, is *darśana* 'intuition' and the subsequent determinate knowledge of the external object is *jñāna*.² The soul knows as well as intuits much in the same way as fire burns as well as illumines. The selfsame consciousness is called *darśana* as well as *jñāna* with reference to the difference of its object. It is called *darśana* when it is engaged in intuiting the self, and *jñāna* when engaged in knowing the non-self. Knowledge would lose its validity if it were admitted that *darśana* and *jñāna* are confined to the comprehension respectively of the universal and the particular exclusively. The ground given is the same as already mentioned by us. Now as *jñāna* and *darśana*, viewed from the transcendental point of view, are identical with the self, it can be said that the self itself, being of the nature of knowledge free from all doubt, delusion and error, is the ultimate organ of knowledge.³ *Darśana* and *jñāna* thus ultimately lose their identity in the self. Brahmadeva gives yet another explanation of this twofold interpretation of *darśana*. He says that the *sāmānya-viśeṣa* (universal-particular) relation of *darśana* and *jñāna* is for the non-Jaina logicians who are unable to understand the real significance. For those of subtle intelligence, however, the other explanation which is in strict accord-

¹ evam tarkābhiprāyena sattāvalokana-darśanam vyākhyātam—*Vṛtti* on *Dravyasaṅgraha*, 44.

² ata ūrdhvam siddhāntābhiprāyena kathyate. tathā hi uttara-jñānotpatti-nimittam yat prayatnam tadrūpam yat svasyā 'tmanaḥ paricchedanam avalokanam tad darśanam bhaṇyate. tadanantaram yad bahirviṣaye vikalparūpeṇa padārtha-grahanam taj jñānam iti vārttikam—*Ibid.*

³ siddhāntena punar niścayena guṇa-guṇinor abhinnatvāt saṁśayavimoha-vibhrama-rahita-vastu-jñāna-svarūpātmā 'va pramāṇam.—*Ibid.*

ance with the scripture is propounded.¹ It is to be noted in this connection that all these proponents of the new conception belong to the Digambara school. So far as our knowledge goes, we do not find any Śvetāmbara exponent of this conception. Among the Digambaras also, only the above-mentioned thinkers propound the theory, the other great thinkers unanimously admitting the *sākāra-anākāra* (determinate-indeterminate) relation between *jñāna* and *darśana*. Of course, it has not been possible for me to examine the whole relevant literature on the subject and so my above remark may be liable to contradiction. But in view of the fact that such great exponents as Pūjyapāda, Samantabhadra, Akalaṅka and Vidyānandi unanimously accepted the conception, we can, with confidence, say that there was little controversy regarding the *sākāra-anākāra* (determinate-indeterminate) relation of *jñāna* and *darśana* among the Digambara thinkers as well. We do not know whether there is any basic affinity between the *upayoga-paśyattā* conception of the *Prajnāpanā Sūtra* and the apparently original theory of Kundakunda and others. In spite of the explanation of Malayagiri regarding the distinction between *upayoga* and *paśyattā*, we are not sure of the original relation between the two. It is also a problem to be decided whether there is any affinity between *paśyattā* and *darśana*. It is a difficult problem and I confess my inability to solve it *ad hoc*.

Now we come to the problem of the temporal relation between *jñāna* and *darśana*. *Jñāna* and *darśana* are conscious activities, and it is an Āgamic principle that two conscious activities cannot occur simultaneously. The *Āvaśyakaniryukti* says that (even) the *kevalins* (the omniscient) cannot have two conscious activities simultaneously.² The Āgamas, therefore, unanimously admit the impossibility of the simultaneous occurrence of *jñāna* and *darśana*.³ The later Jaina thinkers also unanimously admitted the impossibility in the case of the *chadmastha* (non-omniscient)⁴ but there is controversy among them regarding the case of the *kevalin* (omniscient). The Digambara thinkers unanimously hold that the *jñāna* and the *darśana* of a *kevalin* occur

¹ Cf. *tarke mukhya-vṛttyā para-samaya-vyākhyānam*. tatra yadā ko 'pi *parasamayī* pr̄chhati *jaināgame* *darśanam* *jñānam* ce 'ti *guṇa-dvayaṁ* *jīvasya* *kathyate* *tat kathaṁ* *ghaṭata* iti *teṣāṁ* *pratityarthāṁ* *sthūlavyākhyānenā* *bahirviṣaye* *yat sāmānya-paricchedanāṁ* *tasya* *sattāvalokana-darśana-samijñā* *siddhānte* *punah* . . . *sūkṣmavyākhyāne* . . . *ātmagrāhakāṁ* *darśanam* *vyākhyātām* *ity atrā* 'pi *doṣo* *nāsti*.—*Ibid.*

² *savvassa kevalissā jugavāṁ do natthī uvaogā*—*ĀNir*, 973. The other reading is *kevalissa vi* (See *Tīkā* on *TSūBh*, I. 31).

³ See *BhSū*, XVIII. 8; *PrSū*, pada 30.

⁴ Literally *chadmastha* means 'one involved in the world'. But we write the word 'non-omniscient' for the sake of contradistinction. Besides, a *chadmastha* is necessarily non-omniscient.

simultaneously. But among the Śvetāmbara thinkers, some stick to the Āgamas, while others go astray and assert either that a *kevalin*'s *jñāna* and *darśana* are simultaneous or even that they are mutually identical and have no separate identity. We shall here briefly refer to the authors of these views.

The *Āvaśyakaniryukti*, as we have already stated, does not admit the possibility of simultaneous occurrence of *jñāna* and *darśana* of a *kevalin*. Then we come to Umāsvāti who says: 'The conscious activities manifesting themselves as *mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi* and *manah-paryāya* occur in succession, and not simultaneously. The conscious activities of the omniscient lord, possessed of integrated *jñāna* and *darśana*, however, in respect of 'pure knowledge' and 'pure intuition'—which comprehend all objects and are independent—occur simultaneously in every point of time'.¹ It follows from this quotation that Umāsvāti admitted simultaneous occurrences of *jñāna* and *darśana*. The commentator Siddhasenaganin,² however, gives a different interpretation in accordance with the Āgamas, although he refers for the sake of refutation to some old commentators, possessed of logical intelligence, who interpreted the relevant statements of the Āgamas otherwise and denied succession of conscious activities³ of a *kevalin*. The great Digambara Ācārya Kundakunda clearly states that the *jñāna* and *darśana* of a *kevalin* occur simultaneously even as the light and heat of the sun occur simultaneously.⁴ Pūjyapāda Devanandi follows Kundakunda. He says: 'Jñāna is *sākāra* 'determinate' while *darśana* is *anākāra* 'indeterminate'. They occur in succession in the *chadmastha* (i.e. one who is under the influence of the obstructive *karmans*) while in the *nirāvaraṇa* (i.e. one who is completely free from the obstructive *karmans*) they occur simultaneously'.⁵

Now we come to the great logician Siddhasena Divākara who refused to admit the separate identity of *jñāna* and *darśana* because of logical difficulties. 'We can distinguish between *jñāna* and *darśana* up to *manah-paryāya*. *Kevala-jñāna*, however, *quā jñāna* and *quā darśana* is identical.'⁶ According to Siddhasena Divākara, those who,

¹ matijñānādiṣu caturṣu paryāyē 'payogo bhavati, na yugapat. sambhinna-jñāna-darśanasya tu bhagavataḥ kevalino yugapat sarvabhāva-grāhake nirapekṣe kevala-jñāne kevala-darśane ca anusamayam upayogo bhavati.—TSūBh, I. 31.

² See Siddhasenaganin's *Tikā* on the passage quoted above.

³ Cf. kecī paṇḍitammanyāḥ sūtrāṇy anyathākāram artham ācakṣate tarka-balānuviddha-buddhayo vāraṇavāreṇo 'payogo nāsti, tat tu na pramāṇayāmāḥ, yata āmnāye bhūyāṁsi sūtrāṇi vāraṇavāreṇo 'payogam pratipādayanti.—Ibid.

⁴ jugavam vaṭṭai nāṇam kevala-ṇāṇissa darīṣaṇam ca tahā diṇayara-payāsa-tāpām jaha vaṭṭai taha muṇeyavvam.—Niyamasāra, 159.

⁵ See SSi on TSū, II. 9.

⁶ maṇapajjava-ṇāṇamto ṣāṇassa ya darīṣaṇassa ya viseso kevala-ṇāṇam puṇa darīṣaṇam ti ṣāṇam ti ya samāṇam—STP, II. 3.

on the authority of the scriptures, maintain that the emancipated one (*jina*) does not know and intuit simultaneously make no scruple to flout their *tirthankara*.¹ In other words, he finds logical difficulties in the position and asks those who stand by the old position to reinterpret the Āgamic statement and thus remove the inconsistencies. If *kevala-jñāna* dawns on the complete destruction of the relevant obscuring *karman* it stands to reason that *kevala-darśana* also should dawn immediately upon the destruction of the relevant obscuring *karman*. And as both the destructions are simultaneous, it logically follows that the dawnings of *kevala-jñāna* and *kevala-darśana* also synchronize.² 'As it is said that there can be no *mati-jñāna* in the omniscient *jina* who has completely destroyed the veil, so (should it be admitted that) there can be no separate *darśana* in one who has completely destroyed the veil.'³ 'Moreover,' says Siddhasena Divākara, 'in the scriptures, *kevala* has been said to have beginning but no end, and those afraid of going against the scriptures should take note of this fact.'⁴ Admission of succession in the occurrence of *jñāna* and *darśana* means admission of break of continuity of both of them, and this obviously goes against the scriptures which prescribe non-break (*aparyavasitatva*), that is, continuity of both *jñāna* and *darśana*.⁵ The *jñānāvaraṇa* and *darśanāvaraṇa* are destroyed simultaneously, and the problem arises which of the two, *kevala-jñāna* and *kevala-darśana*, should arise first? Logically we cannot give priority to anyone of them. Nor is it possible to admit the synchronous emergence of both, because two conscious activities cannot occur simultaneously.⁶ If an omniscient soul knows all in one instant, he should continue to know all for ever, or otherwise, he does not know all.⁷ The contention that *jñāna* (knowledge) is distinct and determinate while *darśana* (intuition) is indistinct and indeterminate has no scope in the case of one who has destroyed all karmic veils.⁸ The distinction of 'determinate and indeterminate', 'distinct and indistinct', applies to the knowledge of imperfect beings, and not to that of the perfect ones. And hence there can be no distinction between *jñāna* and *darśana* of the omniscient. There are other difficulties as well. Supposing that even in a *kevalin* the *jñāna* and the *darśana* are quite distinct from one another, they must occur either in succession or simultaneously. In the former case, the *kevalin* could not be held to speak out complete reality, because his statement, being

¹ *Ibid.*, II. 4.

² *Ibid.*, II. 5.

³ bhaṇṇai khīṇāvaraṇe jaha maiṇāṇam jiṇe na saṁbhavai
taha khīṇāvaraṇijje visesao darśaṇam natthi.—*Ibid.*, II. 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, II. 7.

⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, II. 8.

⁶ Cf. darśaṇa-ṇāṇā-'varaṇa-kkhae samāṇammi kassa pūvvaaram
hojja samam uppāo haṇḍi duve natthi uvaogā.—*Ibid.*, II. 9.

⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, II. 10.

⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, II. 11.

in strict conformity with his awareness, would exclude the object of *darśana* when it would synchronize with knowledge, and it would exclude the object of *jñāna* when synchronizing with intuition. And even in the case of simultaneity of *jñāna* and *darśana*, the difficulty of simultaneous statement of the contents of both would still remain.¹ Omniscience would be only an ill-conceived notion if it were admitted that the omniscient *arhat* intuits the unknown and knows the unintuited.² The conception of separate identity of *jñāna* and *darśana* implies that the object of *darśana* remains for ever untouched by *jñāna* and the object of *jñāna* remains for ever untouched by *darśana* and consequently it follows that the *whole* reality ever remains unknown even to the *kevalin*. The various scriptural statements contradicting our position, however, are to be interpreted with reference to various standpoints.³ The scriptures do not recognize *darśana* in the case of *manahparyāya*, inasmuch as the *manahparyāya* cognizes only particular features of the mind-substance of others, and not its universal forms. They further recognize only four classes of *darśana* viz. *cakṣurdarśana*, *acakṣurdarśana*, *avadhi-darśana* and *kevala-darśana*. Siddhasena then quotes an opinion which recognized *darśana* as 'avagraha, simple and pure', and *jñāna* as 'determinate description' of the form 'This is a jar', and distinguished *darśana* from *jñāna* on the ground that the latter can be due to the former while the former can never be due to the latter.⁴ He refutes the opinion on the ground that *avagraha* has been recognized as a sub-type of *mati-jñāna*, and as such if *darśana* were held to be nothing but *avagraha*, it would follow that *darśana* is a type of *mati-jñāna*.⁵ Siddhasena then formulates his own definition of *darśana* which runs as follows: 'Darśana is *jñāna* (cognition) of external objects untouched by, or unamenable to the sense-organs, provided the cognition does not cognize the past and future events by means of a *liṅga* (probans).'⁶ The definition does not overextend to *manahparyāya*, because the external objects are not directly known by it.⁷ *Mati* and *śruti* have no corresponding *darśana*.⁸ But *avadhi* can have *darśana* inasmuch as *avadhi* intuits objects that are untouched by the sense-organs.⁹ The omniscient (*kevalin*) knows as well as intuits

¹ addiṭṭharū aṇṇāyām ca kevalī eva bhāsai sayāvi
ega-samayammi haṇḍi vayaṇa-vigappo ṇa saṁbhavai.—*Ibid.*, II. 12.

³ Cf. *ibid.*, II. 18.

² Cf. *ibid.*, II. 13.
⁴ darīṣaṇam uggahamettam ghaḍo tti nivvannanā havai nāṇam, etc.—*STP*, II. 21-22; Yaśovijaya, however, gives a quite different explanation of gāthā 22 (see his *JBP*, p. 43).

⁵ *Ibid.*, II. 23.

⁶ nāṇam apuṭṭhe avisae ya aṭṭhammi darīṣaṇam hoi
mottūṇa liṅgao jām aṇāgayaīyavisaesu.—*Ibid.*, II. 25. See also the commentary of Abhayadeva.

⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, II. 26.

⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, II. 27-28.

⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, II. 29.

objects inasmuch as he is aware of all objects irrespective of their amenability or unamenability to sense-organs.¹ Siddhasena Divākara, therefore, concludes that *jñāna* and *darśana* of a *kevalin* arise simultaneously and last for ever. He further says that this interpretation does not violate the scriptures while the view that *jñāna* and *darśana* of a *kevalin* arise in alternate succession is not faithful to the scriptures and is to be understood as the position of the non-Jainas.² We have already stated how he proves the non-difference between *jñāna* and *darśana* in order to avoid logical difficulties.

Next we come to Jinabhadra, the great upholder of the Āgamic view. He deals with the problem in his *Viśeṣaṇavatī*³ and *Viśeṣaṇavaśyakabhbāṣya*.⁴ He mentions all the three positions *viz.* (1) simultaneous occurrence of *jñāna* and *darśana*, (2) alternate occurrence of them, (3) non-difference between them.⁵ He records arguments for and against all the three positions. But he supports the alternate occurrence of *jñāna* and *darśana* of a *kevalin* on the basis of scriptural texts. We do not examine his elaborate arguments here, because they do not contain any new speculation. All his objections are based on the scriptural texts and established traditions which unanimously recognize alternate occurrence of *jñāna* and *darśana* as we have stated at the outset of our enquiry about their temporal relation.

Akalaṅka and Vidyānandi, the great Digambara logicians, support simultaneous occurrence of *jñāna* and *darśana* in a *kevalin*. Commenting upon Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmāṃsā*, verse 101, Akalaṅka says 'If the *jñāna* and *darśana* (of a *kevalin*) were to occur alternately in succession, his omniscience would be only a contingent occurrence.'⁶ There is no reason why the universal and the particular should not reveal themselves simultaneously to the omniscient who has destroyed all his karmic veils.⁷ Vidyānandi says: 'Awareness of the universal form is *darśana*, and the awareness of the particular features is *jñāna*. *Jñānāvaraṇa* and *darśanāvaraṇa* obscure these faculties. There is absence of *kevala-jñāna* and *kevala-darśana* in people like us because of the presence of these two. And it goes beyond understanding why the universal and the particular should be revealed only in alternate succession when it is established that the two (*āvaraṇas*) are destroyed simultaneously due to a special kind of absolute purification of the soul?'⁸ Haribhadra,

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, II. 30.

² Cf. *ibid.*, II. 31.

³ Gāthās 184-280.

⁴ Gāthās 3089-3135.

⁵ See *Viśeṣaṇavatī*, 184-5.

⁶ tajjñāna-darśanayoh kramavṛttau hi sarvajñatvam kādācitkam syāt—*Aṣṭasāti* on *ĀMi*, 101.

⁷ sāmānya-viśeṣa-viśayayor vigatāvaraṇayor yugapat pratibhāsayogat pratibandhakāntarābhāvāt—*Ibid.*

⁸ *Aṣṭasahasrī* on the passage quoted in footnote No. 7.

commenting on Jinadāsagāṇi-Mahattara's *Cūrṇi*¹ on *Nandi Sūtra* 22, says that Ācārya Siddhasena and others were the upholders of simultaneous occurrence of *jñāna* and *darśana*, that Jinabhadragāṇi-kṣamāśramana and others were the upholders of the alternate occurrence of these, and that the old Ācāryas upheld non-difference of *jñāna* and *darśana*.² It is difficult to ascertain from the available Jaina literature as to who this Siddhasena and the old Ācāryas were whom Haribhadra refers to. Siddhasena Divākara, as we have seen, supported the position of non-difference and so cannot be regarded as referred to by Haribhadra as the upholder of simultaneity of both. Besides, we do not know of any old Ācāryas who were the supporters of non-difference between *jñāna* and *darśana*. Again in his commentary on the *Sanmatitarkaprakarana* (II. 10), Abhayadevaśūri mentions Jinabhadra as the supporter of alternate succession, and Mallavādin as the supporter of simultaneity. This Mallavādin also is not known to us. The commentator Malayagiri, however, follows Haribhadra in assigning the positions to different authors.³ This problem of identification of Haribhadra's Siddhasena and Abhayadeva's Mallavādin has been thoroughly discussed by the great savant Pandit Sukhlalji in *Jñānabindu-paricaya*—the introductory portion (pp. 54-62) of his excellent edition of Yaśovijaya's *Jñānabindu*—and we refer to that for fuller information.

In Yaśovijaya we find the last Jaina logician who supported the position of Siddhasena Divākara at great length and practically wrote a commentary on almost the whole of the second Kāṇḍa of his *Sanmatitarka-prakarana*, which deals with the problem.⁴ Yaśovijaya refers to the statement of Haribhadra or Malayagiri that Ācārya Siddhasena was the supporter of simultaneity, and says that here only the *prima facie* position of Siddhasena is referred to.⁵ He supplements the arguments of Siddhasena Divākara and strongly supports his position. But what is most striking is the tone of comprehensive reconciliation of conflicting views with which he winds up the discussion. He says: 'Mallavādin

¹ The *Cūrṇi* quotes gāthās from the *Viśeṣaṇavatī* of Jinabhadra already referred to by us. Haribhadra has commented upon these gāthās in his *Nandisūtravṛtti*.

² kecana Siddhasenācāryādayaḥ bhaṇanti, kim? yugapad ekasminn eva kāle jānāti paśyati ca, kah? kevalī, na tvanyaḥ, niyamān niyamena, anye Jinabhadragāṇi-kṣamāśramana-prabhṛtayah ekāntaritām jānāti paśyati ce 'ty evam icchanti . . . anye tu Vṛddhācāryā na naiva viśvak pṛthak taddarśanam icchanti—*NSūV*, p. 52.

³ See Malayagiri's *Nandivṛtti*, p. 134.

⁴ See *JBP*, pp. 33-47.

⁵ yattu yugapadupayogavāditvarān Siddhasenācāryāṇām *Nandivṛttāv* uktām tad abhyupagamavādābhīprāyeṇa . . . kramākramopayogadvaya-paryanuyogān-taram eva svapakṣasya *Sanmatau* udbhāvitavād iti draṣṭavyam—*JBP*, p. 33.

(who admitted separate identity of *jñāna* and *darśana* but did not admit succession) has resorted to *vyavahāra naya* (empirical standpoint) which comprehends distinction, the Revered (Jinabhadra) has resorted to pure *r̥jusūtra* (analytic standpoint) which lies at (that is, distinguishes) the borderline between cause and effect, while Siddhasena has accepted *sāṅgraha* which tends to obliterate distinction. None of these three positions of the Ācāryas, therefore, are improper.¹

We have now described the main features of the Āgamic epistemology. We do not attempt at a comparative estimate, mainly because the Āgamic conceptions are so peculiar and original that they do not allow themselves to be dovetailed into the scholastic scheme of epistemology. It is only the later systematization of the *pramāṇas* by the Jaina schoolmen which can lend itself profitably to comparative evaluation. We therefore content ourselves by giving a systematic exposition of the Āgamic scheme trying to throw light on tangled spots with the help of documentary evidence and independent judgment both.

In the beginning of the chapter we adverted to the problem of the validity of knowledge. The Āgamic epistemology, as we have stated, regards the rightness or the wrongness of knowledge as ultimately dependent upon the rightness or the wrongness of the attitude. If the soul is possessed of perverted attitude (*mithyātva*) its knowledge is necessarily wrong. If it is possessed of right attitude (*samyaktva*) its knowledge is right. Knowledge is the intrinsic characteristic of the soul. But it is vitiated by *mithyātva* which is the Jaina equivalent of the principle known as *avidyā* in the other systems. The *mithyātva* vitiates, as it were, the very texture of the soul and all the imperfections of worldly existence are ultimately due to it. A comparative estimate of the nature and function of this *mithyātva* with those of the *avidyā* of the other systems is necessary in order to understand the fundamental characteristic of the Jaina thought. We shall therefore address ourselves to the comparative evaluation of the principle of *mithyātva* or *avidyā* in the chapter that follows.

¹ bhedagrāhi-vyavahṛtinayām saṁśrito Mallavādi

Pūjyāḥ prāyah karaṇa-phalayoḥ sīmni śuddharjusūtram.

bhedocchedonmukham adhigataḥ saṅgrahām Siddhasenas

tasmād ete na khalu viśamāḥ sūripakṣas trayo 'pi.—JBP, p. 48.

CHAPTER III

THE PROBLEM OF AVIDYĀ

I

INTRODUCTORY

India is the land of spiritualism. Nothing bereft of spiritual value could satisfy the Indian mind. Spiritual conviction and a constant urge for the ultimate truth inspired the manifold branches of Indian thought. Science, Arts, Logic, Philosophy—all possible branches of thought—were inspired by one common aim of freedom from worldly bondage. To get rid of spiritual darkness is the end of all science. An art is not an art if it does not give glimpses into the beauty of truth. And it achieves this objective by removing the conflict between the good and the agreeable, between beauty and truth—which conflict is unreal and accidental. It shows that departure from the truth and beauty is nescience and the recovery of the unity is the natural end and consummation. The common end of all arts is to remind us of the supreme state which is beyond this worldly existence. Logic is nothing but an instrument for the interpretation of the spiritual vision. It is a necessary discipline, because there are people who are not prepared to take anything on trust. Logic is the creation of higher minds. It is the expression of the laws of human thought. It is the organ by which the mind discriminates truth from error. No experience, however exalted, will pass for truth unless it is sanctioned by the canons of logical thought. It is unambiguously admitted that logic is rather an instrument of criticism and can never rise to the level of an organ of discovery. But as the human mind is subject to the influence of emotion and habits fostered by unquestioning beliefs, its discovery is liable to be distorted by passions and impulses, dogmatic faith and intellectual inertia which is frightened by a discovery that is calculated to upset one's vested interests in religion. Indian philosophers have never been remiss in acknowledging supreme value of logic as a corrective of vagaries of dogmatism. In fact, one cannot get rid of logic, however one may decry it. One can hope to convince the other only by means of reasoning. But as reasoning is only an instrument of criticism it can operate only on the data supplied by organs of knowledge. Logic has not been neglected or derided in India, though philosophers were alive to its limitations. Logic cannot find the truth unaided and independently. But it can tell us that a position is not true because it is contradicted. The criterion of logic is non-contradiction in the main. Because the ordinary experience of man is not found to satisfy the intellectual demands of noble minds, as it fails to satisfy the criteria of logic, the necessity of philosophical speculation was felt as imperative. Man has the capacity for finding

the truth, which is attested and approved by logical thought. That is the truth which satisfies the whole man—the rational man in particular. As the emotional and active man in us is liable to be swayed by his ancient habits into untruth, logic comes in to his rescue. Logic clarifies the vision of truth, corrects it of illogical accretions, and purifies our knowledge of reality. Logic is not opposed to spiritual vision, though it is not a direct means to this consummation. The differences among the seers and mystics are rather due to interpretation. A strong logical attitude is thus a necessary propædeutic to the realization of truth. The value of philosophy is enhanced in proportion to its love of logic, which is nothing but the will not to take anything as truth unless the reason is satisfied.

But the majority of mankind is noted for the inertia and incuriosity. They do not feel an urge and inspiration for truth. Why is this difference between the thinking and the unthinking man? Why should there be people who hug their ignorance and make a pet of it? There must be a reason for this.

Confronted with this fundamental fact and in full realization of it, all the systems of Indian philosophy admit, in some form or other, the existence of a principle which acts as hindrance against the apprehension of truth. If the experiences of those who have realized the truth are reliable, what is it that hides the truth from us? There must be some reason or explanation for our common ignorance or perverse knowledge. If the truth is not unknowable, if the records of the experiences of the gifted souls are trustworthy, there must be something which obstructs our innate capacity to know the truth. If this worldly existence is a degradation and a fall because of its hiatus from perfection, there must be some perfect state of existence which we have failed to reach as yet and the realization of which is the ultimate goal and objective of a spiritual aspirant. This again leads to the further enquiry as to what is it that is responsible for the failure. The Indian thinkers are unanimous as regards the cause of this degeneration or descent. It is turning away from the truth. It is looking in the opposite direction. It is going towards the darkness. It is admitted that perfection is integral to the spirit and realization of the same is not a new creation in the sense of emergence of an absolutely unprecedented state. Yet the soul has been hindered from self-realization, which is the same as the discovery of its infinite glory, from eternity. The spirit has been oblivious of itself and has been wandering in the wilderness. The question 'What was the first fall due to?' is avoided by admitting the beginninglessness of the process. The historical beginning of the process is unknown because the spirit is an uncreated entity and exists from the eternal past, but the end is clearly envisaged. The spirit must realize itself. There is no controversy on

this point. The worldly career is sustained and nourished by the ignorance or perverted knowledge of the spirit and it lasts as long as the ignorance or perverted knowledge lasts. It is a wonder why the spirit clings to the fall and deviation from the norm and is so unwilling to look backward to itself. The Indian mind had always been conscious of the innate potentiality of perfection of the spirit and the possibility of realization of self-perfection. It is this consciousness that moulded the culture and thought of India. It is this spiritualism that fostered tolerance and the spirit of mutual understanding in the Indian mind.

The principle which acts as hindrance against the apprehension of truth has been differently conceived in different systems under various names such as *avidyā* (nescience), *mithyātva* (perversity), *ajñāna* (ignorance), *mithyā-jñāna* (perverted knowledge), *viparyaya* (perversion), *moha* (delusion), *darśana-moha* (delusion of attitude) etc.¹ The fundamental unity of all the conceptions lies in the fact that all of them refer to the principle commonly called *avidyā* (nescience) or *moha* (delusion) which hides truth, deludes the spirit and lures it in the wrong direction. The immediate effect of this nescience is to create the soul's interest in the world process and to make it cling to it as the source of happiness. The spirit sticks to the world due to its influence. This leads to the cycle of rebirths. The common aim of all the systems of Indian thought is to show the way out of this cycle, and this can be done only by showing the means of destroying or getting rid of the nescience. The nature of this nescience is conceived in accordance with the conception of the nature of ultimate reality. The function of nescience is to present reality in a form which it has not, and thereby to misguide the spirit. In order to get rid of this nescience the first thing that is necessary is possession of spiritual conviction. Once this conviction lays hold upon the soul, it turns back and treads upon the right path.

We now address ourselves to the appraisal of the various conceptions of nescience in the well-known schools of Indian thought with particular reference to the Jaina position. In the interest of the convenience of procedure and clarification of relevant issues we propose to undertake an examination of the conception of *avidyā* system by system.

II

AVIDYĀ IN THE YOGA SCHOOL

This school recognizes two primordial categories *viz.* *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. *Puruṣa* is the principle of consciousness which witnesses the

¹ *Vide* verse 83 and the prose portion as well of *TSIV* on *TSū* I. 13; also see Yaśovijaya's *Vṛtti* on *YD*, II. 3. *et seq.*

world process of which *prakṛti* is the ground. *Puruṣa* is *draṣṭā* (witness) and is pure consciousness (*drśimātra*) and even though it¹ is eternally pure and unchanging it witnesses the transformations of *buddhi*² which is the first evolute of *prakṛti* and the instrument for presenting the objects to the *puruṣa*. In the process of witnessing the activities of the *buddhi* it loses hold of itself and apparently identifies itself with them. The objective world (*drśya*) is constituted of the three primal elements or energies, which have been cyclically evolving the subjective and the objective orders of being. These manifest themselves in the subjective plane as pleasure, pain, and dullness-cum-stolidity and in the physical plane as reposeful equilibrium, motion, and inertia. The entire psycho-physical order exists for the enjoyment and final release of the *puruṣa*³ according as it succeeds in enlisting his interest by its meretricious charms or in disabusing him by the discovery of its unspiritual character as not-self absolutely unattached to the spirit. The twofold world process is guided by a blind teleology and actually subserves the interests of the *puruṣa*. The relation between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* is one of the enjoyer and the enjoyed, the seer and the seen, or the subject and the object. There is no actual relation between them in the ordinary sense of the term. The *prakṛti* unfolds and presents its processes to the *puruṣa* through the sense-organs and the *buddhi* which resembles to a great degree the *puruṣa* in purity and luminosity. The *puruṣa*'s relation to *prakṛti* serves to cater for the enjoyment (*bhoga*) of the former, which consists in illumining and appropriating the world process. And it leads to final release (*apavarga*) when the *puruṣa* realizes its natural difference and distinction from the world process by realizing its own inalienable spiritual nature.⁴ This relation between the inherently pure *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* is beginningless and is due to nescience (*avidyā*)⁵ which has been defined to be a perverted knowledge which comprehends non-eternal as eternal, impure as pure, sorrow as pleasure, and non-soul as soul.⁶ The *Bhāṣya* says 'Avidyā (nescience) is neither knowledge nor negation of knowledge. But it is wrong cognition as opposed to true cognition and as such falls in the category of cogni-

¹ We shall refer to *puruṣa* by the pronoun 'it' as well as 'he' according to our convenience.

² *draṣṭā drśimātraḥ śuddho 'pi pratyayānupaśyāḥ*—*YD*, II. 20.

³ *prakāśa-kriyā-sthiti-śīlāni bhūtendriyātmakāni bhogāpavargārtham drśyam*.—*YD*, II. 18; also cf. *tadartha eva drśyasyā 'tmā*—*YD*, II. 21.

⁴ Cf. *sva-svāmiśaktyoh svarūpopalabdhi-hetuḥ samyogaḥ*—*YD*, II. 23. Also cf. *Bhāṣya* thereon: *puruṣaḥ svāmī drśyena svena darśanārthaṁ samyuktaḥ, tasmāt samyogād drśyasyo 'palabdhīr yā sā bhogaḥ, yā tu draṣṭuḥ svarūpopalabdhiḥ so 'pavargaḥ*.

⁵ Cf. *tasya hetur avidyā*—*YD*, II. 24.

⁶ *YD*, II. 5.

tion.¹ It further describes nescience as a (mental) trace or a predisposition left by wrong cognition.² The *buddhi*, under the influence of this wrong cognition, cannot comprehend the separate identity of the *puruṣa*, and repeats its course. It is only when the distinctive identity of the *puruṣa* is realized that the *buddhi* reaches consummation of its activity and does not repeat its course. The *prakṛti* now has fulfilled its purpose and is disengaged from the *puruṣa*. It now lies disenchanted with the cessation of nescience, and ceases to entangle the *puruṣa* in the meshes of the world process. And as a result the *puruṣa* is emancipated.³ The *puruṣa* does not witness the world process any more inasmuch as the *buddhi* that presented it to the *puruṣa* is not there. This is called *mokṣa* (emancipation) or *kaivalya* (self-isolation) which has been defined as either the final reversion of the *guṇas* (elements or energies) to their original ground *prakṛti* in view of the discontinuation of the service to the *puruṣa*, or as the self-recovery of consciousness in its intrinsic nature.⁴

In this connection it is necessary to explain in brief the nature of the subject and the object and their relation according to the Yoga school. *Buddhi*, as we have stated, is an evolute of *prakṛti* and as such is unconscious in itself.⁵ But due to the association with the *puruṣa* it becomes, as it were, capable of such conscious activities as knowing, feeling and willing. The psychical activities cannot be affiliated to *puruṣa*, as it is not susceptible to change. Activity is an attribute of matter and consequently the psychical activities are the inherent characteristics of the *buddhi*. They are as unconscious as the cerebral activities. But they become spiritualized by the reflection of the spirit in the *buddhi*. The spiritualization is apparent and conditional—an extrinsic determination due to the presence of the *puruṣa* and to the innate nature of the *buddhi* which, on account of its luminosity and reposefulness, has the capacity to catch the reflection of the light of the *puruṣa*. The light belongs to the *puruṣa* and the *buddhi* shines in the borrowed light like a satellite of the sun. The sense of personal identity is due to the association of the unchanging

¹ avidyā na pramāṇam na pramāṇābhāvah kintu vidyā-viparītam jñānāntaram avidye 'ti—*Bhāṣya*, *YD*, II. 6.

² viparyaya-jñāna-vāsanā—*Bhāṣya*, *YD*, II. 24.

N.B. Avidyā *quā* vāsanā leads to the world process. Avidyā *quā* wrong cognition is possible only after the process has taken place. See *SPB*, I. 55.

³ See *Bhāṣya*, *YD*, II. 24.

⁴ Cf. *puruṣārtha-sūnyānām guṇānām pratiprasavah kaivalyam svarūpa-pratiṣṭhā vā citi-saktir iti—YD*, IV. 34.

⁵ Cf. *sarvārthādhyaivasayakatvāt triguṇā buddhis triguṇatvād acetane 'ti—Bhāṣya*, *YD*, II. 20.

spirit with the ever-changing *buddhi*. The *buddhi* is a changing identity—a variable constant which maintains its integrity and self-identity in spite of the changes that happen to it. We could dispense with the *puruṣa* or the spirit if the *buddhi* were possessed of intelligence in its own right and conversely we could dismiss the *buddhi* as an unnecessary and superfluous appendage if the spirit were a dynamic principle. Our personality is a composite entity—a complex of the spirit and the dynamic *buddhi*. We can account for the intelligence and consciousness by means of the spirit and the growth and evolution and progress of the individuated self by means of *buddhi*.

We have seen how the Yoga system explains the emergence of the personalized self—the psychical and the logical subject. We are now to consider how the school accounts for the knowledge of the external world. The objects attract the *buddhi* even as a magnet attracts iron, and modify it.¹ And then *citi*, the principle of consciousness, which *per se* is incapable of transference and movement (seemingly) assumes the modifications of the *buddhi* either by its reflection in the *buddhi* or by the reflection of the *buddhi* upon it, and thus occurs the cognition of the modifications of the *buddhi*.² Consciousness remains unmoved. But the *buddhi* appears to be conscious in its presence. This apparent consciousness of the *buddhi* is called knowledge. The *Bhāṣya* quotes the following passage which is attributed by Vācaspati to Pañcaśikha: 'The enjoyer is immutable and incapable of transferring itself to the *buddhi*. But it seems to assume the modifications (of the *buddhi*) by reason of its reflection upon the latter and appears to transfer itself to it—that is to say—the self seems to transfer its identity to the *buddhi* and its changes. The activities of the *buddhi* are then transferred to the *puruṣa* (the conscious self) and the *puruṣa* seems to own them up as its own functions.'³ Thus the transference of identity is not unilateral. It is a bilateral process. On the side of the *buddhi* the seeming identification of the *buddhi* with the *puruṣa* is effected by reason of the spiritualization of the changes of the *buddhi* by the reflection of the spirit upon it. As the processes of the *buddhi* are not distinguished from the *puruṣa* due to the seeming identification of the spirit with it, the activities of the *buddhi* (intellect) are felt, to all intents and purposes, as the activities of the self. The *puruṣa* (spirit) becomes

¹ Cf. ayaskānta-maṇi-kalpā viṣayā ayaḥ-sadharmaśām cittam abhisam-badhyo 'parañjayanti—*Bhāṣya*, YD, IV. 17.

² Cf. citer apratisaṅkramāyās tadākārāpattau svabuddhi-saṁvedanam—YD, IV. 22.

³ apariṇāminī hi bhoktṛ-śaktir apratisaṅkramā ca pariṇāminy arthe pratisaṅkrāntे 'va tadvṛttim anupatati tasyāś ca prāptacaitanyopagraha-rūpāyā buddhivṛttter anukāramātratayā buddhivṛttiyaviśiṣṭā hi jñānavṛttir ity ākhyāyate—*Bhāṣya*, YD, II. 20. Our rendering is not literal, but gives only the central meaning.

seemingly identified with the *buddhi* and the *buddhi* becomes identified with the spirit. This mutual identification is responsible for the intelligization of the unintelligent changes and for their being not felt as distinct. Thus as a witness of the world process as presented by the *buddhi*, the *puruṣa* appears to have a knowledge-modification (*jñānavṛtti*) in common with the *buddhi*.¹ And this knowledge-modification is nothing but the *buddhi*-modification as intelligized by consciousness of the *puruṣa* and has clearly these two elements as its constituents: (1) the *buddhi*-modification, and (2) the apparently transferred consciousness. The second element of 'apparently transferred consciousness' has been interpreted by the commentators as the reflection of the *puruṣa*. Thus commenting upon the passage 'The spirit (*puruṣa*) is the witness of the *buddhi*',² Vācaspati says 'The spirit's witnessing of the *buddhi* (*buddhipratisamveditvam*) is nothing but the transmission of the image of the spirit to the *buddhi*-mirror'.³ Vijñānabhikṣu, however, holds a radically different view. Let us now make a critical estimate of the Yoga epistemology of perception, which is necessary for the understanding of the problem of bondage and consequent emancipation from it.

The epistemology of perception of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga school is based upon a theory which has been borrowed by the Vivaraṇa School of Śāṅkara Vedānta almost in toto. It is the direct antithesis of the theories sponsored by the Naiyāyikas and the Jainas. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga view may be called the representative theory of perception in contradistinction to the presentative theory of the latter who do not believe that the object is known through the medium of an image. There is, however, no inherent improbability in the *buddhi* being transformed into a structural form after the pattern of the object, because the *buddhi* or the mind-stuff is after all a material thing like the external object of cognition. The theory postulates that nothing can be known without a similar transformation of the mind; in other words, the mind can know its own modification directly and immediately and through this the object which is the pattern. According to Vācaspati the *modus operandi* is rather simple. The *buddhi* or the mind becomes transformed into the likeness of the object with which it comes in contact. This likeness is called the *vṛtti* or modification or function. The *vṛtti* by itself cannot make the object known since it is as blind and unknowing as the material object. The real illumination takes place when the light of the spirit falls upon it. The *vṛtti* is almost as transparent as the spirit and as such the former is capable of catching

¹ Cf. *YD*, I. 4; III. 35; also *Bhāṣya* thereon.

² sa *puruṣo buddheḥ pratisamvedi*—*Bhāṣya*, *YD*, II. 20.

³ *buddhi-darpane puruṣa-pratibimba-saṅkrāntir eva buddhipratisamveditvam* *pūṁsaḥ*.

the image of the latter. This reflection at once illuminates the mental modification and this illumination is knowledge. The cognition of an object is thus equivalent to the illumination of the mental modification called *vr̥tti*. This cognition is at once objective and subjective and is a unitary act. It may express itself as 'This is pen' and 'I know the pen' according as the emphasis is put on the reflection or the mental modification. According to *Vijñānabhikṣu*, who quotes texts from the *Purāṇas* and ancient authority in support, knowledge is possible only through mental modification which acts rather as the medium. Knowledge of an external object is possible if the mind is transformed into a structural likeness of it. This mental modification is by itself blind and unknowing. It becomes a cognition when it is reflected on the *puruṣa* (spirit). The objective judgment e.g. 'This is pen' takes place when the mental modification is imaged in the *puruṣa*. The *puruṣa* is the locus of the cognition. As for the subjective cognition or self-consciousness 'I know the pen' it is a different cognitive act. According to the epistemological postulate a thing can be known if the *buddhi* is transformed into its shape. The same rule applies to *puruṣa* also. *Puruṣa* or the self, in order to be known, must induce a structural modification in the *buddhi*. This modification of the *buddhi* after the pattern of the *puruṣa* is then imaged in the self and self-cognition, that is, the subjective judgment 'I know the pen' takes place. The locus of cognition is always the *puruṣa* as it is the locus of the image of the mental modification. So according to *Vijñānabhikṣu* the objective cognition and the subjective cognition are numerically two different acts and the mental modifications are also two. To sum up, *Vācaspati*'s theory is that both for the subjective and the objective cognition one mental modification is enough and the cognition takes place always in the mind. It is the spiritual illumination of the mental modification by the reflection of the spirit in it that constitutes cognition. *Vijñānabhikṣu*, like the *Naiyāyika*, thinks that the cognition of the subject and that of the object are two different acts, for which there are two different mental modifications. The cognition is not the illumination of the mental change by the imaging of the spirit upon it as *Vācaspati* holds. It is when the mental modification is imaged in the spirit that cognition takes place. The determination of the cognition as of an object or of the subject, that is, the *puruṣa*, is due to the nature of the object. If the object be an external entity it is an objective cognition. If it be the subject, it is subjective. The *modus operandi* is the same. The mind must be modified into the shape and form of the object and this modification must be imaged in the *puruṣa* or the self. The cognition always takes place in the *puruṣa*, whether the object of it is *puruṣa* or other than *puruṣa*. There is no departure from the rule that the content of

cognition is always the reflected image of the mental modification in the self even when the object happens to be the *puruṣa* i.e. the self itself.

After this long digression let us now return to our subject proper. We have stated that the *buddhi* possessed of the trace of wrong cognition cannot comprehend the separate identity of the *puruṣa*. We also stated what this wrong cognition or nescience (*avidyā*) consists in. It essentially consists in mistaking the process for the eternal, the ugly for the beautiful, the evil for the good and the unconscious for the conscious. The fundamental characteristic of nescience, however, consists in mistaking the unconscious for the conscious. The *Bhāṣya* quotes a passage, attributed to Pañcaśikha by Vācaspati, which runs as follows: 'Comprehending the manifest or the unmanifest *buddhi* as the self (conscious principle), a person revels in its prosperity thinking that the prosperity belongs to the real self, and he mourns over its misfortune thinking that the misfortune belongs to the self. All such is unawakened and unenlightened.'¹ Neither the prosperity nor the misfortune belongs to the *puruṣa*. But, under the influence of nescience, it appears that they belong to him. This nescience (*avidyā*) is a *kleśa* (affliction), and the root of other *kleśas* at that *viz.* *asmitā* (egoism), *rāga* (attachment), *dveṣa* (aversion) and *abhiniveṣa* (desire for life).² The *Bhāṣya* says 'All the *kleśas* (afflictions) are only the varieties of *avidyā* inasmuch as *avidyā* pervades them all. The other *kleśas* relate to the same object which is related to *avidyā*. They emerge with the emergence of *avidyā* and are destroyed with the destruction of it.'³ Egoism, attachment, aversion, desire for life or will to survive—all these are essential factors for the sustenance and promotion of the world process, and *avidyā* is at the root of all these. The world process loses its meaning and purpose when the *avidyā* is uprooted and the *buddhi* reverts to its pristine state of *prakṛti*. The evolution of the *prakṛti* is for the enjoyment of the *puruṣa* and the enjoyment is possible only if the two absolutely separate and distinct principles of *puruṣa* the enjoyer and *buddhi* the enjoyed become, though indeed only apparently, identical. This apparent identity of the *puruṣa* and the *buddhi* or the principles of the seer and the seen is called *asmitā* (egoism).⁴ If

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1 *vyaktam* *avyaktam* *vā* *sattvam* *ātmatvenā* 'bhipratītya *tasya* *sampadam* *anunandat�* *ātmasampadam* *manvānas* *tasya* *vyāpadam* *anuśocat�* *ātmavyāpadam* *manyamānah* *sa* *sarvo* 'pratibuddha *iti*—*Bhāṣya*, *YD*, II. 5.

² See *YD*, II. 4.

³ See *Bhāṣya*, *YD*, II. 4.

⁴ Cf. *YD*, II. 6. Also cf. *Bhāṣya*: *puruṣo* *dṛksaktir* *buddhir* *darśanaśaktir* *ity* *etayor* *ekasvarūpāpattir* *ivā* 'smitā-kleśa *ucyate*, *bhoktṛ-bhogaśaktyor* *atyanta-vibhaktayor* *atyantāsaṅkirṇayor* *avibhāgapraptāv* *iva* *satyām* *bhogah* *kalpate*. Also cf. *sattvapuruṣayor* *atyantāsaṅkirṇayoh* *pratyayāviśeṣo* *bhogah*. . . .—*YD*, III. 35.

avidyā is the seed, *asmitā* (egoism) is the sprout. We have spoken of the mental trace of *avidyā*. *Asmitā* (egoism) can be considered as the actualization of that trace. *Rāga* (attachment) and *dveṣa* (aversion) can be viewed as the necessary corollaries of egoism. *Abhiniveṣa* (will to survive) can be taken as the cumulative effect of all the other *kleśas* (afflictions). The *kleśas* work together, help each other, and evolve an ego which would live for ever. This 'will to live for ever' is called *abhiniveṣa*.¹ The *kleśas* nourish one another and perpetuate the world process. The *Bhāṣya* says: 'The (five) *kleśas* are five *viparyayas* (perversions). When active, they strengthen the potency of the *gunas* (viz. *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*—the three fundamental elements constituting primordial *prakṛti*), inaugurate evolution, originate the causal chain, and produce the fruits of *karman* (viz. *jāti* 'birth', *āyus* 'longevity' and *bhoga* 'enjoyment'), being subordinate to one another.'² The *kleśas* lie at the root of the world process. The equilibrium of *prakṛti* is disturbed by the strengthening of the potency of the *gunas* i.e. by the elevation of one above another. The evolution begins with the disturbance of the equilibrium. Then originates the causal chain of *buddhi* or *mahat*, *ahamkāra* etc. The whole evolution is for the enjoyment of the *puruṣa* and *buddhi* is the instrument which presents the world to the *puruṣa*. The evolution lasts so long as the separate identity and absolute disinterestedness of the *puruṣa* is not comprehended. But as soon as the *puruṣa* is found out to be absolutely untouched and unaffected by the world process, the evolution retraces its steps and becomes quiescent never to evolve again.

Thus we find that according to the Yoga school it is the *avidyā* or nescience about the fundamental distinction between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* that is responsible for the worldly existence which loses all its meaning and purpose when the truth is realized. The Yoga prescribes various ways for the realization of this truth. But we need not discuss them here in view of their lack of bearing on our enquiry which is strictly restricted to the study of the function of *avidyā*. Let us now turn to the Sāṅkhya school.

III

AVIDYĀ IN THE SĀMKHYA SCHOOL

There is no essential difference between the metaphysical positions of the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga as we find them in the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* of Isvarakṛṣṇa and the *Yogadarśana* of Patañjali. The fact that the two

¹ See *YD*, II. 9 and *Bhāṣya*.

² *kleśā iti. pañca viparyayā ity arthaḥ, te syandamānā guṇādhikāram drāḍhayanti, pariṇāmam avasthāpayanti, kāryakāraṇasrota unnamayanti, paras-paṇugrahatantribhūya karmavipākam cā 'bhinirharantī 'ti—Bhāṣya, YD, II. 3.*

schools developed a common metaphysic from very early times is attested by such statements of the *Mahābhārata* as 'The adherents of the Sāṅkhya follow the same (principles) as are recognized by the followers of the Yoga. He who sees the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga as one is wise.'¹ But at the same time the *Mahābhārata* clearly states the difference between their attitudes towards the necessity of spiritual discipline. Thus Bhīṣma, in reply to Yudhiṣṭhīra's question about the difference between the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga, says: 'The adherents of the Sāṅkhya extol Sāṅkhya while the adherents of the Yoga extol Yoga. And they give plausible reasons for the establishment of their respective positions.'² He then elaborately states the principles of the two schools in two separate chapters. The main objection of the Yoga against the Sāṅkhya is 'How can one devoid of self-mastery be emancipated?'.³ Emancipation requires perfect control of the physical and the mental forces that hinder the progress towards emancipation. And as this can be achieved only by developing supernormal powers, the Yoga prescribes certain practices for the development of spiritual strength. According to the Yoga, it is only the strong who can be emancipated; the weak are sure to perish.⁴ Thus Bhīṣma says: 'As a weak and a meagre flame of fire, O King, is extinguished when covered by a heavy mass of fuel, so does a weak *yogin* (ascetic) perish, O lord. But as, again, the selfsame fire, O King, when it gathers strength and is accompanied by favourable wind can instantly consume even the whole world, exactly so can a *yogin* who has gathered strength, manifested potency, and is possessed of supreme power dry up the whole creation even as the sun does at the time of world dissolution'.⁵ The Yoga requires that one should exert oneself and attain superhuman powers of self-control in order to destroy the forces of evil. Otherwise one will share the fate of the weak and helpless creatures, perpetually entangled in a trap.⁶ Simple comprehension of truth without the development of adequate strength to cut asunder the trap of bondage is not sufficient to lead to emancipation. The answer of the Sāṅkhya to the Yoga, on the other hand, is stated in the following terms: 'Only one who has comprehended all the processes and is unattached to the objects is indeed emancipated after death. Not otherwise'.⁷ The

¹ yad eva Yogāḥ paśyanti Sāṅkhyais tad anugamyate
ekāṁ Sāṅkhyāṁ ca Yogam ca yah paśyati sa buddhimān.

—*Sāntiparva*, 305. 19; also see 307. 44 & 316. 2-4.

² Sāṅkhyāḥ Sāṅkhyāṁ praśāṁsanti Yogā Yogam dvijātayah
vadanti kāraṇāṁ śreṣṭham svapakṣodbhāvanāya vai.—*Ibid.*, 300. 2.

³ anīśvaraḥ kathāṁ mucyet—*Ibid.* verse 3.

⁴ Cf. abalā vai vinaśyanti mucyante ca balānvitāḥ.—*Ibid.*, verse 18.

⁵ *Ibid.*, verses 19-21.

⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, verses 15-17.

⁷ vijñāye 'ha gatiḥ sarvā virakto viṣayeṣu yah.

ūrdhvāṁ sa dehāt suvyaktarām vimucyed iti nānyathā.—*Ibid.*, verses 4-5.

Sāṅkhya requires that the merits (*guṇa*) and the demerits (*doṣa*) of the various developments of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* should be comprehended for the sake of final emancipation.¹ It gives only a secondary place to yogic practices. The *summum bonum*, however, of both the schools is identical, and both the systems are declared to be equally competent to lead the aspirant to it.² Bhīṣma states the points of agreement and difference between the two schools in the following terms: 'Sauca (purification), tapas (austerity), compassion for the living beings, and observance of the vows—all these are common, O sinless (Yudhiṣṭhīra), to both of them. But their *darśana* (attitude) is not identical.'³ If the Yoga believes in the efficacy of yogic practices, the Sāṅkhya lays stress on philosophic understanding.⁴ But this difference in the basic attitude did not hinder the attempt at mutual understanding and development of common metaphysics. The Yoga school accepted the philosophical speculations of the Sāṅkhya school while the latter accepted the practical code of the former. This process of mutual engrafting is clearly visible in such statements as we quoted at the outset of this section. The *Bhagavadgītā* says: 'It is only the ignorant, and not the wise, who consider the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga as mutually opposed. One rightly depending upon the one attains the fruits of both. The Sāṅkhyas and the Yogas attain to the same place. One who sees Sāṅkhya and Yoga as one sees rightly.'⁵ If the Yoga had no elaborate metaphysics, the Sāṅkhya had no practical code for spiritual realization. Each borrowed from the other its own requirement, and the result was a fusion of the two. If the *Mahābhārata* bears testimony to the process of this fusion, the later systematic expositions of the two systems record the fact of their fusion. We find detailed descriptions of the Sāṅkhya speculations and the Yoga practices in the *Mahābhārata* on more than one occasion.⁶ But there we do not find any attempt at systematization of the conceptions. It is only in the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and the *Yogadarśana* of Patañjali that we find the two schools in systematic forms. Of course,

¹ *Ibid.*, Chap. 301.

² Cf. ubhe cai 'te mate jñāte nṛpate śiṣṭa-sammate
anuṣṭhite yathāśastram nayetām paramām gatim.—*Ibid.*, 300, verse 8.

³ tulyām śaucaṁ tapoyuktām dayā bhūteṣu cā 'nagha
vratānām dhāraṇām tulyām darśanām na samān tayoh.—*Ibid.*, verse 9.

⁴ Cf. for gross exaggeration of this stress:

hasa piva lala moda nityām viṣayān upabhuñja kuru ca mā śāṅkām
yadi viditam te Kapilamatām tat prāpsyase mokṣa-saukhyām ca.

—Māṭhara on *SKā*, 37.

⁵ Sāṅkhya-Yogau pṛthag bālāḥ pravadanti na paṇḍitāḥ
ekam apy āsthitaḥ samyag ubhayaḥ vindate phalam.

yat Sāṅkhyaiḥ prāpyate sthānām tad Yogair api gamyate
ekam Sāṅkhyām ca Yogam ca yaḥ paśyati sa paśyati.—*BhGi*, V. 4-5.

⁶ *Sāntiparva*, Chapters 210 etc. ; 300-318 ; etc.

these finished expositions must have been preceded by other earlier attempts at systematization. But unfortunately they are not available to us. Our enquiry of this section will be based on the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* of Īśvara-kṛṣṇa, the *Yuktidīpikā* and the commentaries of Māthara, Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati as well as Vijñānabhikṣu's works.

The Sāṅkhya conception of *avidyā* is substantially the same as that of the Yoga. But we give a separate treatment to the subject only because of the difference of terminology. The selfsame five *kleśas* viz. *avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *abhiniveṣa* of the Yoga are respectively called *tamas*, *moha*, *mahāmoha*, *tāmisra* and *andhatāmisra* in the Sāṅkhya. The *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* enumerates *tamas*, *moha* etc. as the five varieties of *viparyaya* while the *Yogabhāṣya* first enumerates *avidyā*, *asmitā* etc. as the varieties of the same and then gives the terms viz. *tamas*, *moha* etc. as their respective synonyms.¹ Īśvara-kṛṣṇa or even the commentators Māthara and Gauḍapāda do not mention the terms *avidyā*, *asmitā* etc. It is only Vācaspati who expressly compares *tamas*, *moha*, etc. with *avidyā*, *asmitā* etc.²

In order to understand the nature of *viparyaya* (perverted knowledge, elsewhere known as *avidyā* or nescience) according to Īśvara-kṛṣṇa, it is necessary to state in brief the scheme of psychical factors that make up what is called *pratyaya-sarga* (psychical creation).³ *Mahat* or *buddhi* is the first evolute of *prakṛti*, and it has eight forms—four *sāttvika* and four *tāmasa*. *Dharma* (what leads to prosperity and emancipation),⁴ *jñāna* (discriminating knowledge), *virāga* (non-attachment), and *aiśvarya* (supernormal powers) are the *sāttvika* forms. The opposites of these viz. *adharma*, *ajñāna*, *avirāga* and *anaiśvarya* are the *tāmasa* forms.⁵ These eight are called *bhāvas* or psychical factors.⁶ They determine the nature of the *buddhi* and lead the *līṅga* (subtle body) to various forms of existence.⁷ These psychical factors produce various psychical complexes which have been classified into four broad categories viz. *viparyaya* (perverted cognition),⁸ *asakti* (mental disability due to deficiency of sense-organs), *tuṣṭi* (idle

¹ See *SKā* 48. Cf. *avidyā*-*smitā*-*rāga*-*dveṣa*-*abhiniveṣa* *kleśā* iti eta eva *svasañjñābhis* tamo moho mahāmohas tāmisro 'ndhatāmisra iti—*Bhāṣya*, *YD*, 1. 8. Also cf. *Yuktidīpikā* (p. 154): se 'yam *avidyā* pañcaparvā.

² See *TKau* on *SKā*, 47-48. The *Yuktidīpikā* does so only implicitly.

³ Īśvara-kṛṣṇa mentions three distinct types of creation viz. *līṅgasarga* 'subtle physical creation' (*SKā*, 40-41), *pratyaya-sarga* (also called *bhāva-sarga*) 'psychical creation' (*SKā*, 46, 52), and *bhautika-sarga* 'gross physical creation' (*SKā*, 53-54). The psychical, according to the Sāṅkhya, is an evolute of the non-conscious *prakṛti*, and as such should not be confounded with immutable consciousness. (For an enumeration of nine types of *sarga* see *Sāntiparva*, 310. 16-25).

⁴ *dharmo* 'bhyudaya-niḥśreyasa-hetuḥ—*TKau*, *SKā*, 23.

⁵ See *SKā*, 23.

⁶ Cf. *SKā*, 43. See also *Mātharavṛtti* and *TKau*.

⁷ See *SKā*, 40-45.

⁸ Māthara defines *viparyaya* as *samśayabuddhi* 'doubt'.—*Vṛtti* on *SKā*, 46.

complaisance), and *siddhi* (consummation of knowledge).¹ Of these four, the first three are the hindrances to the attainment of the fourth.² Perverted cognition, mental disability and idle complaisance stand in the way of the attainment of consummate knowledge. Fifty sub-categories of these four complexes are noticed in the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*.³ But we shall not deal with all these inasmuch as they have little bearing on our subject of enquiry, which is concerned only with the nature of *viparyaya*. The *Sāṅkhyakārikā* notices five sub-categories of *viparyaya* viz. *tamas*, *moha*, *mahāmoha*, *tāmisra* and *andhatāmisra*. Of these five, again, each of the first two is divided into eight, the third into ten, and each of the last two into eighteen types.⁴ The illustrations of these sixty-two types are found in the commentaries.⁵ (1) Comprehension of the eight categories of *prakṛti*, *mahat*, *ahaṅkāra* (ego) and the five *tanmātrās* (subtle elements) as identical with the immutable soul is eightfold *tamas*, and is also called *avidyā*. (2) The gods, on their attainment of eightfold supernormal powers, develop false belief in the immortality of the ego and permanence of their eightfold supernormal powers. This is *moha* and is also called *asmitā*. (3) There are five subtle and five gross objects of enjoyment, the former for the gods and the latter for human and sub-human beings. Attachment to these objects is called tenfold *mahāmoha*⁶ or *rāga*. (4) These ten objects together with eightfold supernormal powers constitute eighteenfold objects of *tāmisra*. When an individual fails to achieve these objects, and feels rebuff, he develops anger or hatred for the objects. This hatred is called eighteenfold *tāmisra* or *dveṣa*. (5) When one attains the eighteenfold objects mentioned above, and is haunted by the fear of losing all these, one develops a complex called *andhatāmisra* or *abhiniveṣa* which is eighteenfold due to its reference to the eighteenfold objects. These are the five sub-categories of *viparyaya* which are given in the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*. Vācaspati recognizes the identity of this fivefold *viparyaya* with the five-knotted *avidyā* of the sage Vārṣaganya.⁷ And this fact is also established even by the nature of

¹ Cf. tato 'sya niścaya utpadyate sthāṇur ayam ity eṣā siddhiḥ—*Māṭhara*, *SKā*, 46.

² Cf. *SKā*, 51.

³ See *SKā*, 46-7.

⁴ See *SKā*, 48.

⁵ See *Māṭharavṛtti* and *TKau*, *SKā*, 48.

⁶ Cf. devānāṁ śabdādayaḥ pañca tanmātrākhyā viśayā aviśeṣāḥ kevalā-nandarūpāḥ evāṁ manusyānāṁ bhautikāśarīratayā sukhaduḥkhasam-pannāḥ ity eṣā daśavidhō mahāmohāḥ—*Māṭhara* on *SKā*, 48. Also cf. sabdādiṣu pañcasu divyādivyatayā daśavidheṣu viśayeṣu rañjanīyeṣu rāga āsaktir mahāmohāḥ—*TKau*, *ibid.*

⁷ See *TKau* on *SKā*, 47. Also cf. se 'yāṁ pañcaparvā bhavaty avidyā.—*Bhāṣya* on *YD*, I. 8; also see *Tattvavaiśaradī* on it. Also cf.

tamo moho mahāmohas tāmisro hy andha-saṅjñakah

avidyā pañca-parvai 'ṣā prādurbhūtā mahātmanāḥ.—*Viśṇupurāṇa*

quoted in *Yogavārttika*, *YD*, I. 8.

the illustrations of Māṭhara and Gauḍapāda. Vācaspati gives the same illustrations and furthermore supplies the corresponding Yoga terminology.¹ Unfortunately we do not find clear definitions of *tamas*, *moha* etc. in the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* itself, and have to depend upon the commentaries. But we find nothing against our view that the Yoga and the Sāṅkhya do not differ as regards their conception of *viparyaya* or *avidyā*.

Vijñānabhikṣu, however, has attempted to differentiate between the Yoga and the Sāṅkhya conception of *viparyaya*.² Thus, commenting on the Yoga aphorism *viz.* *viparyayo mithyājñānam atadrūpa-pratiṣṭham*³ Vijñānabhikṣu says: 'In this (Yoga)-śāstra *anyathākhyāti* is the doctrine (of error) and not *avivekamātra* as propounded by the Sāṅkhya'. He quotes the aphorism 'Avidyā consists in the comprehension of non-eternal as eternal, impure as pure, sorrow as joy and non-soul as soul'⁴ in order to show that the Yoga conception of *avidyā* implies the doctrine of *anyathākhyāti* which holds that error consists in the cognition of one thing in the character of another, or the superimposition of one thing upon another. He further distinguishes the Yoga *anyathākhyāti* from the Vaiśeṣika *anyathākhyāti* on the ground that in the Yoga doctrine the content of the cognition is held to be superimposed upon the external thing while in the Vaiśeṣika doctrine one external object is superimposed upon another external object.⁵ Vijñānabhikṣu further substantiates his position while commenting on the statement of the *Yogabhāṣya*⁶ that *avidyā* is neither 'valid cognition' nor 'absence of cognition', but it is a 'false cognition' and as such is a category of cognition. There he says: 'In this (Yoga) system the term *avidyā* does not mean *aviveka* i.e. non-discrimination in the sense of negation of discrimination as it does with the followers of Sāṅkhya. But it (*viz.* *avidyā*) is a species of determinate cognition or judgment as it is with such schools as the Vaiśeṣika. This follows from both the *Sūtra* and the *Bhāṣya*'.⁷

Let us try to understand Vijñānabhikṣu's conception of *aviveka*, Yoga *anyathākhyāti* and Vaiśeṣika *anyathākhyāti*. According to Vijñānabhikṣu, the absolutely non-existent such as square-circle cannot be the object of knowledge, and so he holds that in such cases as the erroneous cognition of silver in conch-shell, dreams and imaginations, it is the mind-transformation that is the object or content of knowledge,

¹ See Also *Yogavārttika*, YD, I. 8.

² His disciple Bhāvāgaṇeśa follows him. See his commentary *Dīpikā*, YD, I. 8.

⁴ YD, II. 5.

³ YD, I. 8.

⁵ Cf. Vaiśeṣikācā 'trā 'yam viśeso yad bāhya-rajatāder nā 'ropaḥ kintvāntarasyai 've 'ti—*Vārttika*, YD, I. 8.

⁶ YD, II. 5.

⁷ asmiṁś ca darśane Sāṅkhyānām ivā 'viveko nā 'vidyāśabdārthaḥ kīm tu Vaiśeṣikādīvad viśiṣṭa-jñānam eve 'ti *Sūtra-Bhāṣyābhyām* avagantavyam—*Vārttika* on YD, II. 5.

and not something absolutely non-existent.¹ Accordingly, he defines *aviveka* as 'knowledge of two things with their difference uncomprehended.'² Thus the erroneous cognition of a piece of conch-shell as silver consists in the cognition of both the piece of conch-shell and the mind-transformation with their difference uncomprehended. The mind takes the shape of silver. This mental silver and the piece of conch-shell lying in front are both the objects of the wrong cognition 'This is silver'. The non-comprehension of the difference between the silver as mental content and the external conch-shell is responsible for the error. This is *Vijñānabhikṣu*'s interpretation of *aviveka*. The doctrine of *Yoga anyathākhyāti*, on the other hand, as interpreted by *Vijñānabhikṣu* would hold that the erroneous cognition 'This is silver' does not refer to two unrelated objects, but it refers to only one object, the related object—the objective substratum with mental content superimposed upon it as the predicate. The mind transformed into the shape of silver is the predicative content of the cognition 'This is silver' in which *this* stands for the real object and *silver* for the mental transformation or the idea. In other words, the judgment 'This is silver' is a complex of an objective fact, which is the subject, and a subjective idea, which is the predicate. The judgment is false because the predicate is not an objective real and so does not belong to it. In the veridical perception, the subject and the predicate are both objective facts and are related by an objective relation. The false judgment or error is one in which the predicate is a mental content which has no true relation with the logical subject (*this*) but still is superimposed upon it. The predicate and its relation are both unreal. The doctrine of *Vaiśeṣika anyathākhyāti*, on the other hand, would hold that it is the piece of silver that exists elsewhere that is superimposed on the subject of the erroneous cognition 'This is silver'. *Vijñānabhikṣu* seems to criticize this *Vaiśeṣika* doctrine when, commenting on the *Sāṅkhyasūtra* viz. *nānyathākhyātiḥ svavacovyāghātāt* (V. 55), he says: 'It is also not proper that one thing should be cognized in the form of another because that would involve contradiction of one's own statement Even the upholders of *anyathākhyāti* admit that the non-existent cannot be cognized. The meaning is this: the *non-existence of a thing in front* cannot condition the cognition of the *existence of the thing elsewhere*'.³ *Vijñānabhikṣu*

¹ Cf. *naraśringādīnām abhānāt . . . śuktি-rajata-svapna-manorathādau ca manah-pariṇāmarūpa evā 'rthaḥ pratiyate nā 'tyantā 'sann iti vakṣyati—SPB, V. 52.*

² *aviveko 'grīhitāśaṁsargakam ubhayajñānam—SPB, I. 55.*

³ anyad vastv anyarūpeṇa bhāsata ity api na yuktam, svavaco-vyāghātāt . . . asato bhānā-'sambhavasyā 'nyathā-khyāti-vādibhir api vacanād ity arthaḥ purovartiny asattve 'nyatra tatsattvā bhānāprayojakatvam iti bhāvah—SPB, V. 55.

does not criticize the Yoga doctrine anywhere, though he always differentiates it from the doctrine of *aviveka* of the Sāṅkhya system. And as we have stated above he quotes the *Yogasūtra* II. 5 in order to show that the Yoga system upholds the doctrine of *anyathākhyāti*. But there are passages in the *Yogabhāṣya* which imply the doctrine of *aviveka* as well.¹ On the other hand, there is a passage² quoted in the *Yogabhāṣya* and ascribed to the great Sāṅkhya exponent Pañcaśikha by Vācaspati, which can easily be interpreted as implying the doctrine of *anyathākhyāti* for the Sāṅkhya system. The truth seems to be that both the systems, the Yoga and the Sāṅkhya, had a common theory of error, and that was the theory of *aviveka*.

Both the systems regard *viveka* (discrimination) as the condition of emancipation.³ And there is no reason why both of them should not regard *aviveka* (non-discrimination) as the condition of bondage. Of course, had the doctrine of *aviveka* gone counter to the fundamental position of the Yoga, it would have been plausible to deduce a different doctrine of error. But when the fundamental position of both the systems is identical, we fail to understand why *Vijñānabhikṣu* is so keen on differentiating the Yoga doctrine from the Sāṅkhya one. *Vijñānabhikṣu* makes capital out of Patañjali's definition of *avidyā*. But from a consideration of the general philosophical position of the Yoga system as found in the *Yogasūtra* and the *Bhāṣya*, we can easily establish that the doctrine of *aviveka* is not inconsistent with the Yoga system. We can also easily interpret the Yoga definition of *avidyā* as implying the doctrine of *aviveka*, or at least as not against such interpretation. Let us briefly attempt to see what the Yoga system points to.

According to the Yoga system, as we have already stated, the evolution of the *prakṛti* is for the enjoyment of the *puruṣa*, and the enjoyment is possible only if the two absolutely separate and distinct principles of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* become apparently identical. Now what this apparent identity is due to? It is certainly due to *avidyā*. The function of *avidyā* thus is found to be 'to make appear as identical what are not really identical'. And how can this function of *avidyā* be possible? *Avidyā* belongs to the *buddhi*, and so it cannot operate upon the external object. Therefore it follows that *avidyā* operates

¹ For instance, the passages—(1) *yā tu kaivalya-prāgbhārā vivekaviṣaya-nimnā sā kalyāṇavahā, saṃsāra-prāg-bhārā 'vivekaviṣaya-nimnā pāpavahā* (*Bhāṣya*, *YD*, I. 12); (2) *buddhitāḥ parami puruṣam ākāra-śilām vidyādibhir vibhaktam apaśyan kuryāt tatrā 'tma-buddhiṁ mohene 'ti* (quoted in the *Bhāṣya*, *YD*, II. 6)—can easily be interpreted as implying the doctrine of *aviveka*.

² *vyaktam avyaktam vā sattvam ātmavēna 'bhipratītya tasya sampadam anunandaty ātmasampadam manvānah . . . sa sarvo 'pratibuddhah—Bhāṣya*, *YD*, II. 5.

³ See *YD*, II. 26; *SKā*, 2, 64-66.

upon the *buddhi* in order to produce the appearance of identity. Now this operation can be possible in two ways: (1) by arresting the normal activity of the *buddhi* and (2) by misguidance of the *buddhi*. By the first kind of operation, *buddhi* is thwarted and made incapable of cognizing the difference, and by the second kind of operation the *buddhi* is made to mistake the one for the other. The *Yogasūtra* and the *Bhāṣya* do not affirm one and negate the other of these possible operations of *avidyā* and so we are at liberty to accept any or both of the two operations. If we admit *avidyā* as having the capacity of thwarting the *buddhi*, the doctrine of *aviveka* will follow. And if we ascribe to the *avidyā* the capacity of misguiding the *buddhi* the doctrine of *anyathākhyāti* will be the logical deduction.

Let us now see what Patañjali's definition¹ would imply. The definition can symbolically be expressed as *avidyā*=cognition of A as B. Now this definition can imply either (1) that both A and B are the objects of cognition which has failed to cognize their difference and consequently they appear as one, or (2) that only B is the object of cognition and consequently it alone appears. In the first case the doctrine of *aviveka* is the implication, and in the second the doctrine of *anyathākhyāti* is implied.

Thus it is established that the doctrine of *aviveka* is not inconsistent with the Yoga system, and also that Patañjali's definition of *avidyā* can be interpreted as implying the doctrine of *aviveka* as well. Vijñānabhikṣu's insistence, therefore, that the Yoga accepts the doctrine of *anyathākhyāti* as distinguished from the doctrine of *aviveka* of the Sāṅkhya is not based upon valid grounds.

It is beyond doubt that the Sāṅkhya theory of error called *avivekākhyāti* or *vivekā-khyāti* is not to be confounded with Prabhākara's theory. Prabhākara believes that there is no error possible and the proposition 'This is silver' does not point to a unitary judgment. 'This' stands for the substratum which is real and 'silver' is the object of recollection without being felt as recollected. Thus this recollected silver is real because only a perceived fact can be recollected. But 'this' which is a perceived fact and 'silver' which is the remembered fact are not realized as distinct. The copula 'is' in the judgment symbolizes the non-apprehension of unrelatedness. The pseudo-subject and the pseudo-predicate are not felt as unrelated which they are in point of reality. So there is no perversion in the objective plane. And on the subjective plane also there is no confusion which would have arisen had the subject and the predicate been felt as related. There is perception of the substratum and recollection of silver, and these two acts of cognition are not felt as distinct. But mere non-perception of

¹ The definition is *anityā-śuci-duḥkhā-nātmasu nitya-śuci-sukhā-tma-khyātir avidyā*—YD, II. 5.

distinction is not tantamount to perception of identity. Thus there is no error because all our cognitions do correspond to objective facts as they are.

There is an unfortunate tendency to interpret the Sāṅkhya theory of error on substantially the same lines with Prabhākara's theory. There is not the slightest warrant for this supposition. The Sāṅkhya must believe in positive error. In the Sāṅkhya theory, the self (*puruṣa*), left to itself, is absolutely unattached to *prakṛti*, and so is unaffected by the vicissitudes of the latter. The self *per se* whether in bondage or in the emancipated state is absolutely free and pure. That in bondage the self does not feel its freedom is due to the fact that it mistakes the vicissitudes of *prakṛti* to be the real incidents of its own career. This mistake is cured and corrected by the realization of the absolute distinction of the self from the not-self. In bondage, the self does not and cannot feel its distinction and difference from the not-self (*prakṛti* and its evolutes), because it identifies itself with the not-self. This identification of self with not-self is due to transcendent illusion which cannot be set down to any historical occasion. The self and not-self are eternal verities, and have a parallel existence. The relation between them is unreal and there is no reason why it should occur at all. But it is a question of fact and not of reason. The illusion of identity, which is called, in the favourite Sāṅkhya terminology, *aviveka* or non-discrimination, also is an uncaused fact. It is a source of gratification and comfort that it is liable to be destroyed by *viveka-khyāti* or the realization of difference. The reason for the illusion being called *aviveka-khyāti* seems to be due to the antithesis between *viveka-khyāti* 'the realization of difference' and the negation of it in illusion. As a matter of fact all who believe in the possibility of error, however variously they may interpret it, must admit that non-discrimination of the subject and the predicate is the condition of it. The illusion of identity is the result of non-discrimination. It is not therefore wide of the mark to describe error as non-discrimination, because without it no error is possible, and because in every case of error it is immanent.

In the *Sāṅkhyasūtra*¹ error is called *sad-asat-khyāti* because the predicate is real taken by itself, and the reality of the subject is universally acknowledged; but though both the subject and the predicate are true, the contradiction of the error proves that the predicate is falsely attributed to the subject. In other words, the relation between the predicate and the subject is unreal in the context. The theory seems to be the analogue of the theory of Vācaspati Miśra as propounded by him in the *Tātparyatīkā*. He also regards the terms to be real, though the relation is not so.

As regards the characterization of the Yoga theory of error as *anyathākhyāti* thinking the predicate to be a mental fact by Vijnānabhikṣu we are not quite sure of the correctness, both traditional and logical, of the theory. We must take it as Vijnānabhikṣu's interpretation. The elaborate attempt made by Vijnānabhikṣu to prove that it is different from the *aviveka-khyāti* attributed to the Sāṅkhya school has been shown by us to be not necessarily warranted by the texts. Furthermore, it has been ignored by Vijnānabhikṣu that *aviveka* in the sense of non-discrimination is the universal condition of error and as such can be accepted without prejudice to their metaphysical commitments by all schools of philosophy including the Nyāya realists and the Vedāntist illusionists. We think it safe not to attempt to classify it under any of the recognized theories of error, because the original authoritative works have not expressed their predilection for anyone of them. One thing is certain, namely, that the Sāṅkhya or the Yoga theory of error is not the same as Prabhākara's theory which denies the very possibility of error.

We have now finished our enquiry about the Sāṅkhya conception of *avidyā*. When this *avidyā* disappears knowledge becomes perfect. And this perfect knowledge leads to final emancipation of the soul. The soul then shines in its own splendour. Īśvarakṛṣṇa describes *kevala-jñāna* (perfect knowledge) and *kaivalya* (final emancipation) in the following terms: 'By constant exercise in the knowledge of truth and due to the absence of nescience (*viparyaya*) there arises such pure (*viśuddha*), perfect (*kevala*) and complete knowledge as 'not am, not mine, not I'. By such knowledge the *puruṣa*, self-possessed and like an onlooker, witnesses the *prakṛti* made barren and devoid of the seven forms¹ because of the fulfilment of the (twofold) purpose (of the *puruṣa*). The one i.e. *puruṣa* is indifferent because of the knowledge 'She (i.e. *prakṛti*) has been seen by me' and the other (i.e. *prakṛti*) retires because of the knowledge 'I am seen'. And there is no more the condition of creation even though the two exist side by side. Thus in final realization *prakṛti* stands disenchanted before the *puruṣa* who is disabused of his illusion. On *dharma* etc.² having been deprived of the conditions (of their existence) because of the attainment of perfect knowledge, the *puruṣa* remains embodied (for some time) due to the residual traces (of *dharma* etc.) just like the revolution of a wheel due to impetus (even after the real force has been withdrawn). And with the shuffling off of the mortal coil, the *prakṛti* retires on the fulfilment of her purpose, and *puruṣa* attains *kaivalya* (final emancipation).

¹ The seven forms are: *dharma*, *adharma*, *ajñāna*, *vairāgya*, *avairāgya*, *aiśvarya* and *anaiśvarya*. The eighth form is *jñāna* which disappears last of all.

² The reference is to the eight bhāvas of *dharma*, *adharma*, *jñāna*, *ajñāna*, *vairāgya*, *avairāgya*, *aiśvarya* and *anaiśvarya*.

absolute and eternal.¹ The *kaivalya* or emancipation of the self is rather a rediscovery of its own nature, and not the acquisition of unprecedented condition or the relinquishment of a real limitation.

Let us now turn to the Nyāya conception of *avidyā*.

IV

AVIDYĀ IN THE NYĀYA SCHOOL

This school does not believe in blind teleology of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga. The soul itself is responsible for its bondage. Although it is as ubiquitous and eternal as the soul of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, it possesses the non-eternal qualities of consciousness, desire etc. much in the same way as the material substance possesses colour, taste, smell, etc. The *Nyāyasūtra* enumerates the following as the specific qualities of the soul: desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and knowledge.² Besides these, the qualities of *dharma* (merit) and *adharma* (demerit), jointly designated as *samskāra* (trace), are also recognized as the uncommon characteristics of the soul. These two accrue respectively from the morally good and bad actions of the organ of speech, mind and body. They inhere in the soul and condition the creation of a new body in the next birth out of the material elements.³ In addition to these, there are a number of defects (*doṣas*) that are classified into three groups viz. *rāga* (attachment), *dveṣa* (aversion) and *moha* (delusion).⁴ Of these three, *moha* (delusion) is the most debasing, inasmuch as it is the root of the other two.⁵ *Moha* is *mithyājñāna* (wrong assessment of values).⁶ Vātsyāyana says: 'The pleasant thoughts of objects cause *rāga* (attachment) and the painful thoughts of objects cause *dveṣa* (aversion). Both these thoughts, being of the nature of wrong assessment of values, are not different from *moha* (delusion). The two viz. *rāga* (attachment) and *dveṣa* (aversion) spring from *moha* (delusion).'⁷ *Moha* lies at the root of *rāga* and *dveṣa*. These three *doṣas* (defects) goad one to action, good or bad, pleasant or painful. In other words, *doṣa* leads to *pravṛtti* (volitional activity),⁸ that is, the threefold action of the organ of speech, mind, and body.⁹ *Dharma* (merit) and

¹ *SKā*, 64-68.

² *icchā-dveṣa-pryatna-sukha-duḥkha-jñānāny ātmāno liṅgam*—*NS*, I. 1. 10. These characteristics are uncommon signs which prove the existence of soul and as such are considered as the specific qualities of it. See *Bhāṣya* and *Vṛtti*.

³ See *NS*, III. 2. 61 and *Bhāṣya*.

⁴ *Ibid.*, IV. 1. 2-3.

⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, IV. 1. 6.

⁶ See *Bhāṣya* on *NS*, IV. 1. 3.

⁷ *viṣayēṣu rājanīyāḥ saṅkalpā rāga-hetavāḥ, kopanīyāḥ saṅkalpā dveṣa-hetavāḥ, ubhaye ca saṅkalpā na mithyā-pratipatti-lakṣaṇatvān mohād anye, tāv imau moha-yoni rāga-dveṣāv iti*—*Bhāṣya*, *NS*, IV. 1. 6.

⁸ Cf. *NS*, I. 1. 18 with *Bhāṣya*.

⁹ See *NS*, I. 1. 17.

adharma (demerit) accrue from this *pravṛtti*. Now this *pravṛtti* qua *dharma* and *adharma* together with the *doṣas* produce the feelings of pleasure and pain as well as their conditions such as the body, sense-organs, sense-objects and consciousness. These products are repeatedly accepted as well as rejected and the process has no end till the soul is emancipated. The worldly life (*loka*) is carried on by the current of this ceaseless process of acceptance and rejection.¹ *Mithyājñāna* (wrong assessment of values), *doṣa* (defects), *pravṛtti* (volitional activity), *janma* (birth) and *duḥkha* (suffering) are the recurring links of the chain of worldly life (*samsāra*).²

Thus the primal and most fundamental condition of the worldly career punctuated by birth and death in unbroken succession is delusion or perverted belief which accepts the evil for the good and rejects the good for the evil masquerading as good. Under the influence of this overpowering passion the soul identifies itself with the psycho-physical organism and the external environment and develops love and hatred, sympathy and antipathy, desire and aversion for whatever is found to be conducive or otherwise to the temporary well-being of its embodied existence. The body may be gross or subtle according as its material varies, but the result is the same viz. its limitation to the little environment in which it is placed. The besetting sin of worldly career is that the self does not distinguish itself from the body and thus develops an inordinate love for what is pleasant and useful to the body and antipathy for what is harmful and unpleasant. The embodied existence necessarily generates a possessive impulse and goads the soul to acquire the good things of the earth. This love of property eventually leads to faction and feud when a competitor arrives to contest the claim. These worldly activities which absorb all the interest of the person produce in their turn merit and demerit according as the activities are good or bad. Disinterested service of fellow creatures generates religious merit and the opposite course of action produces religious demerit. These again necessitate the fresh birth in a new body and environment which are calculated to produce the consequences of the moral values acquired in the past lives. But as this fresh life again is also the occasion for the acquisition of fresh merit and demerit, it invariably leads to another birth. Birth means enjoyment and suffering, growth and decay, and lastly death which is nothing but the dissolution of the physical body. So the worldly career necessarily entails suffering and pain. It may be disputed whether the balance of happiness is greater than unhappiness. But Indian philosophers have unanimously condemned worldly career, because it is not one of

¹ See *NS*, I. 1. 20 with *Bhāṣya*.

² Cf. ta ime mithyājñānādayo duḥkhāntā dharmā avicchedenai 'va pravartamānāḥ samsāra iti—*Bhāṣya*, *NS*, I. 1. 2.

unalloyed happiness. Even if it be granted that the proportion of pleasure is greater than that of pain, yet the very fact that pain is unavoidable shows that worldly career cannot be regarded as a perfect condition of life. It is the supreme prerogative of the soul, whether encased in a human or divine body, that it is not satisfied permanently with anything short of a state of existence free from all taint of suffering and pain. It is this divine discontent with the relative values that augurs for the realization of perfection. This perfection free from the shackles of the not-self is the final salvation of the soul, which is achieved when the soul entirely overcomes and transcends delusion (*mithyājñāna*).

Now what is the nature of this delusion and how is it responsible for the metempsychosis (*samsāra*)? Explaining the nature of this delusion and describing the origin of the metempsychosis, Vātsyāyana says: 'Delusion (*mithyājñāna*) consists in mistaking the not-self for the self. It is a false belief (*moha*) of the form 'I am the body'. It is egoism (*ahamkāra*) which consists in looking upon the not-self as identical with the real self. What are the contents of this ego-consciousness? It is the body, sense-organs, mind, feeling and cognitions, in one word, the psycho-physical appurtenance which is felt as identical with the self. Why is this ego-consciousness, that is to say, the self's identification with what is not-self the cause of the unbroken chain of births and deaths? The soul develops the conviction that it is none other than the body, sense-organs etc. and consequently is constantly obsessed with the fear of self-annihilation on the annihilation of the body and its concomitant organs and faculties. The self cannot think that it is immortal in its own right and because of its identification with the mortal body is perpetually tormented by the fear of death. The soul, therefore, seeks to preserve the body from death by all means. But this clinging to the body in spite of its inevitable end leads to the recurrence of a fresh life in a fresh body and consequent death. The reason for this is that a deep-rooted desire (*vāsanā*) cannot go unsatisfied. The desire for the body is satisfied not by the preservation of the previous one because of its mortality, but by the acquisition of a fresh body. And this means the perpetuation of the worldly career.'¹

We have seen that delusion which induces perverted belief is the

¹ kiṁ punas tan mithyā-jñānam? anātmānā ātmagrahah, aham asmī 'ti moho 'haṁkāra iti. anātmānān khaly aham asmī 'ti paśyato dṛṣṭir ahaṁkāra iti. kiṁ punas tad arthajātam yadviśayo 'haṁkārah? śarirendriya-mano-vedanā-buddhayaḥ. katham tadviśayo 'haṁkārah samsāra-bijam bhavati? ayam khalu śārīrādyartha-jātam aham asmī 'ti vyavasitas taducchedenā "tmocchedanā manyamāno 'nuccheda-tṛṣṇāpariplutah punah punas tad upādatte, tad upādā-dāno janma-maraṇaya yata, tenā 'vyiogān nā 'tyantam duḥkhād vimucyata iti—Introductory *Bhāṣya*, *NS*, IV. 2. 1.

fountain-head of worldly career. We have also seen how this primal nescience, like the Christian counterpart of Original Sin, produces all sorts of evils. The supreme evil is the ego-consciousness which works like the hydra-headed monster. It generates love and hatred and lastly delusion which consists in thinking what is unwholesome as wholesome. The ego-consciousness is not confined to the self but embraces not-self as well. It is the outcome of the identification of the self with not-self beginning with the physical organism which encases it and ending with the external objects which produce feelings of pleasure and pain. This mistaken identity with the body and the senses and the objects of experience is made possible by the idea that they belong exclusively to the self. The material objects are thought to be its exclusive property by the deluded self though they are experienced and enjoyed by all persons without distinction. The external objects by themselves are not an evil. It is only when they are invested with false values by the deluded self that they become a potent source of bondage. The self develops love and attraction for the external objects including the body because it is deluded into thinking that they serve to promote its well-being. It is this belief in the intrinsic value of these brute material facts which are neither pleasant nor unpleasant without a self to contemplate them in these terms, that makes them a snare and a trap for the self.¹ They induce attachment when they are believed to be pleasant and useful and produce revulsion and antipathy when they are conceived to be hostile to the self. The utility or hostility of the sense-data is a matter of false belief fostered by a long-drawn delusion which has been the companion of the soul from beginningless time. The delusion can be removed only by the proper appraisement of the intrinsic nature of the objects as they are without reference to the psychical reactions they are found to produce. When the self dispassionately contemplates these objects as brute facts which have no emotional or volitional satisfaction then the self will cease to be drawn by them. The body, for instance, is an exceedingly unlovable object. It is a mass of flesh and bones and blood, which should by themselves have no charm. It is subject to illness and decay and is bound to be dissolved into its elements by the operation of inexorable physiological and biological laws. It is impure, unclean and ungainly. This is no less true of one's own body than of other objects. But the fundamental and basic ignorance which forms, as it were, the original capital of the worldly existence of the self leads it astray and induces it to ascribe false values to things of experience. Beauty is one such value. Thus when a person looks at a member of the opposite sex he does not think that the human body is a mass of flesh and blood and bones. On the contrary he thinks that the person

¹ Cf. dośanimittam rūpādayo viśayāḥ saṅkalpakṛtāḥ—NS, IV. 2. 2.

is a beautiful damsel whose intimate association and friendship will satisfy all his desires and wants. The same is the case with a woman regarding a man. The human body ought to have no charm for a wise man who can size up things and appraise them at their proper value. It is the fool who is deluded into thinking that not only the body of the man or the woman, but even several parts of the same such as the teeth or the nose or the eyes have got a special fascination. But the wise man will analyse the human body into its component parts and will see in it nothing but flesh, blood, bone, tendons, veins, bile, phlegm and excreta. Viewed in this perspective the whole thing appears to be disenchanted and by its sheer ugliness will repel a prospective lover. So ultimately it is the self which is responsible for its station in life, whether it is free or in bondage. The original sin of ignorance which is responsible for so many and various perversities of our beliefs and dispositions and tastes must be got rid of. And the only antidote of this masterful malady is the knowledge of reality of self and not-self in their proper and true character.

Now a question arises. But is knowledge of reality possible of achievement? If knowledge of reality means knowledge of any particular individual thing and if this be regarded as the instrument of salvation, then there will be no living creature in bondage, because everyone has got true knowledge of something or other. It must, therefore, be accepted that knowledge of reality means knowledge of the entire range of reality, that is, of each and every real that may exist. This is a covetable state no doubt. But it is not possible for ordinary mortals with their thousand and one limitations and imperfections to achieve this infinite knowledge. Infinite knowledge presupposes infinite life and unlimited opportunities for self-culture and the compresence of all the conditions of knowledge. But we do not see, however lucky a person may be, he can command all these resources. Our span of life is limited and that even frequently punctuated with illness, worries and various sorts of wants and tribulations which make the pursuit of knowledge an exceedingly difficult task. So we find that only one man is really learned and wise in a million. So knowledge of reality in its entire range and scope is only a counsel of perfection. If, on the other hand, it is conceded that a person acquires true knowledge of a limited number of things, it is possible to argue that he will have no delusion with regard to these objects and he will be free to that extent. Freedom after all is spiritual, and such spiritual and intellectual freedom can be bestowed by knowledge no doubt. But this limited freedom is not true salvation which is the goal and consummation of our aspiration. A person may lose all illusion regarding things he knows. But as regards things unknown, and their name is Legion, he will be subject to delusion and

attachment and aversion, and consequently to the full catalogue of worries and tribulations that are attendant upon ignorance. The remedy prescribed by the philosophers of the Nyāya school thus transpires to be a false hope, the will-o'-the-wisp, which will for ever elude the aspirant. Thus the remedy is more intractable than the disease.

In reply to this formidable criticism, Uddyotakara, following Vātsyāyana, asserts that the difficulty proceeds from a fundamental misconception of the nature of knowledge of reality and of the nature of delusion. Delusion is not equivalent to negation of knowledge, but it means false knowledge and false belief. Now we shall have to consider what sort of delusion is the cause of bondage which is exemplified by worldly life. It is delusion regarding the true nature of a limited number of reals such as the self, the body etc., that is responsible for our bondage. So it is the correct knowledge of these reals and the correct appraisement of their values which will put an end to our ignorance and the consequential emotional and volitional perversions. And thus our worldly career and the ties which bind us down to the miserable condition of life will be snapped asunder. As has been said more than once, the primal source of our misery is our ignorance of the nature of our own self and our perverted identification of the self with the not-self. It is not an impossible task to acquire this knowledge even with the aid of our limited resources.

The worldly career of a soul, therefore, means identification of the soul with the material product such as the body. So long as the soul does not become conscious of this false identification, it remains in bondage. But how can the soul become conscious of its own separate identity? How can it comprehend that the world does not belong to it? In other words, how is the knowledge of truth possible? The *Nyāyasūtra* says: 'It is possible by the practice of a particular kind of meditation and ecstasy (by means of the concentration of mind).'¹ Mere logical disquisition or philosophical understanding is not sufficient for realizing the truth. The soul has to exert itself for its realization. The mind is to be forcibly removed from the sense-organs, and kept in conjunction with the soul with ardent desire to know the truth. This is meditation or ecstasy (*samādhi*).² It is the result of the accumulated strength of endeavours spread over countless number of lives in the past.³ The soul progressively gains strength and gradually becomes capable of more and more successful meditation and ecstasy. The

¹ *samādhi-viśeṣābhyaśāt*—*NS*, IV. 2. 38.

² Cf. *sa tu (samādhi-veśeṣāḥ) pratyāhṛtasye 'ndriyebhyo manaso dhārakeṇa prayatnena dhāryamāṇasyā 'tmanā samyogas tattvabubhutsā-viśiṣṭāḥ*—*Bhāṣya*, *NS*, IV. 2. 38.

³ Cf. *pūrvakṛta-phalā-'nubandhāt tadutpattiḥ*—*NS*, IV. 2. 41.

Nyāyasūtra also prescribes mental and physical discipline in the shape of restraint of the external activity of the senses and mind for the purification of the soul.¹ The truth is also to be known from and discussed with the wise by means of questions and answers. It is to be sedulously nurtured and guarded at least in the initial stages from the wanton attacks of sceptics and unbelievers. If the opponents possess superior intellectual resources and if the votary of truth is found unequal to disarm the critic, it is sanctioned by the logical code of the Naiyāyika that the opponent should be gagged into silence even by resort to disputation and wrangling,² though they may not be unexceptionable forms of debate. It is to be understood that these devices are adopted by an elderly person who does not wish that the spiritual career of the neophyte should be upset by the onslaughts of designing persons whose sophistical arguments he finds himself unable to refute. When the truth is thus known and realized, the soul gets rid of nescience or delusion (*mithyājñāna*). The *Nyāyasūtra* prescribes the practice of both ecstasy (*samādhi*) and pursuit of knowledge (*jñāna*) for the realization of the truth. If the practice in philosophical pursuit illumines the path, the practice in meditation and ecstasy leads to the attainment of the goal. When the knowledge of truth dawns upon the soul, the nescience or delusion ceases to exist. Describing the process of the cessation of the worldly life, the *Nyāyasūtra* says: 'Apavarga (final emancipation) is attained when of these (factors) viz. *duḥkha* (suffering), *janma* (birth), *pravṛtti* (merits and demerits born of volitional activities),³ *doṣas* (defects) and *mithyājñāna* (nescience or delusion)—the preceding one ceases on the cessation of the succeeding one.'⁴ With the cessation of nescience, defects i.e. the evil predispositions such as attachment cease. With the cessation of defects merits and demerits cease. With the cessation of merits and demerits, birth and death cease. With the cessation of birth and death, misery and suffering cease. With the cessation of birth the body ceases and how can the suffering exist when the instrument of suffering and misery viz. the body and the like has ceased to exist? This absolute cessation of suffering and misery is called final emancipation (*apavarga*).⁵

We have now related in brief the conception of the nature and function of nescience in the Nyāya school. Let us now turn to the Vaiśeṣika school.

¹ See *NS*, IV. 2. 46.

² See *NS*, IV. 2. 47-51.

³ *Pravṛtti* means action, good and bad. But, according to Vātsyāyana, here it means dharma and adharma which accrue from those actions. See *Bhāṣya*, *NS*, I. 1. 2.

⁴ *duḥkha-janma-pravṛtti-doṣa-mithyā-jñānānām* *uttarottarāpāye tadanantarā-pāyād apavargah*—*NS*, I. 1. 2.

⁵ *tadat�anta-vimokṣo 'pavargah*—*NS*, I. 1. 22.

V

AVIDYĀ IN THE VAISEŠIKA SCHOOL

This school did not develop any separate conception of nescience (*avidyā*). The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* is mainly busy with the examination of the generic and specific characteristics of the categories and refers to the problem of knowledge only incidentally. At the outset it proposes to examine the nature of *dharma* (religious merit)¹ which it then defines as what conditions the attainment of well-being and final emancipation.² The scripture (*āmnāya*) is held valid because it speaks of *dharma*.³ Final emancipation is due to the true knowledge (of the categories), born of *dharma*.⁴ After this brief statement about *dharma* and its instrumentality for final emancipation through the knowledge of truth, the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* suddenly proceeds to divide, define, and examine the categories and their sub-categories. It comes back to the problem of *dharma* only in the sixth chapter where, very briefly, some features of *dharma* are considered. Again from the seventh chapter onward it plunges into its main theme of examination of the nature of the categories and the sub-categories and, curiously enough, reverts to the problem of *dharma* only in the last two *sūtras* of the last *āhnika* (lecture) of the last chapter. The main purpose of the *Sūtra* thus is not the examination of *dharma*, although the author pledges at the outset that he would examine *dharma*.⁵ It is difficult to ascertain the reason why the author did not redeem his pledge. The examination of *dharma* is the subject of the *Mīmāṃsā* school and it seems anomalous why the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* should propose to examine it. This anomaly becomes still more puzzling when we find that the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* gives so little attention to the topic of *dharma* which ought to have been given a very important position in view of the initial enunciation of the *Sūtra*. But we can hazard a guess. The author of the *Sūtra* seems enamoured of the *Mīmāṃsā* conceptions of *dharma* (religious merit) and *adṛṣṭa* (unseen religious potency) which he utilizes so frequently for the explanation of apparently unexplainable phenomena, both natural and supernatural.⁶ Many controversial metaphysical problems are settled by reference to the *Vedas*.⁷ Such ultimate issues as the initial motion of the atoms and the minds after universal dissolutions

¹ athā 'to dharmām vyākhyāsyāmaḥ—VS, I. 1. 1.

² yato 'bhyudaya-niḥśreyasa-siddhiḥ sa dharmāḥ—VS, I. 1. 2.

³ VS, I. 1. 3.

⁴ Cf. *dharma-viśeṣa-prasūtād dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyā-nām padārthānām sādharmya-vaidharmyābhyañān tattvajñānān niḥśreyasam*—VS, I. 1. 4.

⁵ About *adṛṣṭa* cf. VS, V. 1. 15; V. 2. 2, 7. 13. 17. About *dharma* cf. IV. 2. 7; IX. 2. 9.

⁶ Cf. VS, II. 1. 17; III. 2. 21; IV. 2. 11; V. 2. 10.

and the attainment of the knowledge of truth are held as due to *adrṣṭa* and *dharma*.¹ Besides this, the *Sūtra* refers to some Vedic rites for the acquisition of *adrṣṭa*.² In view of such importance of the conception of *dharma* for the exposition of philosophical problems dealt with in the treatise, it was not unnatural that the author should propose *dharma* as the main theme of it and accept the validity of the Vedic Scripture (*āmnāya*) that contained it. Religious potency (*adrṣṭa*) lies at the root of creation and if the creation is beginningless, the potency also is beginningless. It is this potency which is responsible for new creations after dissolutions. The *Sūtra* does not define *adrṣṭa* and this is perhaps due to the fact that its meaning was well known at that time. The Vedic rites have results, immediate or remote, known or unknown. Where the result is not immediate and known it should be regarded as remote and unknown prosperity.³ Such performances as ablution, fasting, celibacy, living at preceptor's house for study of the scriptures, and the like produce religious potency.⁴ These rites and duties of the fourfold stages of life (*āśramas*), moral degradations and their opposites also produce *adrṣṭa*.⁵ One sets to perform good and bad actions resulting in merit and demerit impelled by desire for gain and hatred for loss.⁶

Both *dharma* and *adharma* produce *adrṣṭa*. The terms *dharma* and *adharma* are also used in the sense of *adrṣṭa*,⁷ that is, the result produced by *dharma* and *adharma*. *Dharma* and *adharma* quā cause are respectively identical with the rites and duties prescribed by the Vedic injunctions and their violations while *dharma* and *adharma* quā effect are respectively identical with the result of those rites and duties and their violations. In other words, *dharma* and *adharma* quā effect are *adrṣṭa*. It is in these senses that the terms *adrṣṭa*, *dharma* and *adharma* are used in this treatise. The relevant meanings are to be understood with reference to the context. After this digression let us come to our subject proper viz. the problem of *avidyā*.

We have stated at the outset that the Vaiśešika school did not develop its own theory of *avidyā*. The Nyāya school had great influence on the development of the Vaiśešika school and in later times

¹ VS, V. 2. 13; I. 1. 4.

² VS, VI. 2. 2.

³ Cf. *drṣṭādṛṣṭa-prayojanānām drṣṭābhāve prayojanam abhyudayāya*—VS,

VI. 2. 1.

⁴ *abhiṣecanopavāsa-brahmacarya-gurukulavāsa-vānaprastha-yajña-dāna - pro-kṣaṇa-diṇnakṣatra-mantrakālaniyamāś cā 'drṣṭāya*—VS, VI. 2. 2.

⁵ *cātūrāśramyam upadhā anupadhāś ca*, VI. 2. 3. The next sūtra defines upadhā as *bhavadoṣa* and *anupadhā* as *adoṣa*.

⁶ *icchā-dveṣa-pūrvikā dharmādharmayoh pravṛttih*—VI. 2. 14. *Upaskāra*, however, interprets the sūtra in a different way. The interpretation can be summed up as *icchā-dveṣa-pūrvikā pravṛttih dharmā-dharmayoh kāraṇam*.

⁷ See IV. 2. 7; IX. 2. 9.

both the schools coalesced, and consequently developed a common theory. But let us collect together the relevant materials that are in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, and see their implication. The *Padārtha-dharma-saṅgraha* (also known as *Praśastapādabhāṣya*) of Ācārya Praśastapāda is an excellent rearrangement and interpretation of the topics of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, and is of great value for the understanding of the original *Sūtra*. Our enquiry accordingly will be based on these two works. The enquiry of the whole chapter has limited itself to the most original sources, and as such it is proposed to withstand the influence of the later developments and innovations as much as possible.

The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* recognizes two kinds of cognition *viz.* *vidyā* (right cognition) and *avidyā* (wrong cognition).¹ Of these, the right cognition is divided into four sub-classes *viz.* perceptual (*pratyakṣa*),² inferential (*laiṅgika*),³ recollection (*smṛti*)⁴ and supernormal spiritual intuition (*ārṣa-jñāna*).⁵ The wrong cognition, on the other hand, is subdivided into fourfold species *viz.* doubt (*samśaya*), perverted cognition (*viparyaya* or *avidyā*), indecision (*anadhyavasāya*) and dream-cognition (*svapna*).⁶ We shall not discuss the conceptions of all these topics, our main interest being limited to the conception of wrong cognition (*avidyā*). The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* says that *avidyā* is due to the defects of sense-organs and the perverted influence of the memory-impressions.⁷ Praśastapāda refers to *avidyā* by the term *viparyaya* which he recognizes to be of two kinds *viz.* perceptual and inferential.⁸ He defines *viparyaya* as cognition of the form 'It is A' with regard to what is other than A⁹, and enumerates the following as the conditions of such erroneous cognition: (1) blurred vision of two objects possessed of many well-known distinctive features by one whose sense-organs are overpowered by the bodily humours in disorder, (2) conjunction of soul and mind accompanied with the (awakened) memory-impression produced (in the past) by the past cognition of an object not present (at the time), and (3) religious demerit (*adharma*).¹⁰ For instance, the

¹ *VS*, IX, 2. 10-12. We are treating the subject on the basis of *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, although we have referred to the original *Sūtra* as far as possible.

² Cf. *VS*, VIII. I. 4-11; about yogi-pratyakṣa see IX. I. 11-15. For the terms *pratyakṣa* and *laiṅgika* see X. I. 3.

³ Cf. IX. 2. 1-5; III. I. 7-17.

⁴ IX. 2. 6.

⁵ IX. 2. 13.

⁶ See *PB*, p. 520; see *VS*, II. 2. 17-20 (*samśaya*); IX. 2. 10 (*avidyā*); IX. 2. 7 (*svapna*).

⁷ indriyadoṣāt saṁskārādoṣāc cā 'vidyā—*VS*, IX. 2. 10.

⁸ *viparyayo* 'pi *pratyakṣanumāna-viṣaya* eva bhavati—*PB*, p. 538.

⁹ atasmīn tad iti *pratyayo* *viparyayaḥ*—*PB*, p. 538.

¹⁰ *prasiddhāneka-viśeṣayoh* pitta-kaphānilopahatendriyasya ayathārthālocaṇād asannihita-viṣayajñānaja-saṁskārāpekṣād ātmamanasoh saṁyogād adharmāc ca—*PB*, p. 538.

misperception of a cow for a horse. A cow is possessed of many well-known distinctive features that can easily differentiate it from a horse. But due to the defects of the sense-organs, one can have a blurred vision wherein a cow is wrongly intuited as a horse. This intuition is further strengthened by the stimulation of a past memory-impression of a horse, and the result is a full-fledged cognition of a horse. Religious demerit also plays its part in the production of error. This is an instance of perceptual error. The wrong inference of fire from vapour mistaken for smoke is given as an instance of inferential error. The miscomprehension of body, sense-organs and mind as the self is also a case of wrong or perverted cognition (*viparyaya*). In one word, perverted cognition consists in mistaking one thing for another. This conception is identical with the conception of the Nyāya school.

We are perhaps beating about the bush. The fact is that the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* or even Praśastapāda does not put forth the basic problem in clear terms, although it is clearly implied in their expositions. We have indulged in this apparently irrelevant digression in order to make the background of the Vaiśeṣika thought clear and vivid in order to see its implication. We shall now refer to the statement of Praśastapāda on worldly life and emancipation (*apavarga*), which will clearly show the Vaiśeṣika attitude towards the problem of ultimate nescience. But before that we shall refer to the very brief account of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* itself about *samsāra* and *mokṣa*. The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* says that one acquires *dharma* and *adharma* by one's actions inspired by desire and hatred, and that these *dharma* and *adharma* are responsible for the cycle of birth and death.¹ *Adṛṣṭa* is responsible for the conjunction of soul, sense-organs, mind, and the sense-objects, and this conjunction is responsible for the experience of pleasure and pain,² which is an essential factor of worldly life. When the external activity of the mind is stopped and it is in undisturbed union with the soul, there is absence of pain, and this is called *yoga* which may mean either the arrestation of mental activity or the self-possession of the spirit.³ But so long as the last vestiges of *adṛṣṭa* are not destroyed, there cannot be final emancipation. The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* says 'Absence of conjunction of the soul with the body, and the non-origination of new body on the exhaustion of *adṛṣṭa* is *mokṣa* (final emancipation).'⁴ The *Sūtra* also refers to the transcendental knowledge born of meditation (*samādhi*).⁵ Praśastapāda puts this Vaiśeṣika position tinged, of

¹ See *VS*, VI. 2. 14-15.

² Cf. ātmendriya-mano-'rtha-sannikarṣat sukhaduhkhe—V. 2. 15.

³ tadanārambha ātmasthe manasi śarīrasya duḥkhābhāvah sa yogah—

V. 2. 16.

⁴ tadabhāve saṁyogābhāvo 'prādurbhāvaś ca mokṣah.—V. 2. 18.

⁵ See IX. I. 11-15. See also *PB*, p. 553: asmadviśiṣṭānām tu yoginām.

course, with Purāṇic ideas developed in between the time, in the following terms :

‘ A soul under the sway of nescience (*avidyā*) and possessed of attachment and hatred gets covetable body, sense-organs, sense-objects, pleasure etc. according to the forces of its past actions (*āśaya*) in the different worlds of the Creator (Brahman), the gods, the Prajāpati, the manes (*pitṛs*) and human beings, due to abundant creative religious merit¹ in conjunction with a little of demerit. On the other hand, due to abundant religious demerit in conjunction with a little of merit, it gets an uncovetable body, sense-organs, sense-objects, pain etc. in the worlds of devils (*pretas*) and brutes. Thus due to creative merit in conjunction with demerit, the worldly life continues unceasingly with repeated births among gods, men, animals and denizens of hell.

‘ But due to emancipative² merit acquired with full comprehension (of truth) and without any desire for result, one is born in a pure family, with ardent desire to know the means of ending (all) pain. He approaches a master and is enlightened with the knowledge of the true nature of the six categories. Thus his nescience is eliminated, and he becomes free from attachment. Now because of the absence of attachment and aversion, new *dharma* and *adharma*, owing their existence to them, do no more accrue, while the stored ones are exhausted by ‘ enjoyment ’. After this, on the cessation of attachment and the like, the pure emancipatory *dharma*,³ causing happiness of contentment and non-attachment to the body, itself ceases by producing joy born of the intuition of the supreme reality *viz.* the soul.⁴ Then due to the cessation of all merit and demerit, the body and the organs of the self with all the seeds of worldly life parched and exhausted fall apart. And there being no more origination of new body and the like, there is final emancipation much like the final extinction of fire which has consumed all its fuel.⁵

The soul is now bereft of all its specific qualities which derived their genesis from the conjunction of the soul with the mind, which is the starting point of worldly career. Emancipation is absolute and eternal quiescence.

¹ *pravartakād dharmāt* has been translated as ‘ due to creative *dharma* ’.

² *nivartaka*.

³ *nivṛttīlakṣaṇāḥ kevalo dharmāḥ*.

⁴ *paramārtha-darśanajām sukham kṛtvā nivartate*. *Vyomavatī* explains this as *paramārthaḥ sarvapadārthānām ātmā, taddarśanājātām paramārtha-darśanajam*. The *Nyāyakandalī* says *paramārthadarśanajam ātmadarśanajam*.

⁵ *PB*, pp. 643-44: *aviduṣo rāgadveṣavataḥ . . . mokṣa iti.*

VI

AVIDYĀ IN THE VEDĀNTA SCHOOL

In this section, our enquiry will be confined to the *Upaniṣads* and the works of *Gaudapāda* and *Śaṅkara*. The seeds of the *Vedānta* conception of *avidyā* and *māyā* can be traced in the *Upaniṣads*, and as such we shall refer to those passages of the *Upaniṣads* where the traces of the conception are apparent. *Gaudapāda*, in his *Āgamaśāstra*, developed the conception, and finally *Śaṅkara* unfolded its implications and made a consistent theory of it. We shall not refer to the post-*Śaṅkara* developments in view of the limited scope of our enquiry. We shall deal only with the most salient features of the problem and avoid the subtle dialectics on which *Śaṅkara* based his theory. Our treatment thus will in no sense be full or complete, not to speak of its perfection.

Let us begin with the *Upaniṣads*. The ultimate reality, according to the *Upaniṣads*, is devoid of all plurality, and it is only perverted outlook that is responsible for our perception of plurality. The *Upaniṣads* denounce plurality in the strongest possible terms. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* says 'By the mind alone is *it* to be comprehended. There is in *it* no plurality. He who sees any semblance of plurality in *it* goes from death to death.'¹ Plurality is only apparent. One goes from death to death, that is, one is subject to birth and death, so long as one does not cease seeing plurality. The cycle of birth and death ceases only when oneness is realized. The *Īśā* *Upaniṣad* says: 'But one who sees all things in the self and the self in all things is not repulsed by it because of the realization of truth. When to him, who knows, the self has become all things, how can any more there be delusion and sorrow for him who sees oneness?'² Delusion and sorrow, in one word, the worldly life, can appear only if there is perception of plurality. Worldly life ceases when oneness is realized. But what is responsible for this perception of plurality? What is this perversity of vision due to? The world is a fact and a beginningless fact at that. But what does its nature consist in? Why do we see plurality and not the oneness? Why do we see the world and not the basis that sustains it? The *Upaniṣads* are fully conscious of the problems, and also the difficulty of formal enunciation of their answers, and it is

¹ manasai 'vā 'nudraṣṭavyam ne 'ha nānā 'sti kiñcana
mr̥tyoh sa mr̥tyum āpnoti ya iha nānē 'va paśyati.

—*BṛUp*, IV. 4. 19. Also cf. *KaUp*, II. 4. 10-11.

² yas tu sarvāṇi bhūtāny ātmāny evā 'nupaśyati
sarvabhūteṣu cā "tmānam tato na vijugupsate.
yasmin sarvāṇi bhūtāny ātmāi 'vā 'bhūd vijānataḥ
tatra ko mohaḥ kah śoka ekatvam anupaśyataḥ.

—*IUp*, 6-7.

because of this that sometimes they speak in parables. Speaking of the reason why one sees the world and not the self the *Kaṭha* Upaniṣad says: 'Svayambhū (the self-subsistent principle who has all the conditions of self-existence in himself) cut open the out-seeing organs and so one sees outward (*parāṇi*) and not the self inside (*antarātman*). A wise man, however, desirous of immortality sees the inside self with his eye turned away from the external world. The stupid, however, follow the external desires. They enter the outspread trap of death. The wise, however, seeing immortality, the eternal among the non-eternal, do not desire (for any thing) in this world.'¹ Perception of the external and attachment to the world are the legacy handed down by *Svayambhū* and none is responsible for that. But the legacy is not a perpetuity. Nor is it an ultimate truth. One is only to turn away and turn back to get rid of that legacy. This is the teaching of the Upaniṣads. The face of truth is covered by a golden vessel.² We live in truth and yet are ignorant of it. We tread upon truth and yet do not recognize it. The *Chāndogya* says: 'Even as those who are ignorant of the secret contents of the earth do not have access to the hidden store of gold even though they tread upon the surface of it, exactly so all these common people carried away by untruth (*anṛ̥tena pratyūdhāḥ*), even though they daily go there, do not have access to the *Brahmaloka* (region of the *Brahman* or truth).'³ Truth is very near us. We ourselves are truth. One does not know it because one does not care to lift the veil covering it. 'The stupid, falsely considering themselves wise and learned, reside within the fold of *avidyā*, and meet misfortunes running to and fro.'⁴ *Avidyā* is a knot to be cut asunder, and it is not beyond our power to do so. Realization of oneness of the world with the self dispels all darkness. The world has come from *Puruṣa*, the Absolute, and so is identical with It. It has no existence of its own, and as such cannot persist for one who has realized the Absolute, or rather become the Absolute. The *Mundaka* Upaniṣad says: 'The *Puruṣa* is all this—*karman* (sacrifice), *tapas* (austerity) and *Brahman*, the highest immortal. He who knows this as hidden in the cave cuts asunder, O darling, the knot of *avidyā* even (while living) here (in this world).'⁵

¹ parāṇci khāni vyatṛṇat svayambhūḥ
tasmāt parāṇi paśyati nāntarātman.
kaścid dhīraḥ pratyagātmānam aikṣad
āvṛ̥ta-cakṣur amṛ̥tatvam icchan.
parācaḥ kāmān anuyanti bālās
te mṛ̥tyor yanti vitatasya pāśam
atha dhrī amṛ̥tatvam vīditvā
dhruvam adhruveṣ iha na prār̥thayante.

—*KUp*, II. 4. 1-2.

² hiraṇmayena pātreṇa sātyasyā 'pihitām mukham.—*IUp*, 15.

³ *ChUp*, VIII. 3. 2.

⁴ *KUp*, I. 2. 5.

⁵ *MuUp*, II. 1. 10.

Now let us see the Upaniṣadic conception of *māyā*. In the *Rgveda*, wherever the word *māyā* occurs it is used only to signify the might or the power. Indra takes many shapes quickly by his *māyā*. Yet sometimes *māyā* and its derivatives *māyin* and *māyāvat* are employed to signify the will of the demons, and we also find the word used in the sense of illusion or show.¹ The *Śvetāśvatara* Upaniṣad conceives *māyā* as the power of the Almighty God. 'The *Māyin* (God) creates all this—the sacred verses, the offerings, the sacrifices, the penances, the past, the future, and all that the Vedas declare—from this (*akṣara* or the immutable one); and the other (i.e. the individual *jīva*) is bound up with that (*akṣara*) through *māyā*. Know that *prakṛti* is *māyā* and *Maheśvara* (the Great Lord) is the *Māyin*. The whole world is filled with what are His members.'² This God spreads His trap and lords it over the world by means of His divine powers.³ The world is one Great *Māyā*. This Cosmic *Māyā* (*viśva-māyā*) can be ended by meditating upon, joining, and finally becoming one with that Great God.⁴ This is what we get about the conception of *māyā* in the Upaniṣads.

To sum up: *Avidyā* is perversity of vision and attachment to the world. *Māyā* is the cosmic force that brings forth the world of plurality. If the *māyā* conditions the universe, *avidyā* keeps one attached to it. There is *māyā* because there is *avidyā*. With the cessation of *avidyā*, *māyā* ceases. The existence of a magician and his art depends upon the existence of their dupes. If there is no dupe there is no art of magic. Let us now see the vicissitudes of this conception in later times.

We now come to Gauḍapāda. The Upaniṣadic conception of reality as beyond reach of mind and intellect had much influence on later Buddhist thought. Nāgārjuna developed the seeds of the Upaniṣadic thoughts into full-fledged dialectic, and criticized every metaphysical concept as untenable and self-contradictory. This dialectic had great influence on the philosophy of Gauḍapāda who utilized the art with much ability. He accepts the logic of Nāgārjuna and applies it to the world and the Upaniṣadic texts alike and thus he gives us for the first time the *philosophy* of the Upaniṣads in the proper sense of the term. He rejected the phenomenal world as illogical and self-contradictory. The doctrine of causality, in all its forms, is found to be untenable and absurd.⁵ We shall not discuss all these problems here, our enquiry being limited to the particular problem of *avidyā*.

¹ *IP*, Vol. I, pp. 103-4.

² *SUḥ*, IV. 9-10.

³ Cf. ya eko jālavān iśata iśanibhiḥ
sarvān lokān iśata iśanibhiḥ.—*Ibid.*, III. 1. Also cf. V. 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I. 10.

⁵ See *ĀŚ*, IV from *kārikā* 3.